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THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

SECTION

341

AND MINING CORPORATIONS
D.

CHARLES HAIR*

INTRODUCTION

The application of the collapsible corporation provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code' to mining corporations is an example of a failure to fully
allow for the inherent differences between mining operations and other kinds
of business ventures. As has been noted elsewhere, 2 the strict application of
section 341 to mining corporations will often have the unfortunate result of
causing such corporations to be treated as collapsible even though the abuses
at which section 341 is directed are not present. This problem was recognized by Congress 3 and remedied to some extent with the enactment of the
escape provisions of section 341(e). The problem, however, still exists.
The purposes of this article will be to describe generally the application
of section 341 to mining corporations, and to provide guidance in dealing
with section 341 problems. It should be noted that there has not been much
of a history involving this problem, so there are often no definitive interpretational answers. A probable reason for the lack of decisions in this area is
that mining ventures are not often incorporated. The individuals involved
are likely to be more interested in taking individual advantage of items such
as exploration and development expenditure deductions and depletion allowances than they are in such corporate advantages as flexibility, limited
liability, and free transferability. Consideration of possible section 341
problems themselves may be still another strong factor discouraging the use
of corporations.
Nonetheless, there will be situations calling for the use of corporations,
and at such times the tax advisor must carefully consider the possible impact
of section 341.
I.

THE COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION ABUSE

The abuse at which section 341 is directed can be illustrated as follows.
Some individuals purchase undeveloped real estate for $100,000, and they
put the real estate into a real estate development corporation in return for
the corporation's stock. Next, the real estate is subdivided and fully developed. As developed, the real estate now has a fair market value of
* Associate, Younge & Hockensmith, Grand Junction, Colorado; B.A., George Washington University; M.A., J.D., University of Michigan; M.L.T., Georgetown University.
I. I.R.C. § 341. All references to regulations are to the Income Tax Regulations.
2. See Hambrick, Collapsible Corporations : Oil and Gas: Does the /958 Act Affbrd Any Relief?,
28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 815 (1960); Cruickshank & Tomlin, 108-2d T.M., Oil and Gas Transactions and Subchapter C (1950), at A-44 ff.
3. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958).
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$1,000,000. If the corporation proceeds to sell lots, the corporation will be
taxed on its income from the sales at ordinary income tax rates.4 Subsequent distributions of income to the individuals will be taxed a second time
as dividends or salary. Even if the shareholders individually develop and sell
5
lots, their gains will be ordinary income.
To avoid both the ordinary income tax rates and the double taxation
possibility, in the absence of section 341, the corporation might liquidate by
distributing the real estate to the individuals in return for their stock. Assuming the corporation has been in existence for twelve months, the individuals now have a long-term capital gain of $900,000 under section 331 (a)(1).
They also obtain a basis in the real estate of the full $1,000,000, so that when
they sell the lots they will not have any additional income unless the sales
bring in more than $1,000,000. In effect, these individuals have converted
what would have been a large amount of ordinary income into long-term
capital gains.
To eliminate this conversion possibility, section 341 was enacted. In the
above example, section 341 would have the effect of causing the $900,000
gain on the liquidation to be treated as ordinary income. 6 Thus, section 341
clearly eliminates the abuses at which it was aimed. As will be seen from the
discussion below, however, section 341 has such wide applicability that it
operates more as a bludgeon than as a scalpel.
II.

GENERAL APPLICABILITY To MINING CORPORATIONS

Basically, section 341 sets forth fairly complicated rules for determining
when a corporation is "collapsible," and provides that shareholder gains
from disposing of their interests in a collapsible corporation will be treated as
ordinary income regardless of the capital gain treatment that would otherwise be available. Because of the broad coverage of the basic definition of
"collapsible corporation," Congress has provided a number of possible escape routes in section 341. It is the escape routes that create most of section
341's complexity, but without the escapes the scope of section 341 would
probably be intolerable.
To make the following discussion more concrete, assume the following
hypothetical fact situation. A has purchased a working interest entitling him
to three-fourths of all the uranium extracted from Tract X. B holds the
remaining one-fourth interest. Tract X is completely unexplored and undeveloped. To obtain funds for mining the uranium they expect to find, A and
B form the Uranium Mining Corporation (Uranium), which will issue 100
shares of stock. A takes 45 shares in return for his interest, while B takes 15
shares. The remaining 40 shares are sold for $1,000 per share to C (20
shares), D (15 shares), and E (5 shares). A, B, C, D, and E are all individuals. Rich uranium deposits are located, development is completed, and ura4. The lots would be "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business" under either I.R.C. § 1221(1) or § 123 1(b)(1)(B), so
that the corporation is a "dealer."
5. I.R.C. §§ 1221(1), 1231(b)(1)(B).
6. Id. § 341(a)(2).
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nium is now being produced. The Giant Uranium Mining Corporation
(Giant) now comes along and offers to buy out Uranium's shareholders at a
breathtaking profit.
Assuming that none of the shareholders are dealers in uranium leases,
there does not appear to be any reason why these shareholders should be
denied capital gains treatment in this situation. If any of them had individually owned for twelve months, developed, and then sold the Tract X lease,
they would clearly have been entitled to treat any gain as long-term capital
gain. Thus, there would be no abuse in allowing the shareholders capital
gain treatment on a sale of their stock or in a liquidation.
Section 341, however, is applied literally regardless of whether there is
any apparent abuse. It has been specifically held to apply to situations, such
as that described above, in which the shareholders would have had capital
gains treatment if they had not incorporated. 7 In effect, then, a provision
intended to prevent turning ordinary income into capital gains can come full
circle and turn capital gains into ordinary income.
In analyzing whether section 341 applies to Uranium it becomes apparent that section 341 will apply to most mining corporations in which the
shareholders are contemplating selling out. Section 341 (b)(1) defines "collapsible corporation" as "a corporation formed or availed of principally for
the manufacture, construction, or production of property, for the purchase
of [section 341 assets], or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed
or availed of, with a view to [collapsing the corporation]." Collapsing the
corporation basically consists of a disposition of stock by shareholders before
the corporation realizes "a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property." 8 At first blush this definition may appear to be
quite broad. It is.
The phrase "formed or availed of" indicates that collapsibility does not
depend on having had the proscribed purposes at the inception of the corporation. It is sufficient if the corporation is "availed of" at any time for those
purposes. The fact that a corporation might have been formed with no intention of constructing or producing property will not affect the determina9
tion of whether it is later "availed of" for such purposes.
"Principally" has been held to modify "the manufacture, etc." 10 At the
same time, "manufacture, etc." can be interpreted to apply to nearly any
kind of corporate activity. To make the definition even more all-inclusive,
section 341 (b) (2) (A) provides that a corporation is deemed to have manufactured, etc., property if "it engaged in the manufacture, construction, or pro7. Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
8. It should be noted that this discussion is not intended to exhaustively analyze § 341.
Therefore, in some cases generalizations are made, and in some cases certain of the rules of
§ 341 are not discussed at all. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 64-994 § 212(a), 64 Stat.
935 (1950).
9. See Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1958); H. REP. No. 2319, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1950).
10. SetMintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960); Burge v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958); Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
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'
duction of such property to any extent."

Has Uranium principally engaged in any of these activities? The answer
to this question illustrates the difficulty in applying section 341 to mining
corporations. Such corporations ordinarily do not manufacture anything,
but what about construction or production? The Internal Revenue Service
has ruled that drilling dry holes or conducting unsuccessful exploration ac12
tivities do not constitute "construction or production." The negative implication of this ruling is that successful exploration and development activities
' 13
As a result, it appears that
do constitute "construction or production."
as soon as any of its
production
or
construction
Uranium had engaged in
uranium ore.
recoverable
of
the
existence
exploration activities revealed
This analysis raises a few questions in the mining area. The first question involves the fact that section 341 refers to the construction or production of "property." In the usual case it will be fairly clear whether any
"property" is being constructed. For instance, in the example of the real
estate developer used above it is clear that once lots have been developed or
houses have been built on the lots, "property" has been constructed. Suppose, however, that the Uranium shareholders sold out the corporation after
successful exploration but before any development. Where is the "property"
that has been constructed or produced? To find that property has been constructed or produced the argument must be that because successful exploration activities necessarily increase the value of the relevant mineral interests,
there must be some kind of "property" representing the increased value.
Surely this is a case of the tail wagging the dog.
The second problem involves the question of whether the production of
minerals should be treated as section 341 "production." Looking at the classic section 341 abuse in which ordinary income is converted into capital
gains, it does not appear that such an abuse would normally occur in a mining corporation. In Uranium's case, any uranium recovered has most likely
been sold and the twenty-two percent depletion allowance claimed. When
Uranium is sold out, therefore, there will be no conversion of ordinary income unless there has been an intentional stockpiling of recovered ore.
14
Moreover, an Internal Revenue Service ruling suggests that the recovery of
minerals will not be treated as "production" since that ruling holds that construction or production are completed once a producing well is completed.
The problem becomes more complex if the mining corporation engages
in processing or refining the extracted minerals prior to sale. In theory, it
can be argued that extraction itself is not "production" because the minerals
being extracted are already in existence. Further processing, however, raises
the question of whether something new is not manufactured or produced at
some point. Again, it is likely that even if there is further processing, any ore
11. Emphasis supplied.
12. Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
13. Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-2 C.B. 236, specifically holds that the drilling and equipping of
wells constitutes construction or production under § 341.
14. Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
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extracted and processed will be sold rather than stockpiled so that there will
not be an intent to convert ordinary income into capital gains.
Despite these underlying problems of logic or policy, it is relatively clear
that Uranium will be treated as a corporation formed or availed of principally for the construction or production of property. Thus, we come to the
final definitional question which is whether there is a "view" to collapse the
corporation before a substantial part of the income is realized. Here again
the test is difficult to avoid. In almost any case where a corporation is sold or
liquidated before it has realized a substantial part of the income from its
property, the "view" can and will be found to exist.' 5 The key in most situations lies in showing that a substantial part of the income has been realized,
since where there has not been such substantial realization there tends to be
16
a presumption that there was a "view."'
When is a substantial part of the income from the property realized? It
is generally accepted that realization of at least one-third of the total income
to be realized is "substantial."' 17 Where mining corporations are concerned,
the problem is to determine what is meant by the "income to be derived
from such property." This determination is relatively easy in the case of a
housing project in which it can be assumed that once one-third of the houses
are sold, one-third of the total possible income has been realized.
In Uranium's case, however, the first theoretical problem to resolve is to
determine what the relevant income is. In the real estate example, the relevant income is clearly the income from the sale of improved lots, where the
improved lots are the property that was constructed or produced. Where a
mining corporation is concerned, it is not entirely clear what the property
constructed or produced is, but it is clear that the income to be derived from
such property cannot be anticipated income from the sale of the leases themselves.
Evidently the relevant income must be the anticipated income from the
sale of minerals, even though the minerals are arguably not the section 341
"property" that was constructed or produced so that arguably such income
is not "derived from such property." Uranium, then, would need to estimate
the projected amount of extractable ore in order to determine whether onethird of the income from such ore has already been realized. This required
estimate would usually not pose a great problem since Uranium would already need to have made such an estimate for purposes of computing its
possible cost depletion.
A further problem may arise out of an argument raised by the Service
in the case of Honaker Drg., Inc. v. Koehler. I In that case, the Internal Revenue Service argued that items that had been expensed in advance 19 should
be subtracted from income received in determining the percentage of total
15. See

BITTKER &

EUSTICE,

FEDERAL

INCOME

TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS

SHAREHOLDERS, 12-14, 12-15 (4th ed. 1979) (discussion of when the "view"

AND

can be avoided).

16. Id.
17. Rev. Rul. 72-48, 1972-I C.B. 102.
18. 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
19. An example of such items would be intangible drilling costs which the corporation
elected to deduct currently.
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20
Although this theory was rejected
expected income that had been realized.
in Honaker, the Service may not have abandoned it.
A policy-oriented objection can be raised with regard to treating potential income from mineral sales as the income "derived from such property."
If the idea of section 341 is to prevent revenue losses resulting from conversion of ordinary income into capital gains, the objection in the mining area is
that in many cases there would be no revenue loss even without the application of section 341. In Uranium's case, if the shareholders sell their shares to
Giant and can treat the gains as a capital gain they must then pay taxes at
capital gains rates. The income "derived from such property" is still going to
be derived and taxed as it would have been, except that now Giant is the
taxpayer. The only way for a revenue loss to result is for Giant's available
cost depletion to exceed percentage depletion, because cost depletion is only
available to the extent of basis and Giant may be able to obtain a greater
21
Percentage depletion, however,
basis than Uranium had in the leasehold.
is available without regard to basis, and in many, if not most, cases percentage depletion will exceed cost depletion.
Nonetheless, it appears from this analysis that Uranium, and many
mining corporations, will fall under the section 341 definition of "collapsible
corporation." Thus, Uranium was (1) formed or availed of, (2) principally
to construct and produce property, (3) with a view, (4) to collapse before a
substantial part of the income from such property has been realized.
In addition to the factors discussed above, there is an excellent chance
that Uranium is subject to section 341(c), which simply establishes a rebutta22
The presumption applies if (1) the
ble presumption of collapsible status.
fair market value of a corporation's section 341 assets equals or exceeds fifty
percent of the fair market value of all of its assets, and (2) the fair market
value of the section 341 assets also equals or exceeds 120% of the adjusted
3
basis of such section 341 assets. 2 "Section 341 assets" are defined in section
24
and most property de341(b)(3) to include any property held for sale
held for a period of
been
has
scribed by section 1231(b) where such property
25
used in a trade or
"property
defines
1231(b)
Section
less than three years.
A and B
interests
leasehold
as
the
such
items
include
business" and would
26
put into Uranium.

The reason this presumption probably applies to Uranium can be illustrated with the following example. Assume that the leasehold interests put
20. Honaker Drlg., Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
21. Giant could obtain a greater basis through application of § 342(b)(2) or by buying
Uranium's assets outright, with the Uranium shareholders utilizing a § 337 liquidation. See
I.R.C. § 611 and appropriate regulations.
22. BIT-rKER & EUsTICE, supra note 15, at 12-17. "The theory of the rebuttable presumption is that if the 'section 341 assets' are substantial in amount and have risen significantly in
value above their basis, it is reasonable to place the burden of disproving collapsability on the
taxpayer."
23. I.R.C. § 341(c)(A), (B).
24. "[P]roperty held by the corporation for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its
trade or business." Id. § 341(b)(3)(B).
25. Id. § 1231(b). References to § 1231(b) property are used interchangeably with references to property used in a trade or business.
26. We must again assume that Uranium is not a dealer in such interests.
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into Uranium by A and B had a combined basis to A and B of $60,000 when
they exchanged those interests for Uranium stock, and that section 351 applied to the exchange.2 7 Because of section 351, neither A and B nor Uranium recognized any gain or loss on the exchange, and Uranium's basis in
the leasehold is $60,000. Next, assume that the fair market value of the
leasehold is $200,000 when Giant offers to buy Uranium out. Uranium's
non-section 341 assets (mining equipment, 2a and so forth) have a fair market value of $200,000. The section 341(c) presumption applies because (1)
the fair market value of Uranium's section 341 assets ($200,000) equals fifty
percent of the fair market value of its total assets ($400,000), and (2) the fair
market value of the section 341 assets ($200,000) also exceeds 120% of its
adjusted basis in such assets ($60,000).29
It is submitted that these tests will often be met by mining corporations.
Indeed, the above example simply shows what can happen where the fair
market value of a leasehold rises sharply as is likely to happen once successful
exploration has occurred. Two other typical occurrences will also tend to
cause the presumption to apply. One occurrence is the use of depletion al30
lowances which will cause a decrease in the adjusted basis of the leasehold.
The second occurrence is the extraction of ore which will have a zero basis to
31
the corporation, and which will also be a section 341 asset.
From the above discussion, it may appear that a mining corporation is
doomed to collapsible corporation treatment. Fortunately, however, section
341 provides a number of exceptions to collapsible corporation treatment.
III.

SECTION 341(d) EXCEPTIONS

Section 341 generally does not apply to a shareholder who owns five
percent or less of the outstanding stock of the corporation. 32 To meet this
exception the shareholder must not have owned more than five percent of
the stock at the time the construction or production began or at any time
thereafter. 33 In addition, the exception will not apply if the shareholder's
holdings can be attributed to another shareholder under the constructive
ownership rules applicable under section 341(d). 34 In our basic example,
only E will benefit from this exception, and even E will not benefit if E is
related to one of the other shareholders in such a way as to cause attribution
of ownership.
Section 341 also does not apply unless more than seventy percent of the
27. I.R.C. § 351. This section provides for the nonrecognition of gains or losses when property is transferred to a corporation in exchange for securities in situations where the transferor
controls the corporation.
28. We must now assume that the mining equipment would be treated under I.R.C.
§ 341(b)(3)(D) as property described in § 1231(b), since the equipment is used to produce uranium ore. Of course, a similar argument can be made for not classifying the lease itself as a
§ 341 asset.

29. I.R.C. § 341(c)(A), (B).
30. Id.§ 1016(a)(2).
31. /d. § 341(b)(3).
32. Id.§ 341(d)(1).
33. Id.
34. Id
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recognized gain during a taxable year is attributable to property that was
constructed or produced. 35 This exception is not likely to help in our example because virtually all of the gain to be recognized will be attributable to
the constructed or produced property.
Finally, section 341(d)(3) provides that section 341 does not apply to
gains realized more than three years after the completion of the construction
or production. This exception is also likely to have little usefulness for the
mining corporation. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that construc36
tion or production is completed once the developmental phase is done.
There can be, however, problems in determining when development ends
and production begins. Moreover, the typical mining corporation will be
involved in a number of interests such that development on some interests is
continually taking place.
IV.

SECTION 341(e)

The greatest potential for Uranium's escape from section 341 treatment
is found in section 341 (e). If the conditions of section 341 (e) are met then the
following four avenues of escape from collapsible corporation treatment are
available:
1. The shareholders can sell their stock and be taxed at capital
gains rates.
2. The corporation will be eligible for nonrecognition of gain
treatment under the twelve-month liquidation provisions of section
337.
3. The corporation can be liquidated with the shareholders' gains
taxed at capital gains rates.
4. The shareholders can make use of the nonrecognition of gain
treatment allowed for thirty-day liquidations under section 333.37
To determine whether the subsection (e) exceptions apply, it is necessary to go through some complex analysis. First, it must be determined
whether the corporation in question has any "subsection (e) assets" as defined by section 341(e)(5). Generally, the presence of subsection (e) assets
will reduce the possibility of obtaining relief under section 341(e). It should
be noted that constructive ownership rules apply throughout subsection (e)
in determining percentage of ownership.
The first kind of subsection (e) asset consists basically of property, not
used in the trade or business, which could not be sold at capital gains rates
either by the corporation or by a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder. 38
This category will primarily include inventory and items held for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. The key point is that to classify
an item properly one must look both to the item's status in the hands of the
corporation and to the item's status in the hands of all more-than-twenty35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 341(d)(2).
Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 15, at 12-22.
I.R.C. § 341(e)(5)(A)(i).
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percent shareholders. 39 In the example of the real estate development, the
improved lots would fall under this category because the corporation is holding the lots for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
This category of subsection (e) assets will be one of two key categories
for Uranium and other mining corporations. Clearly, Uranium's major asset
is its leasehold interest in Tract X. To determine if that leasehold is a first
category subsection (e) asset we must determine whether Uranium is a
dealer 40 in uranium leases and whether the lease is used in Uranium's trade
or business. Uranium is not likely to be classified as a dealer where it has
never sold uranium leases before. Further, Uranium is in the business of
exploring, developing, and extracting minerals; so that the uranium lease is
clearly used in Uranium's business.
Another question would be involved if Uranium held nonworking mineral interests. Strictly speaking, such interests are not used in Uranium's
trade or business since Uranium would take no part in exploring, developing, or mining such interests other than by investing cash. These interests
would nonetheless be capital assets held for investment to Uranium, so long
as Uranium is not a dealer. At this point, however, we need to examine
whether any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such interests. If so, these interests are subsection (e) assets even though the corpora41
tion would be entitled to capital gains treatment on their sale.
As will be seen in the discussion below, the question of dealer status is
often crucial in determining the applicability of subsection (e).4 2 Most frequently the key to resolving dealer status has been to look to the number and
frequency of prior sales. In the case of Uranium and A, we would look then
to their prior histories of sales of nonworking mineral interests. Uranium has
no prior history and is therefore unlikely to be classified as a dealer. Suppose, however, that 4 has an extensive background of investing in and disposing of mineral interests. Now there is a dealer problem, even though in
43
some cases there probably should not be.
The problem arises because of the number of sales A has made. If we
assume, however, that A is in the business of exploring for minerals and
developing mineral interests, it can be expected that A will have bought and
sold numerous interests. This situation differs from the real estate development example, because there the whole idea of development is to make lots
salable while here the idea of development is to facilitate ore extraction, A
may have had any number of reasons for prior sales such as the need for
capital to develop retained interests, an inability to finance further operations, or an unsolicited offer so large he felt compelled to accept. Thus, the
39. Goldstein, Section 341(d) and (e)-A journey Into Never-Never Land, 10 VILL. L. REV. 215,
245 (1965).
40. The term "dealer" is used to denote a person or corporation holding assets for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business.
41. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 245.
42. For a more detailed discussion of the dealer problem in the mineral area see Smith,
Dispositionsof Oil and Gas Properties - Dealer vs. Investor, 1965 TUL. TAX INST. 485.
43. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 245. See also, H. REP. No. 2632, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1958).
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number of prior sales may not constitute sufficient evidence in itself for clas44
sifying A as a dealer.
Nonetheless, where A has had numerous prior sales it is probable that
the dealer question will be raised. If he is a dealer, then Uranium's nonworking mineral interest is a first category subsection (e) asset.
The second category of subsection (e) assets includes certain property
that is used in the trade or business. As noted above, "property used in the
trade or business" includes the uranium lease unless that lease is considered
held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business. This
property is a second category subsection (e) asset only if the unrealized depreciation on such property exceeds the unrealized appreciation on such
property; or in other words, if there is a net unrealized depreciation. 45 This
situation is unlikely to arise in the mining corporation.
Under the third category, if there is net unrealized appreciation in all
property used in the trade or business, then any such property will be considered a subsection (e) asset to the extent that any such property would not be
a capital or section 1231 (b) asset in the hands of a more-than-twenty-percent
shareholder. 46 This category is the second key category for most mining corporations.
As discussed above, Uranium's uranium lease was not picked up under
the first category of subsection (e) assets where (1) the lease is used in Uranium's business and (2) Uranium is not a dealer in such leases, even if (3) a
more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such leases. Under the
third category, however, the lease can be a subsection (e) asset if a morethan-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such leases. To make the determination, a calculation must be made of the total fair market value and
total basis of all assets used in the trade or business. If basis is exceeded by
fair market value then the third category applies, and every business asset
must be examined to see if any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a
dealer in such assets. If so, then such assets are subsection (e) assets even if
47
the particular asset actually had a higher basis than fair market value.
As in the first category, it can be seen that the key question is likely to
be whether any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in uranium leases. Thus, it is probable that the fair market value of Uranium's
section 1231 (b) assets exceeds Uranium's basis in such assets because (1) Uranium probably has a low basis as compared to fair market value in its uranium lease, and (2) that lease is likely to represent the greatest part of
Uranium's section 1231(b) assets. The fourth category of subsection (e) assets involves copyrights and the like, 48 and is not relevant to this discussion.
The conclusion is that if the corporation, a more-than-twenty-percent
shareholder, or two related shareholders who together own more than
twenty percent of the stock, are dealers in mineral leases then the corpora44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

This problem is specifically discussed by Smith, supra note 42.
I.R.C. § 341(e)(5)(A)(ii).
Id. § 341(e)(5)(A)(iii).
Id.
Id. § 341(e)(5)(A)(iv).
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tion's leases are subsection (e) assets. Because such leases are likely to be a
mining corporation's major assets, such classification may prevent the corporation from making use of the relief provisions of subsection (e).
Generally, no relief is available under subsection (e) unless the net unrealized appreciation in the corporation's subsection (e) assets is less than
fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth. 4 9 Thus, the problem of having a mining corporation's mineral leases classified as subsection (e) assets
becomes apparent. Because the mineral leases are (1) likely to be the corporation's major assets and (2) likely to have greatly appreciated in value while
the basis has been greatly reduced, then classification as subsection (e) assets
makes it unlikely that subsection (e) relief can be obtained. Moreover, further rules under subsection (e) can cause problems even where there are no
subsection (e) assets under the basic categories described above.
Section 341(e)(1) permits capital gains treatment on the sale of shares
by a shareholder. The principal additional rule introduced under section
341(e)(1) is that in addition to computing net unrealized appreciation on the
basic subsection (e) assets, if the shareholder in question is a more-than-fivepercent shareholder, it is also necessary to compute the net unrealized appreciation on assets that would have been subsection (e) assets if that share50
holder had been a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder.
To explain, suppose that in the case of the Uranium Corporation
neither the corporation nor A is a dealer in mineral leases, and none of the
shareholders are related in a way that would bring the constructive ownership rules into play. Suppose further that the net unrealized appreciation of
the uranium lease exceeds fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth.
From these facts the lease is not a subsection (e) asset because the corporation and its only more-than-twenty-percent shareholder are not dealers. On
a sale of shares, however, every more-than-five-percent shareholder, which
includes everyone except E, must separately compute the net unrealized appreciation on subsection (e) assets as if such shareholder were a more-thantwenty-percent shareholder. Thus, if any of them are dealers in mineral
leases, they will not be entitled to capital gains treatment on a sale of their
shares. This provision applies on an individual basis, so that it is possible for
51
some shareholders to obtain capital gains treatment while others cannot.
Corporations can make use of the nonrecognition of gain on sales of
property in a twelve-month liquidation 52 if the requirements of section
341 (e)(4) are met. The basic requirement is that the net unrealized appreciation of the subsection (e) assets not exceed fifteen percent of net worth at
any time during the twelve-month period. 53 Here we are not concerned
with anyone who is not a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder. This provision, however, only deals with the tax treatment of the corporation.
To determine the tax treatment of the shareholders on receipt of liqui49. Id. § 341(e)(I)(C).
50. Id.
51. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 234.

52. I.R.C. § 337.
53. Id. § 341(e)(4)(A), (B).
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dating distributions in a twelve-month liquidation, we need to examine section 341(e)(2). Under section 341(e)(2) we must once again consider each
more-than-five-percent shareholder separately, and determine the net unrealized appreciation of basic subsection (e) assets plus the net unrealized
appreciation of assets that would be subsection (e) assets if such shareholders
were more-than-twenty-percent shareholders. Those shareholders meeting
the fifteen-percent-of-net-worth test are entitled to capital gains treatment
on receipt of liquidating distributions. 4 Here again, it is possible for some
shareholders to obtain capital gains treatment on the liquidating distributions while others cannot.
Finally, section 341(e)(3) permits nonrecognition of gain treatment in
thirty-day liquidations pursuant to section 333. Again the basic condition for
such treatment is that the net unrealized appreciation of subsection (e) assets
not exceed fifteen percent of net worth. For purposes of this provision, however, "subsection (e) asset" is defined to include all assets that would be subsection (e) assets for more-than-five-percent shareholders. In other words,
here the basic definition of "subsection (e) asset" is broadened, and if one
shareholder cannot obtain nonrecognition treatment none of them can.
V.

WHAT

To Do

From the above analysis it is possible to reach the following generalized
conclusions:
1. A typical mining corporation is likely to come under the basic
section 341 definition of "collapsible corporation."
2. If a mining corporation is classified as a collapsible corporation, it must primarily look to subsection (e) for relief.
3. If the corporation or any of its more-than-twenty-percent
shareholders are dealers in mineral interests, subsection (e) relief is
probably unavailable.
4. If any more-than-five-percent shareholder is a dealer in mineral interests, subsection (e) relief is probably unavailable to that
shareholder and thirty-day liquidation treatment is probably unavailable to any shareholder.
5. Any corporation or shareholder that has engaged in a significant number of mineral lease transactions must face the possibility
that the Service will want to treat them as dealers.
What do these conclusions suggest in terms of the proposed buy out of
Uranium by Giant?
First, Uranium ought to consider whether it can meet the subsection (e)
requirements. If so, it is irrelevant whether Uranium is a collapsible corporation or not so long as the buy out is structured either as a stock sale or as a
twelve-month liquidation in accordance with the section 341(e) rules.
The key question for this purpose will be to determine whether any of
the relevant parties are dealers in uranium leases. If no one has had a significant number of prior dealings in such leases, no one should be classified as a
54. Note that this discussion only discusses the basic rules. Other requirements must be
met under both §§ 341(e)(2) and 341(e)(4).
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dealer. Unfortunately, it is the nature of a mining corporation that at least
some of the shareholders, and the corporation itself if the corporation has
been in existence a significant period of time, will have had a significant
number of prior dealings.
If a dealer problem is foreseen, the next step is to make the relevant
subsection (e) percentage calculations. Of course, in making the calculations
there is room for planning in setting the various fair market values and determining net worth. Thus, the best evidence of fair market value of corporate assets will be the price assigned to the assets after negotiation between
buyer and seller. Where the seller is a corporation disposing of its assets in a
twelve-month liquidation, it is obviously to the shareholder's advantage to
have most of the purchase price allocated to assets that cannot be classified
as subsection (e) assets. Such an allocation serves to reduce the amount of
unrealized net appreciation on such assets.
If it is determined that the subsection (e) percentage tests cannot be
met, it is time to consider other defenses. The weight of such defenses must
then be compared to the risk that they will fail.
The most immediate defense will be that the relevant parties should not
be classified as dealers. As suggested above, this defense can be a strong one
because of analytical problems involved in applying normal "dealer" principles in the mineral area.
Beyond the dealer question, it will be necessary to go back to the other
section 341 exceptions and to the collapsible corporation definition to determine if there is another escape. As analyzed above, however, the other escapes will probably be of litle help.
What then can Uranium do if it makes the required analysis and determines that it cannot presently escape section 341 treatment?
1. It can cease all activity that might constitute construction or
production and wait three years to liquidate. This solution may be
unacceptable for a number of reasons.
2. It can continue to operate until one-third of the estimated uranium ore on Tract X' has been extracted and sold, and then liquidate. This solution is more palatable although it means that
additional leases should not be acquired. Also, this plan will not
work well if additional ore deposits are located on Tract X. There
may even be a problem in determining when one-third of the income has been recognized in light of the position taken by the Service in Honaker Drlg.55
3. Uranium can go through a tax-free reorganization with Giant.
The drawback here is that Uranium's shareholders may not want
simply to trade their Uranium shares for Giant shares.
4. The corporation can make an election under section 341(f)
which would permit the shareholders to obtain capital gains treatment on a sale of their shares. 56 There are two difficulties with this
approach. First, it is often difficult in general to convince a buyer
to buy stock rather than assets. Second, this difficulty is com55. 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
56. I.R.C. § 341(0(2).
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pounded by the fact that a 341 (f) election has been made, because
the election
can cause detrimental tax treatment to the subsequent
57
buyer.
5. The shareholders can sell their shares under the installment
method. 58 In this way, if they are ultimately subjected to ordinary
income treatment, they will at least spread out such income. Here
again, however, it may be difficult to convince a buyer to buy
shares, especially since he may be buying a collapsible corporation.
There are some other possibilities, but these are the major ones. As indicated, there are problems with all of the solutions such that once
shareholders find themselves in a collapsible corporation situation there simply may not be a satisfactory way out. It should be noted in this connection
that there is little hope of obtaining advance assurance through a private
letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service because it does not ordinarily issue rulings either as to collapsible corporation status or as to dealer
59
status.
This analysis leads to the most important point of all. There must be
sound planning at the outset to determine whether a corporation should be
used at all. If a partnership is used, there will obviously not be a collapsible
corporation problem. There will still be a dealer problem, but the dealer
problem is only exacerbated when combined with a collapsible corporation
problem. Thus, when the initial decision on whether to incorporate is made,
the possibility of section 341 treatment must be weighed.
Another possibility in early planning is to elect Subchapter S treatment.6° This approach may be desirable because capital gains retain their
nature when passed through to Subchapter S corporation shareholders, and
section 341 does not apply to such gains. The reason early planning is called
for is that under section 1378 the capital gains pass-through benefit may be
severely restricted if a Subchapter S election has not been in effect for a
corporation's previous three taxable years. 6 1 It should be noted that the regulations indicate that the Service may not allow a capital gains pass-through
where a sale of the assets involved would generate ordinary income in the
hands of a substantial shareholder. 6 2 This regulation's validity, however, is
63
at least open to question.
A final alternative where a corporation is otherwise desirable is to go
ahead and use a corporation to do the actual exploration, development, and
mining, but keep the mineral leases out of the corporation. In this way corporate advantages such as limited liability can be utilized, while the major
assets that might trigger section 341 treatment are kept out of the corporation. Again, there will still be a dealer problem if the leases are sold, but the
problem will not involve section 341 at the same time.
57. Id.
58. I.R.C. § 453.
59. Rev. Proc. 80-22, 1980-26 I.R.B. 26.
60. See Boland, Collapsible CorporationsUnder the 1958 Amendment, 17 TAx L. REV. 203, 231

(1962).
61. I.R.C. § 1378(c)(1).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1(d), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 C.B. 317.
63. See BITrKER & EUsTIcE, supra note 15, at 6-26 n.58.
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555

CONCLUSION

There are clearly both analytical and policy problems in applying section 341 to mining corporations. Nonetheless, it appears to be well established that section 341 will be applied to such corporations with the result of
severely discouraging the use of the corporate form in many mining operations. Where use of a corporation is desirable despite section 341 risks, the
best that can be done is to seek competent advance tax counseling and hope
that the Service will ultimately not see fit to invoke section 341.

PROTECTING THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
CHILD'S TRUST INTEREST FROM STATE
REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
JOHN P. MASSEY*

INTRODUCTION

Many mental incompetents require institutional care. A number of institutions providing such care are publicly established and supported.' Due
to the increasing expenses involved in maintaining these institutions, most
states have enacted reimbursement statutes which allow recovery of at least a
portion of the expenses from the assets of the incompetent and specified relatives. 2 Such access to individual assets has prompted the affected individuals
to seek protective devices for their property. This article focuses on parental
testamentary attempts to secure trusts established for the benefit of their
3
mentally incompetent children from public reimbursement claims.
These efforts have resulted in a direct conflict between competing policies: the policy of state reimbursement for expenses incurred in supporting
mental incompetents and the policy of unhampered testamentary disposition
as a way to provide children with some measure of security. This conflict
has not been addressed in Colorado notwithstanding the presence of the elements for conflict. Colorado has both a reimbursement statute 4 and, it is
assumed, parents who do not want their testamentary assets consumed by
the state in exchange for care that would be provided were there no available assets. Implicit in this desire to protect assets is the desire to extend
benefits to their children beyond those provided by the state. 5 By examining
the treatment of this conflict in other jurisdictions and by relying upon established trust and estate principles, a general rule may be developed which
can be integrated with Colorado law. 6
* B.S., United States Air Force Academy; J.D., University of Denver; candidate for the
New Mexico bar.
1. COLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
2. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 838, 841 (1963).
3. Wherever the word "child" appears alone in the text, it refers to the mentally incompetent child.
4. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-12-101 to -109 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
5. Somewhat analogous to this modern conflict between parents and the state is the parental testamentary attempt to secure property for the benefit of the incapacitated child. In
Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1895), the Supreme Court said:
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the
vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.
Id at 727.
6. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 838, 851 (1963), specifically rejects a solution based on a general
rule. Rather, it contends that the solution must be provided on a case-by-case basis, determined
by the particular circumstances involved. This note develops a general rule with application
beyond Colorado.
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REIMBURSEMENT STATUTES

The purpose of a reimbursement statute is to relieve the public of some
of the cost of caring for the mental incompetent. 7 This is accomplished in
Colorado and in other states by imposing primary cost liability on the incompetent, secondary liability on named relatives, typically the spouse and
parents, and residual liability on the state.8 This individual liability is in
derogation of the common law which casts sole responsibility for institutional care of mental incompetents on the state, regardless of the financial
condition of the patient or his family. 9 Due to this variance from common
law, courts have strictly construed reimbursement statutes in a light most
favorable to the individual whose assets are sought.' 0
While this common law concept of state responsibility is evinced in state
constitutions and statutes, constitutional challenges based upon this premise
2
have been rejected." Constitutional challenges grounded on due process'
and equal protection 13 have also been rejected. In short, barring an inept
legislative construction, reimbursement statutes have been held constitutional. 14
II.

PARENT LIABILITY

15

Prior to addressing the public's right to a child's trust interest, a discussion of Colorado parental liability is warranted for two reasons. First, if the
liability is extensive, the question of protecting assets may be mute. Second,
the basic procedure used to obtain the parent's assets is nearly identical' 6 to
that required to obtain the child's assets.
Colorado requires the Department of Institutions to make a determination of the actual cost of each patient's care and an assessment of a liable
7. In re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 34, 314 A.2d 674, 675 (1974);cf. Schleiger v. State,
193 Colo. 531, 534, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977) (when insurance proceeds are available, the insurance company should pay, not the taxpayer).
8. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-101(1) (1973); accord, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-66 (West
Supp. 1980), construtedin Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137 A.2d 614 (1958); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5121.01-.10 (Page Supp. 1979), construed in Department of Mental Hygiene
& Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
9. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 8-9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968);
Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 243 N.E.2d
83, 85 (1968); State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 45, 308 S.W.2d 4, 6 (1957). But cf. Grames v.
Norris, 3 Ill. 2d 112, 115, 120 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1954) (at common law the incompetent's estate was
liable for necessaries).
10. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. I, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968); In
re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 35, 314 A.2d 674, 676 (1974).
11. Wigington v. State Home and Training School, 175 Colo. 159, 486 P.2d 417 (1971).
12. Id at 162, 486 P.2d at 419; Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 10,
441 P.2d 153, 157 (1968). But see Miller v. State Dep't of Treasury, 385 Mich. 296, 188 N.W.2d
795 (1971).
13. In re Estate of Buzzelle, 176 Colo. 554, 558, 491 P.2d 38, 40, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
13 (1968).
14. For an overview of the constitutionality of reimbursement statutes, see Annot., 48
A.L.R. 733 (1927).
15. This section is not essential to the development of the general rule. It does provide
background, however, which is useful to the attorney faced with questions concerning public
reimbursement liability.
16. See text accompanying notes 19-20, intra.
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person's ability to pay the cost. Based upon these findings, a judicial assessment will be issued against that person. 17 The determination and assessment are conditions precedent to valid state claims.'
Parental liability is specifically limited. The Colorado statute provides
for payment of assessed charges for one hundred eighty months or until the
child reaches twenty-one, whichever first occurs. 19 Additionally, the state
will not demand full payment when exhaustion of parental assets would result. 20 The parent's liability is further limited by death. In order to subject
the parent's estate to reimbursement claims, there must have been a valid
debt established by the determination and assessment 2' made during the
parent's life. 22 This precludes charges against the decedent's estate incurred
after death. 23 Further, the state assumes a status no greater than other
claimants against a decedent's estate. Specifically, the state must file its
claim within the period provided by the non-claim statute or it will be for24
ever barred.
Because of these statutory limitations and because insurance coverage is
often available for these expenses, 25 it is likely that the average parent will
possess assets available for testamentary distribution to the child. The problem now becomes one of devising a testamentary instrument which will safeguard the assets from public reimbursement claims.
III.

TRUSTS

The most tried testamentary device, in the context of this issue, is the
testamentary trust. The reasons for selecting the trust are basic. Trusts can
shield the beneficial interest from invasion by the beneficiary's creditors.
Additionally, trusts can remove the burden of managing assets from the incompetent beneficiary. Both purposes are of fundamental concern to the
26
parent of a mentally incompetent child.
17. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-12-102 to -104 (1973).
18. Schleiger v. State, 193 Colo. 531, 533, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977); Estate of Randall v.
Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 6, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (1968); Ft. Logan Mental Health
Center v. Harwood, 34 Colo. App. 213, 524 P.2d 614 (1974).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-103(2) (1973).
20. Set COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-104(2), (3) (1973) for factors the Department of Institutions considers in determining ability to pay.
21. See text accompanying notes 17-18, supra.
22. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968);
People v. Bozaich, 29 Colo. App. 468, 487 P.2d 597 (1971).
23. Wigington v. State Home and Training School, 175 Colo. 159, 165, 486 P.2d 417, 420
(1971).
24. Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1979); Estate of Randall v. Colorado State
Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153 (1968); State v. Estate of Butler, 30 Colo. App. 246, 491 P.2d
102 (1971).
25. Schleiger v. State, 193 Colo. 531, 533, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977); Estate of Randall v.
Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 6, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (1968); Ft. Logan Mental Health
Center v. Harwood, 34 Colo. App. 213, 524 P.2d 614 (1974).
26. For other advantages of trusts, see S. ScoTT & S. SIUTA, LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 226 (1979), where attention is given to the advantages of a trust
as compared to a guardianship. What is not explained is that a guardianship may not be terminated until all debts owed the state are satisfied. Whereas an incompetent trust beneficiary
receives legal title to trust assets upon return to competency, the state is able to collect through
the guardianship. No statute of limitations exists to block collection. See State v. Estate of
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A trust is not a guaranty of asset security, however. 27 The state has
several means by which it may pursue reimbursement. When the child has a
beneficial interest in a trust and the trustee refuses to release that interest to
the state, the state may proceed against the interest in its capacity as a custodial guardian. In this procedure, the state asserts that it is safeguarding the
child's welfare, in response to the trustee's failure to do so. Therefore, a judicial order compelling the trustee to release trust assets for the child's welfare
is proper and necessary. 28 Similarly, the state may proceed as a surety, subrogating any legal right to maintenance that the child might have arising
out of a beneficial trust interest. 29 Both of these procedures require the state
to employ the fiction of acting in the child's stead.
30
A more direct method is for the state to proceed as a support creditor.
In that capacity the state acts in its own behalf without resorting to the
fiction of acting for the child. Additionally, the state, as a governmental
entity, may be able to claim a preferential status in relation to other support
3
creditors. '

Whichever option the state pursues, the basis of its action is the reimbursement statute. The Colorado statute provides that allproperty of liable
persons shall be subject to state claims, irrespective of its origin, composition, or
source. 32 By resorting to a testamentary trust, the parent attempts to withdraw the assets from this property classification. The basic test becomes:
Does the mentally incompetent beneficiary have an interest in the trust estate which he can compel the trustee to apply for his benefit? If he has such
an interest, the state can reach that interest, 33 but only to the extent of the
beneficiary's reach. 34 The extent of the beneficiary's interest depends, in
Petzoldt, 126 Colo. 76, 246 P.2d 909 (1952); Joyce v. People, 81 Colo. 306, 255 P. 622 (1927).
The lesson is simple: Avoid guardianships or do not pass title to the child upon trust termination.
27. See Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 678, 320 P.2d
186, 188 (1958) (mentally ill person's estate includes beneficial interest in trust); Department of
Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 773, 95 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 (1936) (trust estates are subject
to the charges of the beneficiary).
28. See Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958).
29. See Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243
N.E.2d 83 (1968).
30. See State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957).
31. 60 HARV. L. REv. 312, 313 (1946). But cf. Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135, 137
(Colo. 1979)(the state of Colorado obtained no special creditor status when filing against a
decedent's estate).
32. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-12-109(2)(1973). It should be remembered that the statute
will be strictly construed in favor of the individual. This may aid in the judicial determination
that a particular trust interest is not the beneficiary's property in the context of the reimbursement statute.
33. Department of Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 773, 95 S.W.2d 599, 601 (1936); cf.
In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 381, 107 N.W.2d 146, 150 (1961)(the beneficiary must have
an absolute and uncontingent interest in the trust estate). See also Reilly v. State, 119 Conn.
508, 510, 177 A. 528, 530 (1935).
34. See Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243
N.E.2d 83 (1968)(subrogation action allows the surety to claim whatever right the beneficiary
has); State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957)(support creditor can reach the trust res
only to the extent that the beneficiary can).
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35
turn, on the intent of the testator.

Parent-testators have used three basic trusts in their attempts to remove
assets from the property classification and, thus, from the state's reach: the
support trust, the spendthrift trust, and the discretionary trust. These trusts
will be treated separately, implying elements unique to each. Settlors, however, are creative and the separate trust elements are often commingled, re37
36
sulting in hybrid trusts and judicial confusion.
A.

Support Trust

A support trust restricts the beneficial interest to that necessary for education or support. 38 A clear manifestation of the settlor's intent to restrict
the trust's use solely for support is essential to its validity. A mere testamentary classification of the trust as one for support, without further evidence of
the testator's intent, may cast it into a general trust category. 39 Similarly, a
manifestation of intent which goes beyond the "support only" restriction
40
may cost the trust its support trust classification.
The support trust classification has the advantage of shielding the beneficial interest from most creditors. 4 It is this aspect which makes the support trust appealing to parents who want to preserve assets for their
children's use. The disadvantage of such a trust, however, lies in the exception to the "no creditors" rule. That exception allows support creditors to
obtain claim relief from a support trust. 4 2 Thus, a state which provides institutional care and maintenance is clearly entitled to reimbursement from the
43
trust assets as a support creditor.
35. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957): RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 128 (1957).
36. See, e.g., Estate of Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570
(1961)(support trust with discretionary power); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137
A.2d 614 (1958) (spendthrift trust with discretionary power). Department of Mental Hygiene &
Correction v.Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968)("absolute and sole discretion"
within support guidelines held neither purely discretionary nor a strict support trust). Compare
City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946), and Reilly v. State, 119 Conn.
508, 177 A. 528 (1935)(separate cases construing the same trust where the first court termed the
trust discretionary and the second court termed it spendthrift) wit/h 2 S. Scor, LAw OF
TRUSTS § 154, at 1176 n.2 (3d ed. 1967)(trust in Reilly categorized as a support trust).
37. It has been stated that -[clourts do not always clearly appreciate the distinction be2 S.Scorr-, LA
tween spendthrift trusts and trusts for support and discretionary trusts .
OF TRUSTS § 154 (3d ed. 1967).
38. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 128, Comment e: 154. (1957): cf. State v.
Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 47, 308 S.W.2d 4, 8 (1957)(the words "support and maintenance" indicate
a support trust).
39. 2 S. SCOTT, supra note 37. A general trust, with no restrictions on the beneficial interest, is alienable by the beneficiary and subject to creditor claims.
40. See City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946)("comfortable trust"
distinguished from support trust).
41. 2 S. SCOTT, supra note 37; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128, Comment c
(1957).
42. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957). 2 S. ScoTr, supra note 37,
§ 157.2; 60 HARV. L. REV. 312, 313 (1946).
43. See State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957); 60 HARv. L. REV. 312 (1946).
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Spendthrft Trust 44

Parents have also resorted to the spendthrift trust, a device similar to
the support trust. One similarity is that, like a support trust, the spendthrift
trust is designed to provide assets for support and maintenance of the beneficiary, secure from creditor claims. 4 5 A spendthrift trust is distinguished from
a support trust in that the former protects the assets from creditor claims
through specific provisions which preclude alienation of a present interest,
while the latter creates a future contingent interest, from which neither ben46
eficiary nor creditors can demand payment.
As with a support trust, the fatal flaw of a spendthrift trust is that support creditors can obtain satisfaction from the trust fund. 47 The logic in
allowing support creditors this access is that the testator's primary intent of
providing support and maintenance is not subverted. 48 State support creditors may take additional comfort in the public policy sustaining spendthrift
trusts; that is, spendthrift trusts provide a method for preventing "impecunious beneficiaries" from becoming "public charges."'49 If the state is not allowed to recover the public expenses of supporting a mental incompetent,
the incompetent becomes, by definition, a "public charge."
C.

Dzscretz'ona.y Trust

A discretionary trust provides the beneficiary with only so much of the
trust assets as the trustee, in his discretion, decides to release. 50 The extent of
the beneficiary's interest is, therefore, dependent on the trustee's discretion.
This indefinite nature of the beneficiary's interest is the key to frustrating
creditor claims.51 Basically, a beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to exercise his discretion. Since the creditor has no greater right in the beneficiary's
interest than the beneficiary has, the creditor cannot compel the trustee to
52
release trust funds for the creditor's claims.
There is an important qualification to the trustee's discretionary power.
Since the power is granted or created by the testator, he may limit it in any
manner, and the trustee must act in accordance with the limited power. If
44. Spendthrift trusts have not been granted universal approval, because they interfere
with the policy of free alienation of property. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed.
1947), for state decisions on the validity of spendthrift trusts. They are valid in Colorado. E.g.,
Snyder v. O'Connor, 102 Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938). See alo In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal.
App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865
(1946); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137 A.2d 614 (1958).
45. E.g., In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); Newell v. Tubbs,
103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935); 2 S.
ScoTT, supra note 37; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152(2), 154 (1957).
46. 2 S. ScorT, supra note 37, § 157.2.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1957). Stealso Lackmann v. Department
of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958); State v. Parrot, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
400 (1967). But see Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935).
48. 2 S.ScoTT, supra note 37, § 157.2.
49. In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 814, 145 P.2d 672, 675 (1944).
50. 2 S.ScoTT, supra note 37, § 128.3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1957).
51. 60 HARV. L. REV. 312 (1946).
52. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957); see text accompanying note

33, supra.

1981]

MENTAL INCOMPETENTS TRUST

the trustee acts beyond the testator's limitations, he has abused his discretion
53
and a court can compel him to act correctly.
It is common for testators to limit the discretionary power. Also, courts
may find that the testator intended limited discretionary power, even in
cases where words such as "absolute" or "sole" are used to describe the
power. 54 Court-inferred limits on intent will be given effect. Should an intent to provide for the beneficiary's care, support, maintenance, benefit, or
words to that effect, be discovered, the discretionary power becomes subject
to that testamentary intent, and the beneficiary, through the court, can compel the trustee to act accordingly.5 5 This implies an interest which, because
of the beneficiary's right to compel support, will allow a support creditor to
compel release of the trust interest to satisfy support claims. As with support
and spendthrift trusts, release of discretionary trust assets to support creditors does not undermine the testator's intent if that intent manifests a support purpose. On the contrary, the release of the assets under such
circumstances implements the testator's intentions.
IV.

GENERAL RULE

Support trusts, spendthrift trusts, and discretionary trusts are designed
to protect the beneficiary. When ordinary creditor claims are involved these
trusts will provide successful protections. When support creditor claims are
involved, however, such as a state's claim for reimbursement of expenses for
institutional support of a mental incompetent, the trust devices will not always insure successful creditor barriers.
Obviously, support and spendthrift trusts are inappropriate devices for
parents who wish to bar state reimbursement claims. Those trusts provide
an automatic entree for the state acting in its capacity as a guardian, surety,
or support creditor. The discretionary trust does not have this automatic
feature, however. It is only when the trustee's discretionary power is drafted
to include provisions for the support or care of the beneficiary that the state
can compel reimbursement from the trust res. A discretionary trust, however, need not include such provisions.
The parent who wants to establish a testamentary trust for a mentally
incompetent child, secure from public reimbursement claims for institu53. Estate of Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 813, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575
(1961); Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 680, 320 P.2d 186,
190 (1958); In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 169, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613, 616 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In
re Crow's Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968). State v. Rubion,
158 Tex. 43, 48, 308 S.W.2d 4, 9 (1957).
54. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Crow's
Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968); Department of Mental Hygiene &
Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
55. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); Department of Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 95 S.W.2d 599 (1936); In re Gruber's
Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sur. Ct. 1953). It is probable, then, that even a discretionary spray
without specified shares for the class members would not prevent support creditors from reaching the trust if intent to support is contained in the instrument. See generally 2 S. Sco-r-r, supra
note 37, §§ 155(1), Comment d; 161, Comment b.
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tional care, may do so by drafting a discretionary trust carefully limited to
exclude any provisionsfor support, care, or maintenance. The parent-testator should
make clear his intent to h'mit applicationof the trust assets to supplementing benefits
providedat public expense. Such a trust clearly withdraws whatever interest the
child may possess from the property classification essential to a public reimbursement claim. This trust construction rule is in accord with accepted
testamentary and trust provisions applied in cases dealing with reimburse56
ment statutes.
V.

THE FINAL OBSTACLE:

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This general rule is subject to rejection by the legislature or by the judiciary. Rejection would, however, establish the primacy of the policy of reimbursing public expenses over the policy of free testamentary disposition
whenever the policies conflict. Justification for rejecting this general rule
would have to be sufficient to override two strong considerations: the historical evaluation of the competing policies and the sociological evolution of
public support conceptions.
The first consideration, the historical evaluation of the competing policies, has been addressed by the courts. The judiciary has mandated strict
construction of reimbursement statutes whenever there is a conflict with testamentary dispositions. 57 This posture has been adopted for two reasons.
First, the concept of devising property freely has been considered a basic
constitutional right. 58 Second, the burden of providing care for the mental
incompetent originally fell on the public. 59 These reasons suggest that testamentary dispositions should be given deferential treatment, whenever possible, in those situations involving a conflict with reimbursement statutes.
The second consideration, the sociological evolution of public support
conceptions, evinces a trend which would have to be ignored by any legislature or court which rejects the proffered general rule. That trend is the conceptual evolution of welfare from a charitable status to a status of right and
entitlement deserving of constitutional protection. 6°
When viewed as a gift, the stigma of charity traditionally attached to
public assistance has prompted courts to deny that a testator could have
intended that the object of his bounty become a public charge in order to
56. An overview of cases where the trusts withstood state reimbursement claims and cases
where the trusts failed this purpose will make the general rule apparent. Compare Estate of
Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1961)(state claims denied);
City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946)(reimbursement claims denied);
and In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961) (state claims denied) with
Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958) (state
claims allowed); In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968)(state claims allowed); and
Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83
(1968) (state claims allowed).
57. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. I, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968); In
re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 35, 314 A.2d 674, 676 (1974).
58. E.g., State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957); In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d
375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961).
59. See text accompanying note 9, supra.
60. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (some welfare benefits are a right for which
one must be accorded due process before the benefits can be terminated).
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preserve trust assets. 6 ' Courts have so held in instances where no specific
reference to public support considerations could be found in the will. Courts
have even used this rationale in instances where the trust instrument directed the trustee to consider other available resources in dispensing trust
benefits. 6 2 In short, when viewed as charity, courts will not consider public
assistance as an available resource when reviewing a trustee's use of discretion.
This public conception of welfare as charity has changed with the expansion of welfare benefits. The advent of medicare, social security, and the
like, has extended public assistance to a growing number of citizens. With
this expansion, the functional view of welfare has evolved from a charitable
one to one embracing a public insurance program with vested rights for citizens. 63 Just as it would be unfair to deny with impunity these vested rights
in all but the most destitute situations, so would it be unfair to deny a
mental incompetent public assistance because he possesses a limited benefi64
cial interest in a trust fund.
SUMMARY

Public confiscation of trust funds set aside for the benefit of a publicly
institutionalized mentally incompetent child can be prevented by careful
drafting of a testamentary trust. This conclusion has been clearly expressed
in case law:
This case presents a striking example of what happens so frequently in instances where testators seek to provide a trust for the
benefit of some unfortunate relative or friend. Welfare officials are,
generally, very active in taking advantage of these situations. Although these situations are of very common occurrence, I never
have observed one where the simple precaution of drafting was adequately taken to insure the little patrimony provided against the
onslaughts of welfare officials. Without protective language accompanying it, discretion given to the fiduciary is not enough ...
In every such case, it would be an easy matter to prevent any such
controversy by the simple means of more explicit draftsmanship,
plus selection of a fiduciary who could be depended upon to take a
65
friendly and efficient interest in the intended beneficiary.
The explicit language to which the court refers should be sufficient to
take the trust out of the ambit of support or spendthrift trusts and to place it
clearly within the province of a discretionary trust. Further, the testator
61. In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Crow's
Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
62. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sur. Ct. 1953); see Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968). But see Reilly v. State,
119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935); In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961).
63. Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d 952, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1978), reviews this evolutionary change in the perception of public assistance from a gift to a right.
64. Town of Randolph v. Roberts, 346 Mass. 578, 195 N.E.2d 72 (1964).
65. In re Emmon's Will, 59 N.Y.S.2d 264, 269 (Sur. Ct. 1946)(Page, Sur.)(citations omitted).
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should make clear his intent to limit the trustee's discretionary actions to the
application of trust assets for benefits which supplement any public assist66
ance received by the incompetent beneficiary.
Application of this rule will not defeat the purpose of a reimbursement
statute. It will only exclude the statute's application in those specific instances where a parent employs the rule to secure benefits for a mentally
incompetent child. This will result in a proper balancing of the competing
policies of public reimbursement and free testamentary disposition. The rule
represents a compromise which allows both policies to coexist in a fair and
equitable manner.

66. See In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961), for an example of
explicit "supplement only" language which proved successful. See also S. ScoTr & S. SiuTA,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 227 (1979), for suggested wording
that "[t]he trust is intended to supplement the disabled person's earnings or governmental
financial assistance." Id. (emphasis added).

PATIENTS' RIGHTS VS. PATIENTS' NEEDS:

THE

RIGHT OF THE MENTALLY ILL TO REFUSE
TREATMENT IN COLORADO
NANCY L. SHAVILL*

Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals of nearby piggeries were better housed, fed, and treated than
many of the patients on their wards. I saw hundreds of sick people
shackled, strapped, straightjacketed, and bound to their beds....
I saw them crawl into beds jammed together, in dormitories filled
to twice or three times their normal capacity. I saw them incarcerated in "seclusion rooms"-solitary isolation cells, really-for
weeks and months at a time. I saw signs of medical neglect, with
curable patients sinking into hopeless chronicity. I found . . . excruciating suffering stemming from prolonged, enforced idleness,
herdlike crowding, lack of privacy, depersonalization, and the overall atmosphere of neglect.'
Thus was the life of many inmates of mental institutions described
twenty years ago. Since that time many factors have alleviated the inhumane and degrading conditions which persons, solely because of mental illness, have had to endure. Among these factors have been the development
and utilization of psychotropic medication, the deinstitutionalization of
mental patients, the patients' rights movement, and the community mental
health centers movement. 2 Concurrently, the courts have recognized the
right of mentally ill persons to be treated, 3 the right to due process in civil
commitment hearings, 4 the right to the least restrictive treatment alternative, 5 and the right to refuse treatment. 6 As a result, the conditions sur* B.A., DePauw University; M.A., University of Denver; J.D., University of Denver; candidate for the Colorado Bar; Legal Staff Assistant, Honorable George B. Lee, Jr., Arapahoe
District Court, 18th Judicial District.
1. Constitutional Rights ofthe Mentally Ill Hearings on S B. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1961) (statement of Albert
Deutsch) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch, Statement].
2. There are now more than 500 community mental health centers in operation, which
have helped to reduce the inpatient population of mental institutions by two-thirds in 20 years.
Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 SCIENTIFIc AM. 46, 49
(1978).
3. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afdsub nom., Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
5. Id.; Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
6. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978), rev'd in part on rehearing, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979); Winters v. Miller, 306 F.
Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);
Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
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rounding the treatment of mental patients have improved considerably.
The last of the patients' rights to be recognized-the right to refuse
treatment-has raised a number of conflicts between the medical and legal
professions. In addition, some of the consequences of the exercise of the right
to refuse treatment have raised serious questions about the direction in
which the treatment of mental illness is heading and have shaken the philosophical underpinnings of the mental health treatment system.
In Colorado, the right to refuse medication was first recognized by the
Department of Institutions, Division of Mental Health, in regulations published in July 1979.' Prior to the promulgation of these regulations, however, a Colorado district court had issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the medication of an involuntary mental patient.8 The subsequent appeal of this order resulted in the Colorado Supreme Court's recognition of the right to refuse medication in Goedecke v. Colorado9 in that an
involuntary mental patient could refuse the administration of psychotropic
medication unless his illness "has so impaired his judgment that he is incapable of participating in decisions affecting his health." 10
The recognition of the right to refuse medication in Colorado has had
considerable effect on the treatment of mental illness in the state. The author interviewed attorneys, mental health professionals, judges, and patients
to ascertain the impact of the exercise of the right to refuse medication on
the mental health treatment system. This paper will explore that impact,
placing it in perspective through a brief discussion of the history of the treatment of mental illness and its legal bases, a description of the categories of
mental illness and the medications used to treat them, and the effect of the
exercise of the right to refuse medication on the patients, the mental health
professionals, the community at large, and the mental health treatment system.
I.

THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL:

A HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

Throughout history the mentally ill have been cast among the rejects of
society. Viewed with varying tolerance in different cultures, the principal
method of dealing with the mentally ill until recently has been to segregate
them from the general population.It In colonial America, mentally ill per7. Department of Institutions, Care and Treatment of Mentally Ill, Rules and Regulations, 2 C.C.R. 502-I (effective Aug. 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Regulations].
8. Interview with Physician A. The writer interviewed a number of mental health professionals, psychiatrists, patients, judges, and attorneys. Because some requested anonymity, all
will be referred to by letter. Physician A is a psychiatrist and the medical director of a community mental health center which has been involved in a number of hearings regarding the right
to refuse medication.
9. 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
10. Id. at 125.
11. Soe N. KI-rRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY
56-65 (1971); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-8 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock eds.
1971) ]hereinafter cited as Brakel & Rock]. In the Middle Ages, in addition to the insane being
executed as witches or imprisoned, entire ships ("Ships of Fools") were chartered and filled with
insane persons for the purpose of transporting them to, and leaving them at, uninhabited
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sons were often kept locked in rooms or outhouses if cared for by family or
friends. 12 When family or friends were unable to provide assistance, the
mentally ill became subject to the institutions that developed both for the
control of deviants 13 and as a result of the poor laws.14 Mentally ill indigents often wandered from place to place with other social outcasts and pau16
pers, 15 or they were confined in houses of correction, jails, or almshouses
with children, the aged, prostitutes, vagrants, and drunkards, where they
were kept at the lowest possible cost to the community.17
In the mid-eighteenth century, the mentally ill began to be viewed as
treatable. Following the impetus of Philippe Pinel l a in France and William
Tuke in England, Dr. Benjamin Rush began to use new theories and methplaces. N. KITTRIE, at 57. The feeling that the mentally ill are outcasts and that the bizarre
and annoying members of the community should be removed still exists today. See Mechanic,
JudthialAction and Social Change, in THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR MENTAL PATIENTS 47, 69

(S. Golann & W. Fremouw, eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Golann & Fremouw]; Stone, The
Right to Treatment and the Psychiatrt Estabhhmenl, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
289 (1977).
12. A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY FROM THE
COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR (1944).

Cornelius Boatman, adjudged in 1797 to be "a lunatic of unsound mind," enjoyed lucid
intervals but not so that he was capable of the management of himself and his property, consisting of two hundred acres of land, thirty Negro slaves, and other personal property. A trustee
(Boarman's uncle) was appointed to care for Boarman and manage his estate. Throughout the
next thirty years, his estate was enjoyed and wasted by his trustees although
the estate of the lunatic was very productive, and more than sufficient to support him
in every comfort and luxury, . . . the trustees had treated him with great unkindness,
although he was very mild and inoffensive in his conduct; and they had kept him in an
outhouse, which was not sufficient to protect him from the weather; and with not
enough clothing, even of the coarsest kind, to shield him from the weather, not even
enough to cover his body and conceal his nakedness.
Boarman's Case, 2 Bland Ch. 89, 94 (Md. 1824).
13. See N. KIFRIE, supra note 11, at 63.
14. Id. at 60, 62.
15. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 4; Saphire, The Civi'lly Committed Publi Mental Patient
and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 232, 239 (1976).
16. N. KIT-rRIE, supra note 11, at 63. Houses of correction were first established to hold the
criminal, the indigent, and the insane. Connecticut's first house of correction, authorized in
1727, provided for the incarceration of
all rogues, vagabonds and idle persons going about in town or country begging, or
persons. . . feigning themselves to have knowledge in psysiognomy, palmistry, or pretending that they can tell fortunes, . . . common . . . persons . . . and also persons

under distraction and unfit to go at large, whose friends do not take care for their safe
confinement.
Id.
17. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 292; Saphire, supra note 15, at 239. The Boston House of
Industry, for example, housed 60 insane or idiotic persons, about 130 ill and infirm, more than
100 children and infants, and 200 other "unclassified" inmates. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 293.
18. Pinel, after unchaining and then curing some of the inmates of a hospital for the insane
in Paris, wrote:
The insane man is not an inexplicable monster. He is but one of ourselves, only a
little more so. Underneath his wildest paroxysms there is a germ, at least, of rationality and of personal accountability. To believe in this, to seek for it, stimulate it, build
it up-here lies the only way of delivering him out of the fatal bondage in which he is
held.
Quoted in A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 301. Pinel's "moral treatment" implied a mental condition which was curable in an appropriate psychological and social environment. Lipton & Burnett, Pharmacological Treatment of Schizophrenta, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC
SYNDROME 320 (1979).
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ods to treat the mentally ill in the Philadelphia Hospital in 1783.19 He rejected punishment, cruelty, and most forms of restraint, while insisting that
attendants have adequate training, be kind, and employ every means to improve the condition of the patients. 20 The first private hospital for the insane was founded in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1773,21 and the first state
hospital was established in Kentucky in 1824.22 Nevertheless, as late as the
1840's the majority of mentally ill persons were still confined in locked
rooms, cages, outhouses, jails, or poorhouses where they received no therapeutic treatment. 23 Dorothea Dix led the campaign for reform of the treatment of the mentally ill, beginning in Massachusetts in 1843.24 Through her
leadership, state institutions for the mentally ill were founded in eleven states
and the District of Columbia before the Civil War. 25 By 1860, 28 of the 33
states had established insane asylums, 26 and by 1870, nearly every state had
at least one public mental hospital. 27 These asylums were established in the
anticipation that modern, informed, and humane treatment would be provided 28 and represented a marked improvement in the treatment and care of
29
the mentally ill.
Public laws providing for the incarceration of the mentally ill were enacted as early as the late eighteenth century. A 1788 New York statute was
typical:
Whereas, there are sometimes persons who by lunacy or otherwise are furiously mad, or are so disordered in their senses that they
may be dangerous to be permitted to go abroad; therefore, Be it
enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for any two or more justices of the peace to cause such person to be apprehended and kept
and if such justices shall find
safely locked up in some secure place,
30
it necessary, to be there chained.
One basis for the authority of the states to confine the mentally ill was
19. The Philadelphia Hospital had opened in 1752 with a commission to care for "lunaticks" in addition to the sick and poor. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 300; Brakel & Rock, supra
note 11, at 5.
20. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 301.
21. Id. at 300. Other early private institutions for the insane were the Quaker Retreat,
established near Philadelphia in 1817, the McLean Asylum in Massachusetts, founded in 1818,
the Bloomingdale Hospital in New York City, opened in 1821, and the Retreat in Hartford,

Connecticut, established in 1924. Id. at 302.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 304.
24. Id. at 305. In 1843, in an address to the Massachusetts legislature, Dix described the
state of insane persons in the Commonwealth as being confined "in cages, closets, cellars, stalls,
pens! Chained, naked, beaten with rods, and lashed into obedience." Id.
25. Id. at 305-06.
26. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 48.
27. Saphire, supra note 15, at 240.
28. S.B. Stickney, Wyatt v. Stickney: Background and Postscrp)t, in Golann & Fremouw,
supra note 11, at 29.
29. Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1979).

30. 1788 N.Y. Laws ch. 31. As late as 1890, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the
Indiana commitment statute (§§ 5142-5150) was primarily for the "protection of the public

from those whose insanity makes them dangerous to the community. It has in it no feature of
charity to the individual, nor was it enacted with a view to benevolence." Board of Comm'rs v.
Ristine, 124 Ind. 242, 24 N.E. 990 (1890). See also Porter v. Rich, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169
(1898).
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their police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals
by enacting laws and regulations. 3 1 Under the police power, however, the
means adopted for the protection of the public must be only those that are
reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective of32the law, and may not be
unduly oppressive upon the individuals regulated.
A second basis under which states exercised control over the mentally ill
power. At the time of the colonization of America, the
theparenspartae
was
King had powers and duties as the "father of the country" to act as "the
general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics" and all other persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves. 33 After the American Revolution, theparenspalriaepower of the King passed to the states and their legislatures. 34 With regard to the mentally ill, the parens patriae power was
35
originally exercised to protect their property and to provide for their care.
It was not until 1845 that the parenstalrzae power of the state was used to
36
While
detain the mentally ill in order to facilitate their rehabilitation.
recognizing that under the police power "[tihe right to restrain an insane
person of his liberty is found in that great law of humanity, which makes it
necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or others," the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a person
could be confined under the doctrine ofparenspalrt'aewhen restraint is "necessary for his restoration, or will be conducive thereto."' 37 Toward the end of
the nineteenth century, the criterion of need for care and treatment was increasingly included in statutes regarding the commitment of the mentally ill
31. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,
1222 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
32. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1961). For a discussion of the
right to refuse medication and the police power, see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145
(D.N.J. 1978).
33. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971) (quoting Blackstone). See Brakel
& Rock, supra note 1I,at 1-4; N. KITrRIE, supra note 11, at 8-11; Developments in the Law, supra
note 31, at 1206-22.
34. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971). See also Developments in the Law,
supra note 31, at 1208. In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), theparenspatrzae
and often necessary to
power was said to be "inherent in the supreme power of every state ...
be exercised in the interest of humanity." Id. at 57.
35. English law distinguished between the idiot-a person who "hath no understanding
from his nativity"-and the lunatic-a person who "hath understanding, but . . .hath lost the
use of his reason." The statute De PraerogativaRegis, enacted between 1255 and 1290, codified
this distinction, and provided that the lands of idiots were granted to the King. After providing
the idiot with necessaries, the King retained the profits from the land; the land was returned to
the idiot's heirs after his death. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 2. See Yeomans v. Williams, 43
S.E. 73 (Ga. 1907); Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. 446 (1889).
Under.the power delegated to the Chancery, in England by the King and in America by
state legislatures, committees or guardians were appointed to manage the estate of the incompetent person. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 3-4; Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at
1209. See McCord v. Ochiltree, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 15, 16-17 (1848); Rebecca Owings Case, I
Bland (Md.) 280 (1827); In re Mason, I Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 436 (1847); Case of John Beaumont, I
Whart. (Pa.) 52 (1835).
36. Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1209.
37. In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845). Oakes, who was not a violent person,
had been detained because he allegedly suffered from hallucinations and displayed unsoundness
of mind in conducting his business affairs. Only a few days after the death of his wife, Oakes, an
elderly and ordinarily prudent man, had become engaged to a young woman of unsavory character.
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in addition to the criterion of dangerousness to self and others. 38
As early as 1875, however, hospital administrators had begun to complain that the original purpose of state hospitals for the mentally ill was
being subverted by the involuntary commitment of paupers, old people,
mental defectives, harmless eccentrics, and vagrants.3 9 The county almshouses were disappearing, 40 and growing industrialization and urbanization
contributed to the increasing institutionalization of deviants of all sorts. 4 1 In
addition, a "gentleman's agreement" emerged, in which physicians, judges,
and families found it convenient to commit unwanted people to state hospitals. 42 The institutions' increasing inability to cope with the growing
number of inmates led to an era of custodialism. 4 3 By the middle of the
44
twentieth century, nearly 600,000 mentally ill persons were hospitalized.
Most hospitals were overcrowded and understaffed. In spite of the fact that
patients were committed for care and treatment, they received only some
care and very little treatment. 4 5 In 1961, the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health estimated that more than half of all institutionalized
mental patients received no active treatment. 46 Mentally ill persons-hopeless and impoverished, with little power and discredited social status-were,
in effect, warehoused. 4 7 "The fault lay not with individual physicians, nurses
38. See § 2217 of the California Political Code, as amended in 1881, cited in Exparte Clary,
149 Cal. 232, 87 P. 580 (1906); Speedling v. County of Worth, 80 Iowa 153, 26 N.W. 50 (1885);
Van Deusen v. Newcomber, 40 Mich. 80 (1879); Richardson County v. Frederick, 24 Neb. 596,
39 N.W. 621 (1887); Brickway's Case, 80 Pa. 65 (1875). All fifty states now have commitment
statutes based on the parens patriae rationale. Ford, The Psychiatrist's Double Bind The Right to
Refuse Medication, 137 AM. J. PsYcH. 332, 335 (1980); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1134, 1138 (1967).

39. Stickney, supra note 28, at 30.
40. Id.

41. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 49.
42. Stickney, supra note 28, at 30.
43. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 49.
44. Peele, Chodoff & Taub, Involuntary Hospitalization and Treatability: Observations from the
District of Columbia Experience, 23 CAT-. U.L. REV. 744, 749 (1974).

45. At Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1971, there were only three medical
doctors with some psychiatric training (including one board-eligible but no board-certified psychiatrist), one Ph.D. clinical psychologist, and two M.S.W. social workers involved in therapeutic programs for 5,000 patients. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), af d sub
nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Golann, The Core Problem Controversy, in Golann & Fremouw, supra note 11,at 99.

47. Mechanic, supra note 11,at 50. A physician described one institution in the mid-fifties
as having huge barn-like structures which housed the patients, providing no privacy of any
kind. One method of keeping patients under control was the regular use of electroshock treatment (ECT or EST). The facility was clean, however, and some patients who could work had a
job. There was very little in the way of treatment. Interview with Physician B. Physician B is
the director of psychiatry of a large private hospital. The psychiatric ward issmall, and patients
come either through the emergency room or on a contract basis from a community mental
health center. The ward is crisis-oriented, and the average length of stay is five days.
A 1956 article reported, "Patients at Columbus State get EST once, twice, or three times a
week, and in a few cases oftener." Martin, Inside the Asylum, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 10,

1956, 36, cited in Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 163. These conditions continued into the midseventies. A West Virginia court commented in 1974 that "the State of West Virginia offers to
those unfortunates who are incarcerated in mental institutions Dickensian squaler of unconscionable magnitudes." State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E. 109, 120 (W. Va. 1974).
In 1976, an Ohio institution had living conditions substandard and dangerous to both
the mental and physical health of the patients. Housekeeping and maintenance were
extremely poor; many of the physical structures presented fire and safety hazards,
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or attendants-underpaid, undervalued, and overworked as they were-but
with the general community that not only tolerated but enforced these subhuman conditions through financial penury, ignorance, fear and indifference." 48 Out of these conditions emerged the community mental health
49
centers movement and the patients' rights movement.
The development of comprehensive community-based treatment programs through community mental health centers was made possible by the
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963.50 Established with "seed money" from the federal
government, the centers were to provide five essential services in areas with
populations between 75,000 and 200,000: inpatient care, outpatient care,
emergency treatment, partial hospitalization, and consultation and education. 5 ' The feasibility of community mental health services was enhanced
by the development and subsequent widespread use of antipsychotic medications 52 which enabled thousands of patients who were previously managea53
ble only in institutional settings to be released and treated as outpatients.
In addition, a large number of patients were released because institutions
were unable to meet the financial burden of enlarging and upgrading their
facilities to relieve the overcrowding. 54 By the mid-1970's, the population of
55
mental institutions had been reduced to less than 250,000.
The deinstitutionalization of mental patients was furthered by the judicial narrowing of criteria for commitment. Merely being mentally ill or in
need of treatment could no longer serve as the basis for commitment. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 56 the United States Supreme Court found that "a
State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help
of willing and responsible family members or friends. ' 57 Thus, dangerousness to self or others or incapacity to survive on one's own are now the only
while patient areas were generally filthy and malodorous. Moreover, the cottages or
patient living quarters were so crowded that privacy and quiet were nonexistent even
during the night.
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
In addition to the antitherapeutic, dangerous, and inhuman conditions at that institution,
patients were subjected to an alarming number of incidents of physical and sexual abuse by the
staff, id. at 101, adequate care and treatment was virtually impossible, id.at 102, and medication was often administered inappropriately in light of the patients' given diagnoses and symptomatology, id. at 109.
48. Deutsch, Statement, supra note 1, at 41-42.
49. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11,at 9-10.
50. Pub. L. No. 88-164, §§ 200-207, 77 Stat. 290 (1963) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
51. Bassuk & Gerson, supra note 2, at 48.
52. See text accompanying notes 146-84 infra.
53. Bellak, An Idzsncratli Overview, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME 3-4
(1979); DuBose, Of he Parens Patriae Commztment Power and Drug Treatmentfor Schiophrema: Do
theBenefits to thePatients justi Inzoluntay Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1169 (1976).
54. Mechanic,upra note 11, at 51. See Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
55.

A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW:

A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 41 (1976).

56. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
57. Id. at 576. Donaldson had been confined in the Florida State Hospital against his
wishes for fifteen years. The jury had found that Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to
himself nor to others, was provided no treatment. Id. at 577 n. 12.
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58
grounds upon which a mentally ill person can be committed.

The patients' rights movement emerged in 1960 with the publication of
59
an article on the right to treatment, although the duty of the state to treat
those which it confined because of mental illness was recognized as early as
1915 in Hammon v. HR, where the court stated that the state's duty "extends
so far as to include every provision known to medical skill and science for the
6
The right to treatment was first upheld
treatment of the diseased mind."
6
in Rouse v. Cameron, 1 in 1966. Since that decision, at least three constitutional arguments have been propounded to support this right. The first constitutional argument, on the grounds of due process, was articulated in Walt
v. Slickney. 62 "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process." 63 The right to treatment has also been upheld on the constitutional
65
64
and cruel and unusual punishment.
grounds of equal protection
A second right of persons with mental illness is the right to the least
66
Courts have held that patients have the
restrictive alternative treatment.
67
right to be treated in the least restrictive setting within an institution and
that alternatives less restrictive than hospitalization should be considered
58. Dangerousness is extremely hard to predict. See A. STONE, supra note 55, at 25-38;
Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual, American Psych. Ass'n Task Force Rep. 8, 23-30 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Clinical Aspects]; Cocozza & Steadman, Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Griffith & GrifDuty to Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for
fith,
Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 241 (1978); Monahan, Pedction Research and the Emergenc Commitment ofDangerous Mentally Ill Persons:. A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 198 (1978);
Shah, Dangerousnessand Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Polihy Considerations, 132
AM. J. PSYCH. 501 (1975); Simon & Cockerham, Civil Commitment, Burden of Proof and Dangerous
Acts: A Comparison ofPerspectives ofljudges and Psychiatrists,5 J. PSYCH. & L. 571 (1977); Sosowsky,
Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in View of the New Legal RelationshipBetween the
State and the Mentally I/, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 33 (1978); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be
Predited?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972); Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at
1236-45.
59. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
60. 228 F. 999, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1915) (dictum).
61. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
63. Id. at 785. See also Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Stachulak
1973); State ex rel. R.G.W., 145 N.J. Super. 167, 366
v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
A.2d 1375 (1976); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to
Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1282, 1288 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Harv. Comment].
64. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), aJ'dsub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Goodman,
Right to Treatment: Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 680, 690 (1969); Harv. Comment,
supra note 63, at 1293.
65. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Developments in the Law, supra note
31, at 1330-33; Harv. Comment, supra note 63, at 1292.
66. Arons, Working in the "Cuckoo's Nest'" An Essay on Recent Changes in Mental Health Law and
9 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 87 (1977);
the Changing Role of Pschiatristsin Relation to Patientand Society,
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill. PraticalGuides and ConstittionalImperattes, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); Goodman, supra note 64, at 697; Schwartz, In the Name
of Treatment- Autonomy, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW.
808, 833, 835 (1975); Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1245-53.
67. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp.
1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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when committing the mentally ill. 68 The community mental health centers
movement 69 has facilitated the implementation of the right to the least restrictive alternative treatment. The right to the least restrictive alternative
70
has also been applied to organic therapies, including medication.
The most recent of mental patients' rights to be recognized is the right
to refuse treatment. 7 ' Courts have upheld the right to refuse psychosurgery 72 and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), 7 3 and the right to refuse seclusion if not properly supervised by a physician. 74 Since 1978, the right to
75
Massachusetts, 76
refuse medication has been sustained in New Jersey,
77
78
79
80
Oklahoma,
Utah,
Ohio,
and Colorado.
Five constitutional arguments have been advanced to justify the right to refuse treatment in general
and medication in particular: the right to privacy, equal protection, due
process, free expression, and cruel and unusual punishment.
The right to privacy, 8 ' first upheld in Grzswoldv. Connecltcut, 12 is said to
be found within "penumbras" surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments.8 3 Several cases have since held that the right to privacy
8 4
includes the right to decline medical treatment in certain circumstances.
The right to privacy extends to protection against unwanted intrusions into
bodily integrity, and in fact, this protection-"the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person"-was first recognized in
1890.85 The freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions has been applied in a
68. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Harv. Comment, supra note 63, at 1295.
69. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
70. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978).
71. See A. STONE, supra note 55; DuBose, supra note 53; Ford, supra note 38; Griffith &
Griffith, supra note 58; Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Org: Mental Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 66; Comment, Advances in Mental
Health: A Casefor the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Advances 6n Mental Health]; Comment, Forced Drug Medication ofInvoluntarily Committed Mental Patients, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ForcedDrug Medication].
72. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73019434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
10, 1973), reprintedin PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, I LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, 785-821 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973).
73. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
74. Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
75. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
76. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
77. In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
78. A.E. v. Mitchell, No. C 78-466 (D. Utah 1980).
79. Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (U.S.D.C., Ohio, Sept. 16, 1980).
80. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
81. The existence of a right to privacy was first suggested in the article, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold held that a married couple had a constitutional right to
privacy which protected their use of contraceptives in the home. Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion stated that "the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed
to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."
Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 483.
84. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Quinlin, 70 N.J. 40, 54, 355 A.2d
647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
85. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). This case forbade a district court to
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number of different contexts, 86 including the right to refuse medication. It
has been held that in a nonemergency situation, "it is an unreasonable invasion of privacy, and an affront to basic concepts of human dignity, to permit
forced injection of a mind-altering drug into the buttocks of a competent
87
person unwilling to give informed consent."
The right of mental patients to refuse treatment has also been based on
equal protection and due process grounds. Competent physically ill persons
may refuse treatment unless there is a life-threatening emergency, in which
situation treatment will be administered against the wishes of the patient
88
In contrast, mentally ill persons are
only in very limited circumstances.
not per se incompetent solely because they have been diagnosed as being
mentally ill. 89 To deny the mentally ill the right to refuse medication simply
90
Since combecause of their illness violates their right to equal protection.
or refuse
to
give,
the
ability
petence is the criterion upon which is grounded
the
involunmedication,
of
administration
the
for
to give, informed consent
lack of
of
determination
a
prior
without
medication
tary administration of
or
compelling
of
any
absence
in the clear
competence violates due process
9
rational state justification. 1
The first amendment's protection of freedom of expression also supports
the right to refuse medication: 92 "A person's mental processes, the communication of ideas, and the generation of ideas, come within the ambit of the
First Amendment. To the extent that the First Amendment protects the
dissemination of ideas and the expressions of thoughts, it equally must pro93
In order to communicate, the
tect the individual's right to generate ideas."
ability to think is essential, and medication administered in the treatment of
order a surgical examination in a tort case. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Forced
Drug Medication, supra note 71.
86. In Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968), a rectal search, based on
"mere suspicion," made at the Mexican border was held to be unconstitutional. Perhaps the
most famous case involving the violation of bodily integrity and the right of privacy was based
on the fourth amendment. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court
ruled that the pumping of a suspected narcotics dealer's stomach to obtain evidence was "illegal
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner," id. at 172, and constituted "conduct that shocks the
conscience," id.
87. Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (U.S.D.C., Ohio, Sept. 16, 1980). See Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1369 (D. Mass. 1979); In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d
747, 751 (Okla. 1980).
88. In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
89. Plotkin, supra note 71, at 496. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 965 (1971), the court held that a woman, who had been committed involuntarily
because of mental illness but who was competent and who refused medication on religious
grounds, could refuse medication.
90. "If we were dealing here with an ordinary patient suffering from a physical ailment,
the hospital authorities would have no right to impose compulsory medical treatment against
the patient's will and to do so would constitute. . . battery." Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
91. Plotkin, supra note 71, at 496.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73019434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
10, 1973).
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mental illness often impairs that ability. 94 In fact, one purpose of the use of
antipsychotic medication is to change aberrant thought patterns. 9 5 The
Supreme Court has written that "[olur whole constitutional heritage rebels
'9 6
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Thus, under the first amendment, mental patients have the right to refuse
97
medication which affects their thought processes.
A
forced
Courts
on this
II.

final argument supporting the right to refuse medication is that
medication subjects a patient to cruel and unusual punishment.
have supported the right of mentally ill persons to refuse medication
ground only in a criminal context. 98

MENTAL ILLNESS, DRUG TREATMENT, AND POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS

The diagnostic classifications of major mental illnesses are depression,
manic-depressive disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder.
Medication is a major form of treatment for each classification; however, all
medications have potential side effects which, if they occur, may be more
disturbing to the patients than the mental illness itself.99
A.

Marnc-depressive dtiorder

Manic-depressive disorder, also known as bipolar affective disorder, is a
cyclic affective disorder'0° characterized by either recurrent attacks of mania
or alternating attacks of mania and depression.10 1 In the manic phase,
02
symptoms include a bizarre increase in psychomotor activity, grandiosity,'
reduced need for sleep, flight of ideas, elation, poor judgment, aggressiveness,
and sometimes hostility.' 0 3 In the depressive phase, the symptoms resemble
those of major depression.'°4
Lithium carbonate is the preferred treatment for manic-depressive illness;' 0 5 however, the onset of the drug's action is slow, as it becomes effective
only after two weeks of continuous administration.' 0 6 For these reasons,
acute, severely manic patients are often treated concurrently with antipsychotic medication,' 07 and severely depressed patients are treated concur94. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra.
96. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
97. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979).
98. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976).
99. See text accompanying notes 223-28 infra.
100. Affective disorders are mood disorders. See DuBose, supra note 53, at 1180 n.75.
101. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGy: BAStC PRINCIPLES IN THERAPEUTICS 865 (2d ed. K.
Melmon & H. Morrelli 1978) [hereinafter cited as Melmon & Morrellil.
102. Id.; PHYSICtAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1518-19 (34th ed. 1980).
103. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1518-19.
104. Physician A, supra note 8; Interview with Physician C. Physician C is a staff psychiatrist at both a community mental health center and a residential treatment center.
105. A description of the pharmacological action of lithium carbonate is found in Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866. Lithium carbonate was the first psychotropic medication to
be discovered. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 357.
106. Physician A, supra note 8; Physician C, supra note 104.
107. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866. See text accompanying notes 146-84 bifra.
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rently with tricyclic antidepressants. ' 0 For lesser degrees of mania, lithium
alone is usually sufficient.' 0 9 Because lithium carbonate acts as a prophylactic, it is often used on a long-term maintenance basis to prevent or diminish
the intensity of subsequent manic or depressive episodes." 0
Lithium carbonate is potentially very toxic and has a low therapeutic
index;' " that is, there is a very small margin between a therapeutic dose and
a toxic dose.1 12 Toxicity may therefore occur at dosages close to therapeutic
levels." 3 Among the symptoms of toxicity are nausea, diarrhea, thirst, sluggishness, dazed feelings, muscle weakness, and hand tremors. As toxicity increases, symptoms include lack of coordination, drowsiness, coarse tremors,
muscle twitching, and eventually stupor, coma, and death.I1 4 In addition,
upon initial administration of lithium carbonate, patients may experience
mild and transient nausea, mild thirst, and general discomfort, which usually disappear within a few days. 115 Long-term use of lithium carbonate
6
may lead to thyroid enlargement with diminished thyroid function."
B.

Depression

Depression is characterized by feelings of sadness, fatigue, loss of interest
in the social environment, self neglect, lowering of functional activity, insomnia, hopelessness, and fear that the condition is permanent." 7 Suicidal preoccupation, depersonalization, apathy, anorexia, and guilt feelings may also
be present. I"' There are several different approaches to the classification of
108. Physician C, supra note 104. See text accompanying notes 127-33 infra; A. BECK, ela.,
COGNITIVE THEORY OF DEPRESSION 355, 364 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as A. BECK].
109. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866.
110. Physician A, supra note 8; Physician C, supra note 104; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1518. See A. BECK, supra note 108, at 355; Kocsis & Stokes, Lithiun Maintenance: Factors Afecting Outcome, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 563 (1979).
111. See Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867.
112. Interview with Physician D. Physician D is the staff psychiatrist in charge of a division
of a large residential treatment center. He has had a number of patients who have refused
medication. He has gone to court on two occasions for hearings on petitioners' requesting the
involuntary administration of medication. Medication was ordered in both. See Melmon &
Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867.
113. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 990 (24th ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as MEDICAL DICTIONARY]; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1518. Also
known as nephrotoxicity, the symptoms are the result of damage to the kidney cells. Drug Toxicity and Physician's Liability, 3 MASS. GENERAL HOSPITAL NEWSLETTER, BILOGICAL THERAPIES
IN PSYCH. 21 (1980); MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at 992.
114. These are the symptoms of the onset of mild toxicity. As toxicity increases, symptoms
include lack of coordination, drowsiness, coarse tremors, muscle twitching, and eventually stupor and coma. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1519.
115. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1520. If.any of the symptoms of
toxicity appear the drug should be stopped immediately, as continued use of the drug is potentially lethal. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra
note 102, at 1519-20.
116. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867-68. About five percent of patients taking
lithium develop hypothyroidism. Lithium, Hypothyroidism, and CPK, 3 MASS. GENERAL HosPITAL NEWSLETrER, BIOLOGICAL THERAPIES IN PSYCH. 22 (1980).
117. N. KLINE, DEPRESSION: ITS DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 10 (1969); MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 400.
118. N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 10.
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the depressive disorder, 1 19 among which are major vs. minor,' 20 psychotic
vs. neurotic,1

21

endogenous vs. reactive,'

22

and bipolar vs. unipolar.,

23

No

matter which classification is used, all forms of depression may be treated
with medication. 124 In the less serious forms of depression, medication is
most likely to be used on a short-term basis to relieve the immediate acute
symptoms. In the more serious forms of depression, medication may be used
25
on a long-term maintenance basis.1
Tricyclic antidepressants are the drugs most often used to treat depression. 126 They elevate the person's mood and biochemically increase the person's ability to cope. 127 Tricyclic antidepressants may produce a number of
side effects including such anticholinergic symptoms as dry mouth and
blurred vision; allergic reactions such as rash, itching, and increased sensiti119. Kielholz, Opening Address.- Diagnostic Aspects in the Treatment of Depression, in DEPRESSIVE
See N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 10-

ILLNESS, DIAGNOSIS, ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT 12 (1972).

12.
120. The following criteria are used to diagnose a major depressive disorder:
A. One or more distinct periods of dysphoric mood or pervasive loss of interest or
pleasure.
B. Five or more of the following:
1. Increase or decrease in appetite or weight.
2. Excessive or insufficient sleep.
3. Low energy, fatigability, or tiredness.
4. Psychomotor agitation or retardation.
5. Loss of interest or pleasure in usual activities.
6. Feelings of self-reproach, guilt.
7. Decreased ability to think or concentrate.
8. Recurrent thoughts of death or suicide.
C. Duration of dysphoric features for at least two weeks.
D. Sought help or sustained functional impairment.
E. No other major diagnoses (e.g., schizophrenia).
Minor depression is diagnosed when some of the features of the major depressive disorder are
present, but the most prominent feature is a prevailing mood of depression with no psychotic
episodes. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 360.

121. The American Psychiatric Association, in its 1968 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-II), distinguished a single nonpsychotic depression (depressive neurosis) and five types of
psychotic depression (psychotic depressive reaction; involuntional melancholia; and manic-depressive illness, manic, depressed, and circular types). A. BECK, supra note 108, at 362.
122. Endogenous depressions are thought to have a biochemical cause. According to this
theory, the persons affected are prone to depression because of some lack of neurotransmission
in the "coping system" of the brain. Stresses, to which a normal person would react by having a
transient feeling of the "blues" and with which they would be able to adequately cope, caused
reactions in the person with endogenous depression greatly disproportionate to the precipitating
event.
Reactive depressions, on the other hand, are thought to be caused solely by a stressful event
to which the degree of depression is usually proportionate. In this form of depression, interest,
ability to cope, and ability to work may be diminished but are not entirely absent. Melmon &
Morelli, supra note 101, at 850. See also A. BECK, supra note 108, at 363; N. KLINE, supra note
117, at 1315; Kuhn, Clinical Experinces with a New Antidepressant, in DEPRESSIVE ILLNESS, DIAG-

195 (1972).
123. Bipolar depression is the depressive phase of manic-depressive disorder. See text accompanying notes 100-10 supra. Unipolar depressions are distinguished from manic-depressive
disorders because of the absence of manic periods and fewer total episodes of depression.
Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 850.
124. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 363.
125. Id. at 356.
126. Id. at 355.
NOSIS, ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT

127.

PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016. Tricyclic antidepressants vary

both in their sedative and their anticholinergic effects, and the choice of drug is usually made
with these variances in mind. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 855.
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zation to the sun; and such gastrointestinal reactions as nausea, peculiar
taste, and abdominal cramps.12 8 In addition, they may cause adverse psychological effects, including confusional states accompanied by hallucinations, disorientation, delusions, anxiety, restlessness, insomnia, panic, and
nightmares.12 9 Both neurological and cardiovascular reactions may also occur, 130 and a toxic overdose may produce, among other things, shock, stupor, coma, and death.' 3 ' Older persons may not be able to take
antidepressants; 132 consequently electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) may be
the only effective treatment 133 for elderly persons with severe psychotic depression.
Monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors have also been used in the treatment of depression.' 34 They are rarely the first drugs used and are most
suitable for patients who have failed to respond to tricyclic antidepressants.' 35 They have been found to be effective in depressed patients classified as "atypical," "nonendogenous," or "neurotic." 1 36 They should not be
used in combination with, or within two weeks following, the administration
of tricyclic antidepressants because of severe adverse reactions which may
37
result in death.'

C. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a disorder manifested in pathological disturbances of
thought, mood, and behavior.' 38 Among the symptoms associated with
128. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016-17. Hematologic reactions
such as bone marrow depression and agranulocytosis also occur. Id. at 1017. See text accompanying notes 180-82 zinfa.
129. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.

130. Tricyclic antidepressants lower the convulsive threshold, increasing the possibility of
seizures. Other neurological reactions may be numbness, tingling, and extrapyramidal side effects (see text accompanying notes 163-68 infta). Therapeutic doses have produced palpitations,
tachycardia and orthostatic hypotension (reduced blood pressure), abnormalities in the electrocardiagram and arrhythmias, myocardial damage, congestive heart failure, and death. Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.
131. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note

102, at 1017.
132. "The incidence of adverse drug reaction steadily increases with age. Beyond 60 years
of age, there is a progressive reduction of tissue mass, as well as renal, hepatic, and cardiovascular function." Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 63.
133. Physician D, supra note 112; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 355. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), also known as electroshock therapy, has been described as "a technique by which a
current of from 70 to 130 volts of electricity is permitted to flow through the patient's brain,
causing a convulsion equivalent to an epileptic seizure." New York City Health and Hosp.
Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 946-47, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463-64 (Sup. Ct. 1972). For the
involutional melancholia form of psychotic depression, ECT is the treatment of choice. A.
BECK, srupra note 108, at 363.
134. N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 13; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at

1327.
135. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1327.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 1016.

138. The American Psychiatric Association has defined schizophrenia as follows:
a group of disorders manifested by characteristic disturbances of thinking, mood and
behavior. Disturbances in thinking are marked by alterations of concept formation
which may lead to misinterpretation of reality and sometimes to delusions and hallucinations, which frequently appear psychologically self-protective. Corollary mood
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acute schizophrenia are unrealistic thinking, severe anxiety, excessive suspiciousness, perplexity or confusion, social withdrawal, auditory hallucinations, blunted affect, overactivity, feeling of impending doom, and
generalized motor inhibition. 139 Manifestations of schizophrenia may also
be very subtle, so that some persons who have the illness may be considered
to be only eccentric. 140 The functioning of chronic schizophrenics is often
severely impaired, W' and many are unable to deal with the stresses of everyday life. 14 2 Ten percent of all schizophrenics need prolonged custodial
care,' 43 and less than fifteen percent of individuals who are so seriously af44
fected as to require prolonged hospitalization ever function normally.'
Schizophrenia is the most prevalent disorder in the mental health system,
45
accounting for nearly half of all patients.'
Schizophrenia is treated with antipsychotic or psychotropic medication.1 46 The most widely used of the antipsychotic drugs are the phenothiachanges include ambivalent, constricted and inappropriate emotional responsiveness
and loss of empathy with others. Behavior may be withdrawn, regressive, and bizarre.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968), quoted in DuBose, supra note 53, at 1180 n.75.
139. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1181. Dr. Will described the process of schizophrenia:
The acutely disturbed schizophrenic person finds that much that is in his awareness is
no longer familiar to him; his thinking is disordered by the presence of vague, poorly
organized symbols of previous anxiety-fraught interpersonal relationships. The referents and meaning of these symbols are unclear and cannot be communicated to others.
As communication fails isolation increases, and the sufferer finds himself caught in a
nightmare, driven by a feeling of urgency to make sense of the incomprehensibles with
which he is involved. He seeks a simple formula to make all clear, and if he is unfortunate he may elaborate and paranoid solution with its gradiosity, apportioning of
blame, and chronic reformulation of the past and present to refine and protect a "system" that will reduce anxiety. The cost of such a caricaturing of human living is
high-for the patient and anyone with any vestige of interest in him. When the ties of
human relatedness are poorly developed and fragile, despair may enter the scene . . .
formal relationships are abandoned along with hope, and the organism becomes its
own object and the referent of poorly organized symbols of interpersonal affairs. Here
anxiety may be held in check through the maintenance of disorganization.
10 WILL, PROCESS, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SCHIZOPHRENIA IN PSYCHOTHERAPY OF THE PSYCHOSIS 31-32 (1961), quoted in Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 755, 769 (1969). For a survey of systems for diagnosis of schizophrenia currently in
use, see Carpenter & Strauss, Diagnostc Issues in Schzophrenia, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME, 299-304 (1979).
140. There are two theories as to the cause of schizophrenia. One is that it is the result of
pathologic social-family relationships. The second theory is that it is caused by abnormal biochemical-genetic influences. The fact that chemotherapy ameliorates the symptoms supports
the theory that schizophrenia is primarily a biological rather than a psychological disorder. See
Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857. There remains a considerable shortage of information about the variety of defects which underlie the schizophrenic syndrome. Meltzer, Biochem'.
cal Studis in Schizophrenta, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME 45 (1979).
141. Physician D, supra note 112; Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856-57.
142. Physician D, supra note 112.
143. Bellak, supra note 53, at 6.
144. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857.
145. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1151.
146. Antipsychotic drugs are also used for treatment of schizoaffective disorders (accompanied by either mania or depression), as a useful adjunctive treatment for mania (see text accompanying note 107 supra), and for symptomatic control of psychoses associated with old age.
They should be used only minimally for depression and should not be used to treat psychoses
associated with acute brain syndromes due to withdrawal from other drugs or associated with
hallucinogenic drugs. Melmon & Morrelli, sura note 101, at 861-62.
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zine derivatives. 147 Other antipsychotic medications in use are the
4
butyrophenones, the thioxanithenes, loxapine, and molindone.1 3 Most of
these drugs are equally efficacious,' 49 but vary in potency. 150 Individual
patients respond differently to different medications, and a wide range of
possible therapeutic doses of antipsychotic drugs is available.15'
Antipsychotic medications work by affecting the function of the neurotransmitters in the brain.' 52 They are used both to ameliorate the acute
symptoms of schizophrenia 153 and on a long-term, maintenance basis to
prevent the symptoms' return.' 54 Some schizophrenics, however, receive no
benefit from antipsychotic medication,' 5 5 and others may do as well or better without drug treatment.' 6 In addition, while psychotropic drugs have a
147. Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 857-58; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 322,
325.
148. See Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 857, 859; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at
325-27.
149. Physician D, supra note 112; Mellmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857-62; Lipton &
Burnett, supra note 18, at 327.
150. For example, 2 mg. of Haldol (haloperidol) have the same antipsychotic effect as 100
mg. of Thorazine (chlorpromazine). The antipsychotic drugs also vary in their sedative effect,
the less potent having a greater sedative effect than the more potent. Physician D, supra note
112; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 329.
151. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
152. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 895; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
102, at 673; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 323.
153. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
Among the symptoms which antipsychotic medications relieve are thought disturbance, paranoid symptoms, delusions, social withdrawal, loss of self-care, anxiety, and agitation. Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Schwartz, supra note 66, at 812. Combativeness disappears,
and patients become relaxed and cooperative. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1194; Schwartz, supra
note 66, at 813.
154. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862-63; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 333.
The use of antipsychotic medication on a maintenance basis resembles the use of insulin by
diabetics or the use of antihypertensive medication by persons with high blood pressure. Treatment is considered to be indefinite and uninterrupted, although the dosage may vary and be
considerably reduced during the length of the treatment. A sizeable number of readmissions to
hospitals have been traced to the reappearance of symptoms caused by the patient's stopping
the use of medication. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862-63. See also Opler, Tardive
Dyskinesia and Institutional Practice: Current Issues and Guidelines, 31 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY
PSYCH. 239 (1980).
155. As many as 20 to 25% of schizophrenics may receive no benefit from antipsychotic
medication. Physician D, supra note 112. See Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in its 20th Year,
181 SCIENCE 124 (1973); Van Putten, W) Do Schizophrenic PatientsRefuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31

ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Van Putten]; Van Putten & May,
Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacotherapy, 35 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 477
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Van Putten & May].
156. Bockoven & Solomon, Comparison of Two Five-Year Follow-Up Studies.- 1947 to 1952 and
1967 to 1972, 132 AM. J. PSYCH. 796 (1975); Carpenter, McGlashin & Strauss, The Treatment of
Acute Schizophrenia Without Drugs." An lnvestigation of Some Current Assumptions, 134 AM. J. PSYCH.
14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter]; Evans, PremorbidAdjustment,Phenothiazine Treatment, and
Remission in Acute Schizophrenics, 27 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 486 (1972); Van Kammen,
MAO Activity, CSFAmine Metabolites, and Drug-FreeImprovement in Schizophrenia, 135 AM. J. PSYCH.

567 (1978); Van Putten, supra note 155; R. Warner & T. Yeager, Involuntary Civil Commitment: A Medical Perspective, at 6 (Apr. 4, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at Mental
Health and the Law: A Symposium, Boulder, Colorado).
As many as 30% of psychotic patients spontaneously remit within a few days in an appropriate milieu. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.
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wide therapeutic index1 57 and consequently a great margin of safety,158 they
are responsible for a number of side effects,' 59 one of which may be permanent.
When patients are first treated with antipsychotic medication, they may
experience any of several short-term side effects, including drowsiness, dry
mouth, dizziness, nausea, and blurred vision. 160 These usually last no more
62
16 1
Patients may also experience confusion and lethargy. '
than two weeks.
A second category of side effects is the extrapyramidal or neuromuscular syndromes resulting from the drug's effects on the central nervous system. 163 One extrapyramidal effect is Parkinsonism, the symptoms of which
include coarse tremor, shuffling gait, drooling, and rigidity.' 64 Extrapyramidal side effects also include dystonias--uncoordinated body
spasms, including spasm of neck muscles, rigidity of the back muscles, swallowing difficulties, and protrusion of the tongue. 165 Another extrapyramidal effect is akathisia-motor restlessness characterized by feelings
of not being able to calm oneself ranging from inner disquiet to inability to
sit or lie quietly to insomnia.166 Anti-Parkinsonism (anticholinergic) drugs
used to counteract extrapyramidal side effects 167 may produce blurred vision, dry mouth, nausea, and nervousness.'68
157. The therapeutic index indicates the range between a therapeutic dose and a toxic dose
of medication. The greater the therapeutic index, the safer the drug and the lower its potential
toxicity at therapeutic doses. See Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 73, 79-80; Lipton &
Burnett, supra note 18, at 336.
158. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862.
159. See Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 337, for a listing of the nature and frequency of
adverse reactions to various types of antipsychotic medications.
160. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1634; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 338; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203.
161. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203.
162. Interview with Physician E. Physician E is the staff psychiatrist in charge of a division
of a large residential treatment center. The patients on his ward are acutely mentally ill. He
has encountered some patients who have refused medication, but his policy is to wait and try to
talk the patients into taking medication voluntarily. He has not gone to court. The patients on
his ward remain a maximum of three weeks; if they still need treatment they are transferred to
another ward.
163. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203. Both the amelioration of symptoms of psychosis and
the extrapyramidal side effects result from the same pharmacologic action on the postsynaptic
dopamine receptors. The drugs' blockade of receptors in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system
produces the antipsychotic properties and the blockage of receptors in the striatonigral
dopaminergic system is followed by the extrapyramidal symptoms. Melmon & Morrelli, supra
note 101, at 860. Approximately 30% of patients on sedative phenothiazines or thioxanthenes
and more than 50% of patients on other antipsychotic medications will suffer from extrapyramidal syndromes. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 336, 338.
164.

Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 893; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note

102, at 1634; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203; Plotkin, supra note 71, at 475. Other symptoms of
Parkinsonism include pinrolling motion, plastic rigidity, or "cog wheeling," characterized by
stiffness of the skeletal muscles interrupted by lapses at the rate of three to seven cycles per
second; akinesia, which involves difficulty in initiating movements or modifying ongoing motor
activity; and mask-like face. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 893; Plotkin, supra note 71,
at 475.
165.

PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1634; DuBose, supra note 53, at

1203.
166. Physician D, supra note 112; MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 50.
167. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 863. One anti-Parkinsonism drug commonly
used is Cogentin. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1149.
168.

Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 864; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
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A serious and possibly permanent side effect of antipsychotic medications is tardive dyskinesia.1 69 This syndrome is characterized by rhythmical
involuntary movements of the tongue, face, mouth, or jaw (including protrusion of the tongue, puffing of the cheeks, puckering of the mouth, and chew70
Most, if
ing movements), and involuntary movements of the extremities.'
not all, cases of tardive dyskinesia are preceded by the Parkinsonism syndrome.' 7 1 Ironically, however, the anticholinergic medications used to
counteract Parkinsonism and other extrapyramidal side effects are not only
ineffective against tardive dyskinesia, but often unmask latent dyskinesias
and may exacerbate existing ones.1 72 In addition, though the long-term use
of high dosage antipsychotic medications is the cause of tardive dyskinesia,
paradoxically, the symptoms are often not observed until drug usage is discontinued. Because sudden withdrawal of antipsychotic medications may
bring out latent syndromes, the most effective treatment to ameliorate the
symptoms of tardive dyskinesia is to increase the present dosage or to
readminister antipsychotic medication. 173 Although recent research has indicated that lecithin may be used to ameliorate the symptoms of tardive
dyskinesia, 174 at present, no reliably effective treatment has been devel75
oped. '
Other serious side effects of antipsychotic medications include skin and
eye changes, liver damage, and agranulocytosis. The skin may become sensitive to sunlight and turn gray, blue, or purple upon exposure to the sun.
102, at 1149. Anticholinergic drugs may produce mental confusion and excitement with large
doses. Mental symptoms may be intensified and visual hallucinations may occur. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1149. This group of drugs may also unmask or aggravate
tardive dyskinesia. Id. See text accompanying notes 169-75 tnfra.
169. Although there is no question that prolonged administration of high dosages of antipsychotic drugs contributes to the onset of tardive dyskinesia, the actual cause is not known. It
has been suggested that antipsychotic drugs cause hypersensitivity of, or damage to, receptors
or neurons in the striatonigral dopaminergic system in the brain. The risk of tardive dyskinesia
increases with age and length of use of medication. More women than men are likely to develop
the syndrome. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1615; Opler,supra note 154, at 240; Plotkin,supra note 71, at 477. See Lipton
& Burnett, supra note 18, at 339-41.
170. These movements may also involve the diaphram, esophagus, and trunk. Melmon &
Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1615; Opler,
supra note 154, at 240.
171. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865. Fine vermicular (wormlike) movements of
the tongue may be an early sign of the onset of the syndrome. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 113, at 1684; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1103.
172. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 340.
173. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; Opler, supra note 154, at 240.
174. Gelenberg, Chohne and Lecithin in the Treatment of Tardte Dyskinesia: Preliminary Results
from a Pilot Study, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 772 (1979); Neurotransmitter PrecursorsMay Allay Neurologic
Diseases, 8 CLINICAL PSYCH. NEWS 27 (1980).
175. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866; Opler, supra note 154, at 240. One recommended course of treatment at present is to eliminate or reduce anticholinergic medication as
soon as possible and to reduce the dose of antipsychotic medication slowly, trying to strike a
balance between improvement in the psychosis and amelioration of the abnormal movements.
Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 864-65. Another recommended course of treatment is to
periodically withdraw antipsychotic medications so that latent tardive dyskinesia may be discovered. Some patients may do as well without medication (see text accompanying note 155
supra), and withdrawal of medication in some cases has lead to reversal of the symptoms of
tardive dyskinesia and often complete remission. Opler, supra note 154, at 242.
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76
Fine particles may appear in the lens and cornea of the eye. 1 Pigmentary
retinopathy, characterized by diminution of visual acuity, brownish coloring
17 7
Fatty changes
of vision, and impairment of night vision may also occur.
78
Agranulocytosis, which inin the liver may result in chronic jaundice.'
79
volves a precipitate disappearance of white blood cells, 1 is potentially fatal
80
because of the risk of immediate infection. 1 It is most often associated with
This side effect is now less
the administration of drugs in high dosages.'
common, at least in part, because of increased usage of lower dosage, higher
potency drugs, from the use of which it is virtually unknown. 182 Finally,
there have been reports of sudden, unexplained deaths of hospitalized
83
but at present
psychotic patients receiving antipsychotic medications,'
between the deaths
there is insufficient evidence to establish a relationship
84
and the administration of psychotropic medication.'

D.

Schizoafctive disorder

Schizoaffective disorder is characterized by a mixture of schizophrenic
symptoms and altered affect, either depression or excitement. If depression
is the affect presented, the disorder is not easily distinguished from psychotic
depression. If the patient is excited, the disorder resembles the manic phase
of manic-depressive disorders.' 5 Chlorpromazine is more effective for highand chlorly agitated schizoaffective patients,' 86 and lithium carbonate
7
promazine are equally effective for mildly agitated patients. '

E. Misdagnosis and drug treatment
A number of studies have shown that the diagnostic reliability of psychiatric disorders is poor.'8 One commentator concluded that while the
176. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1527; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 339; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1204.
177. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1526.
178. Id. at 857.
179. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1204.
180. Id.; Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865. Agranulocytosis usually appears
within the first six weeks of treatment and is fatal in 30% or more of the cases. DuBose, supra
note 53, at 1205. Symptoms may also include ulcerative lesions of the throat and other mucous
membranes, of the gastrointestinal tract, and of the skin. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note
113, at 48.
181. For example, chlorpromazine and thioridazine. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at
865; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 339.
182. For example, haldoperal, fluphenazine, and tioxene. Such drugs require low dosages
to achieve the same effect. See note 150 supra.
183. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1615; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 339.
184. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1676; Physician C, supra note 104;
Interview with Physician F. Physician F, a psychiatrist, is the medical director of the adult
psychiatric division of a large residential treatment center. He has participated in a number of
medication hearings.
Several patients have shown sudden flare-ups of psychotic behavior patterns shortly before
death. Previous brain damage or seizures may have been predisposing factors. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1676.
185. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866.
186. Id.
187. Id.; Opler, supra note 154, at 241.
188. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychia y and the Presumptionof Expertise: Flipping Coins in he Court-
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reliability of the diagnoses of organic disorders is fairly high, the reliability of
diagnoses of functional disorders is only about fifty percent. 18 9 Contributing
to the problems of diagnosing mental illness are the facts that symptoms
overlap between diagnostic categories, discrimination among diagnostic categories is unclear, and within each category a wide variety of symptoms exists. The manic phase of manic-depressive disorder resembles some forms of
schizophrenia,' 90 while the depressive phase is at first often indistinguishable
from depression.' 9 ' Although the manic patient may respond to antipsychotic medications typically prescribed for schizophrenia, better longterm control of the manic phase results from treatment with lithium.' 92 Persons diagnosed as having schizoaffective disorder may in fact have manicdepressive illness. 193 Depression may be masked with the patient having no
complaints of feeling sad or "blue."' 194 A large number of patients do not fit
neatly into any diagnostic niche.195 As a result of the diagnostic complexities, there is some feeling that the current proclivity is to make too rapid
diagnoses followed by too narrowly derived treatment decisions, particularly
96
regarding drug therapy.1
The problem of misdiagnosis is compounded by the fact that drugs may
97
bring out undesired symptoms. Antidepressants can exacerbate psychoses'
and activate latent schizophrenia symptoms. 19a If antidepressant medication
is given to manic-depressive patients, it may cause symptoms of the manic
phase to occur.19 9 If phenothiazenes, the most frequently used class of antipsychotic medication, are given to nonpsychotic patients, dysphoria results.2°0 Dysphoria is characterized by disquiet, restlessness, and malaise. 20 I
Misdiagnosis is particularly critical in the elderly, 202 who often have
room, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974); Schwartz, supra note 66, at 809; ForcedDrug Medication, supra
note 71, at 113.
189. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 188, at 699-708. The studies generally compared the diagnosis reached by two or more psychiatrists, and found that half the time they differed.
190. Physician A, supra note 8; Carpenter & Strauss, supra note 139, at 292. There has been
a tendency in America to diagnose schizophrenia more often than in Europe. Physician A, supra
note 8; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.
191. Physician C, supra note 104; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 357. One follow-up study of
patients diagnosed as having unipolar depression found that 18% in fact had bipolar depression
(manic-depressive disorder).
192. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
193. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 359.
194. Id.
195. Carpenter & Strauss, supra note 139, at 292.
196. Id. at 317.
197. Katz, Cole & Lowery, Studies of the Diagnostic Process. The Influence of Symptom Perception,
Past Experience, and Ethnic Background on Diagnostic Decisions, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 937 (1969). Antidepressants can exacerbate psychosis. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 858.
Attorney A reported that four of his clients complained of bizarre and frightening perceptual
changes-in effect, being made crazier-after being medicated. Attorney A conducts a private
practice primarily in the area of family law. His mental health clients have come through both
court appointments and his regular practice. He is a member of the Mental Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
198. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.
199. Id.
200. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862. Widespread use of antipsychotic medication without evidence of psychosis is potentially dangerous. Opler, supra note 154, at 243.
201. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 458.
202. Physician D, supra note 112; Interview with Attorney B. Attorney B is in private prac-
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paradoxic reactions to medications; for example, sedatives may produce agitation.2 0 3 Considering the variety of potential side effects of medications
used in the treatment of mental illness and the possibility of misdiagnosis,
refusal of medication by mental patients may be founded on very objective
20 4
bases.
III.

COLORADO STATUTE AND REGULATIONS ON CARE AND
TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL

The Colorado statute regulating the care and treatment of the mentally
ill 20 5 has codified much of the case law regarding patients' rights. The purposes underlying the statute are:
(a) To secure for each person who may be mentally ill such care
and treatment as will be suited to the needs of the person and to
insure that such care and treatment are skillfully and humanely
administered;
(b) To deprive a person of his liberty for purposes of treatment or
care only when less restrictive alternatives are unavailable and only
when his safety or the safety of others is endangered;
(c) To provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity,
and other secure treatment and care for mental illness;
(d) To encourage the use of voluntary rather than coercive
meas20 6
ures to secure treatment and care for mental illness.
The statute provides that a person may be detained on an emergency
basis for evaluation or treatment or certified for care and treatment only if
he or she is an imminent danger to himself or herself or others, or is gravely
disabled. 20 7 A person is gravely disabled if "as a result of mental illness, he is
unable to take care of his basic personal needs or is making irrational or
grossly irresponsible decisions concerning his person and lacks the capacity
'20 8
to understand this is so."
A person can be detained for evaluation and treatment on an emergency basis for only seventy-two hours. 209 If at the end of that period the
person still meets the criteria for certification, he may be certified by court
210
order for short-term treatment of no longer than three months' duration.
The certification and requests for treatment on an outpatient basis must be
tice and has had much experience in the area of mental health law. He serves on the Mental
Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and on the Advisory Committee on
Rules and Regulations of the Division of Mental Health, Department of Institutions.
Particular care must be taken in prescribing for older persons drugs whose side effects include the lowering of blood pressure; e.g., tricyclic antidepressants. See note 132 supra.
203. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 870.
204. Se text accompanying notes 275-85 z 7fta.
205. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 27-10-101 to -129 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
206. Id. § 27-10-101 (1973).
207. Id. § 27-10-105(1)(a) (Supp. 1979).
208. Id. § 27-10-102(5) (Supp. 1979). A person taken into custody on an emergency basis
cannot be detained in a jail, lock up, or other place used for the confinement of persons charged
or convicted of penal offenses unless no other place or confinement for treatment and evaluation
is available. In that event, a person may be held for only 24 hours and must be held separately
from persons charged with or convicted of penal offenses. Id. § 27-10-105(1.1) (Supp. 1979).
209. Id. § 27-10-105(1) (Supp. 1979).
210. Id. § 27-10-107 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
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reviewed by a court if at any time during the three-month period the patient
or his attorney so petitions the court. 2 1 1 At the end of three months, the
certification may be extended by court order for an additional three months
2 12
if the person's condition so warrants.
In the event the person is still an imminent danger to himself or others
or gravely disabled and has received short-term treatment for five consecutive months, he may be certified for long-term treatment for a period of no
longer than six months. 21 3 A hearing on long-term certification before either
the court or a jury is mandatory if requested by the patient or his attorney. 2 14 Long-term certifications may be extended for consecutive periods of
up to six months each thereafter.2 1 5 -Both short- and long-term certifications
must be terminated as soon as the professional in charge of the patient's
treatment determines that the patient has received sufficient benefit from
216
such treatment to warrant release.
Persons detained for evaluation or treatment have a right to receive
medical and psychiatric care and treatment suited to meet their individual
needs in the least restrictive environment possible. 21 7 They may petition the
court for a less restrictive setting within or without the treatment facility,
and if they are receiving no treatment, they may petition the court for release. 2 18 Consent must be given for specific therapies and major medical
treatment in the nature of surgery. 2 19 Specific therapies for which consent
must be given are surgery, electroshock treatment, 220 and the use of psychiatric drugs in extraordinarily large doses. 221 The consent to their administration must be informed, 2 22 freely given, in writing, and signed by the
211. Id. § 27-10-107(6) (Supp. 1979). The hearing must be held within ten days of the
court's receipt of the petition. Id. An attorney must be appointed for every person certified for
short-term treatment. Id. § 27-10-107(5) (Supp. 1979).
212. Id. § 27-10-108 (1973). At the request of the patient or his attorney, a hearing is also
mandatory for extention of certification. Id.
213. Id. § 27-10-109 (1973).
214. Id. § 27-10-109(3) (1973). Requests for jury trials must be filed with the court within
ten days after the receipt of the petition by the patient or his attorney. Id.
215. Id. § 27-10-109(5) (Supp. 1979). Hearings are again mandatory, if requested.
216. Id. § 27-10-110 (Supp. 1979). The professional person must notify the court within five
days of such termination.
217. Id. § 27-10-116(1)(a) (Supp. 1979). See Department of Institutions, Care and Treatment of Mentally Ill, Rules and Regulations, 2 C.C.R. 502-1 § II, C. (effective May 30, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Regulations]. "[Tihe patient shall enjoy the maximum amount of
" Id.
freedom consistent with his/her clinical needs..
218. CoIo. REv. STAT. § 27-10-116(i)(b) (Supp. 1979).
219. Id. § 27-10-116(2)(a) (1973). 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII. See CoLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 27-10-117, -119, -120 (1973), regarding rights and privileges of patients while they are
committed to institutions.
220. See note 133, szpra.
221. 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII.A.
222. An informed consent must be preceded by the following:
1. A fair explanation of the proposed specific therapy, including identification of its
experimental elements, if any;
2. the probable consequences if the treatment is not permitted to proceed;
3. the availability of appropriate alternative treatment, if any;
4. an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the specific therapy;
5. an instruction that the patient or other person giving consent is free to withdraw
his/her consent and discontinue therapy at any time.
1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII.D. 1.
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223
patient or his or her legal guardian.

On July 30, 1979, the Department of Institutions adopted regulations
on the right to refuse medication. 224 Where prescription medications are to
be a part of the treatment program, the patient or his legal guardian must be
informed of the reasons for prescribing the medication, the probable consequences of not taking the medication, the expected benefits of the medication, the common side effects associated with its use, if any, and the major
risks, if any. 225 The physician must make a reasonable attempt to obtain
voluntary acceptance of the medication by the patient and must be available
to answer inquiries regarding the medication. In addition, the patient must
be informed that he may withdraw agreement to take the medication at any
time. If after this procedure the patient refuses to accept medication, then
226
appropriate treatment alternatives must be presented to the patient.
Under nonemergency conditions, the 1979 regulations provided that if
the patient refused medication, and the physician concluded that medication was essential for the patient's treatment, a review hearing was to be
conducted by the facility's medical director or his designee. 22 7 The review
hearing amounted to a quasi-judicial proceeding in which the patient's attorney could be present; the patient could present evidence, question witnesses, and have a physician testify on his own behalf; and written findings
and conclusions were to be issued by the presiding physician. 228 The procedure was followed reluctantly, if at all, for several reasons. Physicians, believing their job was to treat patients, did not want to be placed in the role of
a judge. 22 9 One facility, which hired an outside psychiatrist to preside over
medication hearings, found this method unsatisfactory because of the costs
involved in paying the psychiatrist and providing space and staff for him. In
addition, attorneys raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest because
the psychiatrist was paid by the institution attempting to medicate their clients involuntarily. 230 This review procedure was overturned by the Colorado
Supreme Court in the Goedcke decision, 23 1 which ruled that a patient had
the right to refuse medication in nonemergency situations unless a competent tribunal first finds that the patient's illness "has so impaired his judgment that he is incapable of participating in decisions affecting his
health.232
Following the Goedecke decision, the Division of Mental Health Advisory
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. § VII.B. 1.
1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.
Id. § VIII.A.I.
Id. §§ VIII.A.2., to -.5.
Id. § VIII.B.2.a.ii. Prior to the issuance of these regulations, the decision to medicate

in spite of the patient's refusal was made upon consultation with other physicians. Physician B,
supra note 47; Interview with Physician G. Physician G is a psychiatrist who is the medical
director of a large residential treatment center. He has served in this capacity throughout the
time that the Colorado regulations regarding the right to refuse treatment have been in effect.
228. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.B.2.a.ii.
229. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician C, supra note 104.
230. Physician A, supra note 8.
231. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
232. Id. at 125.
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Board for Service Standards and Regulations 233 proposed new regulations
which were adopted on July 16, 1980,234 after public hearings and numerous
meetings. All references to administration of medication over the objections
of the patient in nonemergency situations were deleted. Under the current
regulations, medication may be administered over the objection of a patient
only if an emergency exists. 235 Such an emergency exists only if one of the
three conditions set forth in the regulations is met:
i. The patient is determined to be in imminent danger of hurting
herself/himself or others as evidenced by symptoms which have in
the past reliably predicted imminent dangerousness in the particular patient or by a recent overt act, including but not limited to a
credible threat of bodily harm, an assault on another person, or
self-destructive behavior.
ii. The patient's life is in imminent danger due to toxicity arising
from the patient's use or abuse of another medication, drug, or
other substance.
is in imminent danger because of a severely
iii. The patient's life236
debilitated condition.
The patient's condition is to be evaluated every twenty-four hours to determine if the emergency condition still exists. 23 7 If the attending physician
determines that the emergency condition continues and that medication is
indicated beyond seventy-two hours, the facility must request a court hearing for an order to administer the medication, 238 and the physician must
239
Medication
obtain a concurring consultation with another physician.
cannot be administered over a patient's lack of consent for longer than ten
days without a court order. 240 The patient must be notified promptly of the
241
The
right to contact an attorney or a court of competent jurisdiction.
treating facility must help the patient contact the attorney or the court if
242
necessary to effectively exercise these rights.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION

The refusal of medication has affected the mental health treatment system in many ways. A very direct effect has been apparent on the wards in
residential treatment centers. One aim of inpatient treatment is to structure
233. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-129 (1973).
234. Department of Institutions, Care and Treatment of Mentally I11,Rules and Regulations, 2 C.C.R. 502-1 (effective July 16, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as 1980 Regulations].
235. Id. § VIII.B.I.A.
The facts supporting the emergency must be detailed in the patient's chart initially and
every 24 hours so long as the emergency continues to exist. Id. § VII.B.3.
236. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.B.l.b.
237. Id. § VIII.B.I.a.
238. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.I.c. 1. The 1979 regulations had provided
that medication could be administered on an emergency basis for only 72 hours. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.B.l.d.
239. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.I.c. If the consultation cannot be obtained
within the initial 72 hours of involuntary administration of medication, no medication can be
administered until a concurring consultation is documented in the patient's chart. Id.
240. Id. § VIII.B.I.d.
241. Id. § VIII.B.2.
242. Id.
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the patient's environment so that it will be as constructive a force as possible
toward the achievement of treatment objectives. 243 The therapeutic milieu
is disrupted in several ways by patients who refuse medication. 244 First, the
outward refusal of medication undermines the good will of other patients on
the ward. 245 Not only do refusing patients try to convince other patients not
to take their medications, but the mere fact of their refusal is sometimes
246
contagious.
Patients refusing medications may become disruptive, out of control, or
violent. 247 Their disturbances may make it impossible to treat others. 248 In
addition, when violence and other uncontrollable behavior occurs on the
243. Cameron, NonmedicalJudgment of Medzcal Malters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716, 731 (1969).
244. Attorney A, supra note 197. See Ford, supra note 38, at 337.
245. Physician G, supra note 227.
246. Interview with Psychiatric Nurse A. Psychiatric Nurse A has a master's degree in psychiatric nursing. She is the head nurse and administrator of the psychiatric ward of a private
hospital. The ward has a capacity of up to 33 patients, both neurotic and psychotic, with both
functional and organic illnesses. The average length of stay is two weeks. About an eighth of
the patients are involuntary and paid for by the state on a contract basis with a mental health
center. This hospital has for some time been keeping detailed documentation of side effects and
has closely monitored the use of medication.
247. Id.; Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Interview with Attorney C;
Interview with Psychiatric Nurse B.
Attorney C specializes in mental health law. His clients come primarily through court
appointments. He has participated in four medication hearings, and serves both on the Mental
Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and on the Advisory Committee on
Rules and Regulations, Division of Mental Health, Department of Institutions.
Psychiatric Nurse B has earned a Ph.D. in psychiatric nursing, has taught that subject, and
has worked in the mental health systems of three states. She is the director of nursing at a
residential treatment hospital which has a capacity of 70 inpatients.
An extreme example of the chaos that can result from the refusal of treatment was summarized in a brief prepared by the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society in response to a temporary
restraining order allowing patients in a state hospital to refuse treatment. Statements in quotation marks are taken from hospital records:
"Tension seems to fill the air at the Austin Unit twenty-four hours a day." One
wing has been destroyed by fire, set by a patient. One female patient attempted to
burn a staff member, to choke a patient, and to strangle herself with a ripped dress.
She smashed a window, threatened to kill several staff members, attacked, kicked, and
spat at them. At another time she was "screaming, threatening, deluded, beat staff,
grabs them, incited another disturbed patient to violence by inviting him to her bed
and defying staff to deal with him. This other patient becomes so threatening that the
night staff sent Dr. G. a letter signed by all informing him that they would not and
could not work under these conditions."
Another female Austin Unit patient punched a social worker and several patients,
cut herself with fliptops, and "gouged her face with her fingernails until she bled; this
continued almost daily through the month of June." A schizophrenic male patient
who has refused medication since the grant of the restraining order has had sexual
intercourse with at least three different patients who are either retarded or are severely
and chronically regressed. He has also broken a window, kicked a patient, and
grabbed and threatened two female staff members. The incidence of assaultive behavior by Austin patients has also increased as the administration of medication has declined in deference to their wishes.
Patients in the May Unit have experienced similar problems. One woman, while
refusing medication, became psychotic and left the hospital in anger, lived on a doorstep without changing her clothes for two weeks, and was twice returned to the hospital by police, and twice set herself on fire in her room. In the May, as in Austin Unit,
"since the issuance of the temporary restraining order, tensions, threats, agitation and
acts of violence have increased."
Quoted in Stone, Legal and Ethical Developments, in DISORDERS OF SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME
571 (1979).
248. Stone, supra note 247, at 566.
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ward, patients become fearful, not only for their own safety but for their own
self-control. 249 In general, most patients do not want to be crazy or violent;
they want to be stopped before they get out of control. Indeed, one major
purpose of the therapeutic milieu is to provide structure and set limits in
order to help patients master their own impulsive behavior.

2 50

The relationships between patient and staff are also negatively affected
by out of control behavior resulting from a patient's refusal of medication.
25
Threats and violence are often directed at the staff. ' The staff in response
becomes fearful and angry, not only because they may be physically injured
and other patients endangered, but also because they are now much more
limited in their ability to deal with such out of control behavior as a result
252
There is
of the new regulations regarding the right .to refuse medication.
2 53
It is
uncertainty as to when the emergency use of medication is allowed.
presently used only when a life-threatening situation arises and only after
violent behavior occurs. 254 The use of restraints and seclusion, the abolition
of which has been advocated for some time, is now often the only method of
dealing with out of control behavior. 2 5 5 For some patients, whose out of con249. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
250. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
251. Id; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
252. Physician F, supra note 184.
253. There are mixed feelings among mental health professionals about whether the 1980
regulations have clarified some of the confusion which existed both immediately after the implementation of the 1979 regulations and after the Goedecke decision. Some feel that the new regulations have made working conditions easier. Physician B,supra note 47; Physician C,supra note
104; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Interview with Attorney D. Others feel the situation is
more confused. Physician D, supra note 112; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
Attorney D is an assistant county attorney responsible for mental health law, who works
with a community mental health center. Attorney D has participated in fifteen medication
hearings.
254. Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
Example /: A patient with a history of aggressive behavior, who had refused medication,
became increasingly agitated. Because of this and other behaviors, the staff knew that he would
become violent. The hospital, however, had a policy of not administering medication against a
patient's wishes unless there was a life-threatening emergency or the patient had demonstrated
through a recent act that he was dangerous to himself or others. As his condition deteriorated,
he was placed in seclusion. Some time later the staff heard a crash, and two members went to
the room in which the patient had been placed. The patient had tried to break a window by
throwing a chair through it. The patient then bashed one of the mental health workers and
threw the other across the room. The situation then was determined to be dangerous enough
for the administration of medication. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
Example 2: A woman who suffered from chronic schizophrenia, and who had been in and
out of the hospital many times, refused to take medication. Part of her behavior pattern was
throwing chairs. The hospital's policy was to administer medication against a patient's wishes
only if a life-threatening emergency arose. The woman had never hit another person with the
chairs she threw, so the situation was determined by the staff not to be life-threatening. After
she refused medication for a period of time and continued to throw chairs, her throwing arm
was placed in a restraint. Her condition eventually settled down to the point where she no
longer threw chairs, and the restraint was removed. She then began to remove her clothing
wherever she happened to be and would not keep it on. Her condition was not considered
serious enough to petition the court for a medication order. Physician D, supra note 112.
255. Physician B, supra note 47; Attorney A, supra note 197; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note
247.
Example 3: A large male, who was clearly out of control 'and potentially dangerous, was
brought to the psychiatric ward of a hospital from the emergency room. He refused to take
medication. The hospital's policy was to medicate only in a life-threatening emergency. The
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trol behavior can be compared to a child acting out to get attention, the
stopping of their actions by the use of physical restraint can have a salutary
effect, not only to prevent physical injury, but to help them to regain con2 56
trol.
The increased use of restraints and seclusion, however, is considered
25 7
by many to be a step backward in the treatment of mental illness.
The dynamics of the patient-staff relationship is also affected in other
ways. First, when assaultive behavior occurs, the staff has a tendency to isolate the patient. This may, in turn, provoke more acting-out behavior on the
part of the patient, which may result in more isolation on the part of the
staff, thus impeding therapeutic progress.2 58 Second, disruptive patients require an inordinate amount of staff time, resulting in less time available for
nondisruptive patients. 259 Third, part of the structure of the therapeutic
milieu is derived from the authority of the therapist. When this authority
and its attendant limit-setting ability are undermined, the structure is
greatly weakened, contributing to increased anxiety on the part of other pa-

tients.

26

0

patient was placed in four-point restraints for several days until his condition settled down, and
he was then released. Physician B, supra note 47.
Example 4: A young woman who was retarded was placed in a residential treatment center
through a community health center. She was paranoid and psychotic, but was not dangerous.
She refused to take medication. She repeatedly ran away from the hospital and continued to
refuse medication. She was first placed in leg shackles, but managed to leave the hospital.
Eventually, she was kept strapped to a chair. Interview with Psychiatric Nurse C. Psychiatric
Nurse C has a master's degree and has worked in several states. She is the head of the inpatient
team at a community mental health center. The team is in charge of patients both at a small
residential treatment unit and at a state psychiatric hospital.
State regulations provide that restraint and seclusion may be used only in an emergency
when a professional person determines that the patient is in imminent danger of hurting himself
or herself or others and treatment of the condition is possible only with the use of restraints or
seclusion. They may be used only when less restrictive means cannot produce the control necessary to prevent harm to the patient or others, and only such restraint or seclusion as is reasonably necessary may be used. The patient may be secluded or restrained for no more than four
hours, unless upon examination by a professional person, an express order is given for a longer
period of restraint. The patient must be observed not less than every fifteen minutes during the
period of restraint or seclusion. Finally, there must be an examination of the patient and new
authorization for seclusion every 24 hours. 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § II.E. See Brakel
& Rock, supra note 11, at 158-61.
256. Physician C, supra note 104.
Hearings on the right to refuse treatment are not limited to the right to refuse medication.
A hearing was held in which two psychiatrists testified that the extended use of four-point restraints was the most appropriate treatment for a patient who did not respond to medication.
The patient had refused the use of physicial restraints. Interview with Judge A. Judge A is a
district court judge who presides over a civil division. He hears most of the mental health cases
in his district, and has presided over some fifteen medication hearings.
257. Physician B, supra note 47; Attorney A, supra note 197; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note
246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 158-6 1.
One physician stated that he felt the use of physicial restraints was inhumane. Physician
D, supra note 112. Another physician felt that in some cases the use of medical restraint through
medication was less intrusive than the use of physical restraint. He cited the example of a very
fearful and paranoid patient, among whose delusions were that someone was out to kill him.
He had refused medication and was strapped in a chair. Being placed in restraints aroused in
him abject terror, for he felt he was trapped and defenseless against his imagined enemy. Physician F, supra note 184.
258. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
259. Physician G, supra note 227.
260. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
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Patients refuse medication for three primary reasons. The first is because of their illness. They may be paranoid and suspect that the medication is poison 26 1 or ascribe some secret and unfriendly meaning to the
therapeutic maneuvers of the therapist. 262 The patient's belief that he or
264
263
Mental illness is stigmatizing,
she is not ill is prominent in psychosis.
and patients who do not want to be labeled mentally ill may refuse the medication which would force them to admit that they are ill. 265 Manic patients
and grandiose schizophrenics are often very euphoric or ecstatic and refuse
266
medication because they do not want the elation they feel to be dispelled.
Dysphoric or depressed patients are less likely to refuse; 26 7 however, some
depressed patients who are suicidal and want to die will refuse treatment
because medication will enable them to live 268 and other depressed patients
may feel they are not worthy of treatment. Patients may not want to be
treated because they are unwilling to surrender the positive, defensive adaptations of their illness. 269 They may not want to reestablish contact with
reality 2 70 because they fear some intolerable condition which exists in reality. Improvement in the patient's mental illness might lead to reality, thus
forcing the patient to confront it. 2 7 ' One physician estimated that nine out
272
of ten patients who refuse medication do so because of their illness.
A second reason for drug refusal relates to the patient-therapist relationship. There may be tension in the relationship, excessive passivity on the
261. Physician F, supra note 184; Physician G, supra note 227; Melmon & Morrelli, supra
note 101, at 118; Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study ofPsychiatrt Inpatients, 137 AM. J.
PSYCH. 340 (1980); Van Putten, supra note 155, at 67.
Example 5: A woman, 55-years-old and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, had been
periodically violent for five years. She suffered from the delusion that members of her family
had been replaced by FBI agents who looked exactly like the members of her family. She was in
the hospital for eight weeks, at a cost of $150.00 per day, before a petition for a medication
order was filed on her behalf. Medication was ordered, and she was out of the hospital in seven
days after receiving medication. Physician D, supra note 112.
262. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 118.
263. Id.; Physician A, supra note 8; Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68; ForcedDrug Medication,
supra note 71, at 261 n.84.
This attitude was recognized by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975): "It is universally recognized as fundamental to
effective therapy that the patient acknowledge his illness and cooperate with those attempting
to give treatment; yet the failure of a large proportion of mentally ill persons to do so is a
common phenomenon."
264. Physician A, supra note 8. See D. RUBIN, ECONOMICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE
LAW 104 (1978).
265. Physician A, supra note 8; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 381.
266. Physician A, supra note 8. One physician feels that reducing some grandiose states by
medication may not be in the best interest of the patient. He cited the example of one schizophrenic who believed that he had received a message from God to spread God's word. The
patient refused medication on the basis of his belief that the medication would interfere with his
direct communication with God. The physician decided against attempting to obtain a court
order for medication because he could not state absolutely in this case that the administration of
medication would be in his best professional judgment. Id.
267. Id.
268. Physician C, supra note 104; Physician F, supra note 184.
269. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 340.
270. Id.
271. Physician C, supra note 104.
272. Physician F, supra note 184.
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part of the therapist, or lack of feedback from the therapist. 273 There may
be negativistic or other power struggles going on between the patient and the
2 74
physician or staff.
Drug side effects constitute a third reason for refusal of medication. 2 75
Some patients refuse medication because of dysphoric response. 2 76 One
study found that an early dysphoric response indicates that the medication
will have no long-term beneficial effect. 2 77 Such physiologic responses as
sedative or extrapyramidal side effects may produce panic reactions and further psychotic deterioration. In addition, the extrapyramidal side effects
may often be very stressful. 27 8 "[M]ost drug reluctant patients find life with
chronic EPI [extrapyramidal side effects] unbearable. ' 2 79 One study found a
strong correlation between hostile, paranoid schizophrenia, extrapyramidal
280
side effects, and drug reluctance.
Patients who refuse medication may not do so consistently. Some patients may refuse medication one day and accept it the next. 2 ' Others refuse
medication infrequently with no apparent pattern.2 8 2 Some refuse medication as a habitual response to stress, but usually resume taking medication at
273. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 341.
274. Id. at 340; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68.
275. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 340, 342-43.
Example 6: A large man, who had been in and out of hospitals many times over a period of
years, refused medication because he said it would make him seem unfriendly, would inhibit
him, and would make him unable to talk as well. In addition, he had suffered some muscle
paralysis seven years earlier for two weeks, the only time he had experienced that side effect. He
was dangerous and potentially violent. During a court hearing, he testified only as to the potential side effects and recognized none of the benefits. Medication was ordered. Attorney D, supra
note 253.
Example 7: A 67-year-old depressed woman, who refused medication periodically during
her hospitalization, stated that she believed the staff was giving her incorrect medication, the
effect of which was making her confused. In fact, blood tests indicated that the amount of
antidepressants in her system was at a very toxic level. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at
242-43. See also text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
276. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 243; Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68; Van
Putten & May, supra note 155, at 479. Patients may complain that they feel miserable. See text
accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
277. Van Putten & May, supra note 155, at 480.
278. Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68.
279. Id. at 70.
Example 8: A.woman, so uncommunicative as to be almost mute, was a patient in a hospital which has a very coercive atmosphere (patients are routinely placed in restraints upon their
arrival). She refused to take medication, and also would not sign a release to obtain background
information. Whenever the subject of medication or the reason for her hospitalization was discussed she would become totally unresponsive. The attorney appointed to represent her noticed
movements of her lips and tongue, indicating the possibility of tardive dyskinesia. The doctors
had done no testing for tardive dyskinesia and had not mentioned the syndrome or the lip and
tongue movements in their report to the court hearing a petition for medication. Her attorney
revealed the existence of the tongue and lip movements on cross examination. The court ordered medication, but stayed the implementation of the order for two weeks so that an independent examination could be made to evaluate the possible presence of tardive dyskinesia.
Attorney C, supra note 247. See text accompanying notes 169-75 supra.
280. Van Putten, supra note 155, at 70.
281. Physician A, supra note 8.
282. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 342.
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some time shortly after refusal. 28 3 It has been found that in these situations,
the patient's overall treatment has not been impaired and some positive advantages have resulted. 28 4 The group of patients about whom there is most
concern is comprised of those who refuse medications over a substantial period of time in a manner which significantly interferes with the hospital's
ability to treat them. 285 These patients' situations bring out the essential
conflict between the right to refuse treatment and the philosophy of mental
health treatment today: These patients have a right to treatment, indeed the
statute mandates their treatment, but if they refuse treatment as is their
right, they cannot be treated.2 86 This dilemma applies particularly to nonviolent, passive refusers, 287 the persons described as "harmlessly crazy, but suffering greatly." 288 Unless after a time of attempted persuasion they
voluntarily take medication, these persons will remain unmedicated. Their
condition may stabilize, but for some, unless they receive medication to help
clear their thinking, no therapeutic progress can be made. There is nothing
in the statute or regulations that mandates against petitions for medication
being brought on their behalf. If their illness makes them incapable of participating in decisions affecting their health, they meet the Goedecke criterion
to have a competent tribunal decide whether or not they can be medicated.
Petitions for nonemergency medication are not being brought, however. Instead there is a tendency to drop patients' certifications as soon as their conditions become stabilized and return them to the community. 289 They are
simply not being treated. °
Although some mentally ill persons may remit spontaneously without
medication,2 9 ' many cannot begin to function effectively without drug therapy; and they need more than medication to help them live in society. They
283. This response has been described as the dynamic equivalent of a child going on a
hunger strike to evoke certain responses from its mother. Id. at 344.
284. Id. at 345. See text accompanying notes 314-16 mnfta.
285. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 343-44.
286. "In situations of this type . . . the right to and the right to refuse treatment are essentially antithetical rights because to enforce one is to fully destroy the other." Schoenfeld, Recent
Developments in the Law Concerningthe M~enta4y Ill-"A
Cornerstone Laid in Mud," 9 U. TOL. L. REV.
1, 16 (1977).
287. "The fact is that the great majority of hospitalized mental patients are too passive, too
silent, too fearful, too withdrawn [tobe dangerous]." Deutsch, Statement, supra note 1,at 43.
Erample 9: A young woman in her 20's was extremely withdrawn and frightened. She was
not dangerous but spent the day walking aimlessly clinging to a stuffed rabbit. She refused
medication, and came under no criteria upon which medication could be administered without
her consent. Her condition gradually deteriorated. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
288. Physician E, supra note 162.
Example 10: A critically ill schizophrenic woman lived in a closet for the first six weeks of
her hospitalization. She would not bathe or eat except in the closet in the middle of the night.
Because she did not come under the emergency rules---she was no danger to herself or others-medication could not be given without her consent. The psychiatrist eventually established an
alliance with her so that she voluntarily took medication. Within two weeks she was out of the
closet and began to function normally. Meanwhile, her hospitalization had cost $100 per day
plus the cost of the doctor. Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
289. Physician E, supra note 162; Physician F, supra note 184; Attorney A, supra note 197;
Redlich & Mollica, Oviennew: Ethical Issues in Contemporay Pschitr, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 125
(1976).
290. Physician G, supra note 227.
291. One authority has estimated that as many as 30% of psychotic patients will spontaneously remit within a few days in an appropriate milieu. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.

1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICA TION

need, at a minimum, social support if not social therapy, but they cannot
benefit from social therapy unless they receive medication. 292 It is the ethical duty of the medical profession to treat, but because therapists cannot
treat in this situation, they feel helpless and frustrated. 293 Even though a
violent patient may present more risk to the therapist, at least something can
be done under the emergency regulations.
Mental health professionals define emergency in a much narrower sense
than the regulations seem to allow. Some mental health facilities will administer medication on an emergency basis only if a life-threatening situation arises.294 Others will administer medication only after assaultive
behavior has occurred.2 95 The regulations, however, allow administration of
medication if "the patient is determined to be in imminent danger of hurting
herself/himself or others as evidenced by symptoms which have in the past
' 296
reliably predicted imminent dangerousness on the part of the patient.
At only one institution are medications being given under the emergency
regulations before assaultive or. violent behavior occurs. In that instance,
medications are administered only if the present pattern of behavior, as
clearly documented in the past, has predictably indicated future aggression
or violence. 297 There has been a tendency to "save" the seventy-two hour
emergency medication until the condition of the patient deteriorates to the
point where he is totally out of control. 298 In addition, mental health professionals in the Denver metropolitan area are acting in the belief that there is
only one emergency medication period allowed per patient. At the Colorado
State Hospital in Pueblo, however, emergency medications are used whenever they are needed-if a patient is medicated, becomes better, and some
time later again meets the criteria for emergency medication, it will again be
29 9
used.
Some mental health professionals consider the ten-day limitation on the
emergency administration of medication without a court hearing 3° ° to be
totally arbitrary and unrelated to good medical practice. The ten-day limitation in the 1980 regulations, however, is a considerable improvement over
the seventy-two hours allowed by the original 1979 regulations. 30 1 The re292. Attorney A, supra note 197.
293. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Ford, supra note 38, at 333;
Redlich & Mollica, supra note 289, at 132.
294. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Warner & Yeager, supra
note 156, at 3.
295. Physician D, supra note 112; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Psychiatric Nurse B,

supra note 247.
296. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.l.b.i.
297. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
298. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note

246.
299. Physician F, supra note 184; Interview with Attorney E. Attorney E is an assistant
county attorney responsible for mental health litigation in his county. He has filed six petitions
for medication. One petition has been heard. Four are awaiting hearings on motions to dismiss,
and one will be heard shortly.
300. Physician D, supra note 112.
301. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246. In discussing the 72hour limitation on medication, one physician drew a parallel to the administration of medication for strep throat: After the patient takes the medication for 72 hours, the symptoms of strep
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quest for a court hearing must still be made within seventy-two hours after
the initial emergency administration of medication to a nonconsenting patient if the physician believes medication will be necessary beyond seventytwo hours. The ten-day limitation merely allows continuation of the medication for more than seventy-two hours pending the court hearing. 30 2 The
extended time period, however, at least gives mental health professionals
more ability to work with the patient therapeutically. 30 3 Some nonconsenting patients given medication on an emergency basis have become calmer
and more amenable to treatment and have continued taking medications
voluntarily before the expiration of the ten days, thus obviating the need for
30 4
a court hearing.
Two categories of patients are potential candidates for medication hearings: nonconsenting patients who need emergency treatment for more than
seventy-two hours and persons who refuse medication but who do not meet
the criteria for administration of medication on an emergency basis. The
criteria used by mental health professionals to evaluate those patients for
whom court-ordered medication will be requested are even more stringent
than the criteria for emergency medication. As a consequence, petitions are
being filed for only the most seriously ill or dangerous patients. 30 5
The process of going to court to obtain medication may have a detrimental effect on the treatment of mental illness because of the delays in obtaining a court hearing. As long as two or three weeks have elapsed from the
filing of the petition for medication until the date of the hearing. 30 6 If a
hearing cannot be set within ten days of the first administration of medication on an emergency basis, the medication must be discontinued at the expiration of the ten-day limit until a court order is obtained. The patient's
condition may begin to deteriorate upon withdrawal. The judicial process
may also have a detrimental effect; if motions to dismiss are filed, they must
first be ruled upon before the hearing on the petition for medication takes
place. 30 7 The additional delay may have a further negative effect on the
throat may be gone, but the bacteria which cause the illness are still in the patient's system; thus
the usual practice is to administer medication for ten days because of the potential for very
serious complications.
302. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § B.l.c.
303. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
304. Physician C, supra note 104; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
305. Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227. Doctors may bring petitions
for involuntary medication for only those patients whose cases they believe they can win. If the
doctors feel a medication order will not be granted, they will not file a petition. Physician A,
supra note 8; Attorney D, supra note 253.
306. Physician D, supra note 112; Attorney D, supra note 253. In one court, there has been
an average of seven days between the time a petition is filed and the time a hearing is held.
Recently, the time has been shortened. Attorney D, supra note 253. In another court, although
there were delays at first in scheduling a hearing on medication petitions, the court is attempting to hear them as soon as possible, and the delays have been shortened. Interview with Judge
C. Judge C is a probate judge and handles all mental health cases for the judicial district in
which his court is located. He has heard a dozen medication hearings.
307. One commentator suggested that "unnecessary delays [sic] in terminating psychotic
episodes is tantamount to 'playing with fire.' "ForcedDrug Medcattn,supra note 71, at 118 n.98.
Example //: A woman for whom a petition for medication had been filed submitted a
motion to dismiss. Between the filing of the motion and the hearing, the woman walked away
from the institution in which she was being treated. She went to her home, saw four photo-
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30 8

An additional consequence of going to court is the submission of the
physician-patient relationship to the adversarial process, which many physicians feel is detrimental to the physician-patient relationship and impairs
the treatment of mental illness. 30 9 Many patients who refuse medication are
distrustful to begin with, and the adversarial process increases this distrust,
thus impeding the establishment of the mutual trust necessary for a therapeutic alliance. 3 10 Having the court make the decision may diminish the
patient's respect for the physician's judgment 3 1 and reduce his or her au3
thority. 12
Positive effects may also result from both the attempt to persuade the
patient to voluntarily accept the medication and the process of going to
court. By discussing court procedures with the patient, the physician can
improve the patient's understanding of that procedure. 3 13 Throughout the
discussions, time is being spent with the patient which may lead toward the
building of a positive relationship and therapeutic alliance, 3 14 with the eventual development of mutual trust necessary for long-term success in mental
health treatment. 3t 5 The patient's role in the treatment decision is likely to
lead to an increased sense of self worth and power. 3 16 Stipulations may be
graphs which were normally in her living room, and because of her delusional system, thought
they had been put there to poison her. She burned them in the middle of her living room floor,
the fire spread, and the inside of her house was gutted. An order for medication was subsequently entered. Once she was placed on medication, she rapidly improved. Physician F, supra
note 184; Attorney E, supra note 299.
308. Example 12: A woman, who had many previous hospital admissions, refused medication. During previous admissions, she had compensated immediately upon taking medication.
She was overtly psychotic and refused to eat. Among her delusions was that she had to purify
her system by drinking salt water. She had been confined for a year without medication and
had been through three jury trials, on the issue of certification, two of which had ended in
mistrials. Because persons can be medicated involuntarily only if they are certified for treatment, she had not been medicated on an emergency basis. If she had been placed on medication, it is very likely in the light of her previous history that she would have been released from
the hospital in a very short time. Physician F, supra note 184.
309. One physician feels that going to court may result in the physician's being perceived by
the patient as being either powerless or cruel. Physician G, supra note 227.
310. Id.; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247. See also Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at
1. One attorney, however, questioned how much of a relationship existed initially. Involuntary patients are probably part of the adversary process already, since they have been certified
by court order as being dangerous or gravely disabled. Prior to that certification, a hearing was
held. Attorney A, supra note 197. In addition, it is the patient, through his refusal, who makes
the issue of medication an adversary one. Physician F, supra note 184.
311. Physician G, supra note 227. Physician G related that prior to the time the rules regarding the right to refuse medication were promulgated, if a patient was medicated against his
will, the patient's later response was that "I didn't know how bad off I was." In Physician G's
estimation, this led to respect for the physician's judgment.
312. Id.; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
313. Physician F, supra note 184.
314. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician E, supra note 162; Attorney C, supra note 247;
Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
315. Attorney C, supra note 247; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Appelbaum & Gutheil,
supra note 261, at 345. See also Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 111-12.
316. Attorney C, supra note 247; Interview with Attorney F. Attorney F conducts a private
practice, specializing in litigation, both in the mental health and criminal defense areas. He has
taught a course in mental health law at the University of Denver School of Law and serves on
the Mental Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
Example 13: A man, who was certified but was being treated as an outpatient, suffered
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reached prior to a court hearing. Even if medication is ordered against the
patient's wishes, he may accept the decision in a positive way if he feels he
3 17
received a fair hearing.
The relative infrequency of medication hearings in Colorado to date
may have been influenced by nonmedical factors as well. Physicians are reluctant to go to court. 31 8 They are busy and resent taking the time to go to
court. 3 19 Many do not feel comfortable in a courtroom with its adversarial
setting and are intimidated by judges and the judicial system. 320 They do
not like to have their expertise challenged in court. 32 1 Furthermore, they
resent "courtroom therapy" and do not trust judges to make what they consider medical decisions. Judges are also uncomfortable making decisions impinging upon medical treatment; 322 however, they understand clearly that it
is not their function as judge to make treatment decisions. 323 The impact of
these nonmedical factors may have diminished during the year that the Colorado regulations regarding the right to refuse medication have been in effect. Doctors and judges are becoming more experienced and comfortable
with medication hearings. 324 In addition, some doctors are attempting to
establish new dialogues and closer relationships with courts to facilitate the
325
process of going to court for medication hearings.
In the court hearing, the petitioner for medication bears the initial burden of showing that the Goedecke criteria for court-ordered medication exists. 326 The Goedecke decision provides that the petitioner must first prove
from a severe mental illness that led him to be highly agitated, irrational, violent, and a serious
danger to others. If he took medication, he was able to lead a fairly active life as an outpatient.
He believed he suffered from no mental illness and refused to take medication. He had suffered
some side effects five years prior to the hearing, but had experienced none recently. He based
his refusal of medication on the belief that if he were placed on drug treatment he would have
to tell potential employers and would not be able to get a job. If he was not medicated, he
would have to be institutionalized. The judge ruled against involuntary medication because the
patient had demonstrated a capacity to make a rational decision regarding treatment. He gave
the man a choice, either remain unmedicated and be placed in an institution or voluntarily
accept medication and continue to be treated as an outpatient. The man chose medication.
Judge A, supra note 256; Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 8-9.
317. Attorney A, supra note 197.
318. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227;
Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Redlich & Mollica, supra note 289, at 130.
319. Attorney D, supra note 253. One physician described going to court as an "incredible
problem," stating that it takes one-half day or longer; and in addition to the physician and
patient, two other staff persons have to go to court. Physician D, supra note 112. See also Stone,
The Myth ofAdvocacy, 30 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCH. 819, 822 (1979).
320. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227.
321. Judge A, supra note 256; Attorney D, supra note 253.
322. judge C,supra note 306. Onejudge felt that if doctors are doing their job to treat their
patients according to their best medical judgment, they should not be afraid to go to court. Id.
323. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge C, supra note 306.
324. Judge A, supra note 256; Attorney D, supra note 253.
325. Judge A, supra note 256; Physician B, supra note 47.
326. This article covers only the treatment of mental illness in the civil system and not the
treatment of forensic patients who have been committed through the criminal system. Upon
the implementation of the regulations regarding the right to refuse medication, there was confusion as to the refusal of medication by forensic patients, particularly as to which courts had
jurisdiction over involuntary medication of forensic patients. For a time, medication hearings
for forensic patients were held in a civil division. Interview with Judge B; Physician F, supra
note 184; Attorney E, supra note 299. The issue was brought to a head when a petition was filed
regarding the refusal of medication by a very difficult forensic patient, who was serving a life
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that the patient is not capable of making decisions affecting his or her
health.3 27 The petitioner must then show that the inability to make the deci3 28
In
sion is due to impaired judgment resulting from the patient's illness.
addition to the Goedecke criteria, evidence must also be presented that the
regulations regarding the attempt to obtain voluntary consent have been
complied with in detail.3 29 The petitioner must further establish that the
medication for which an order is sought is part of a rational treatment
plan. 3 30 Among the considerations in evaluating the propriety of the treatment plan are whether the program of medication is designed to alleviate
the immediate symptoms of the illness, whether the medication is to be used
on a maintenance basis for an indefinite length of time, and whether the
medication will have to be continued in the community on an outpatient
basis.33 1 .The presence or absence of side effects is also important to the deci33 2
sion.
If the treatment plan appears to be appropriate, then the burden shifts
to the patient to show why the treatment plan, including medication, is not
suitable. It is presumed that a rational person would accept an appropriate
treatment plan. In order to prove he is competent to make the treatment
decision, the patient cannot give a mere recital of possible side effects, but
must demonstrate that he is aware of the potential benefits of the medication.3 3 3 If the patient can look only to the disadvantages of the treatment
and not recognize any of the advantages, he is unable to make a competent
decision. 334 In one court's experience, most patients have not understood
the potential positive effects of the medication, and medication has been or335
dered in nine out of ten hearings.
sentence, but who also had had a long history of mental illness. He suffered from tardive dyskinesia and had marked physicial symptoms. It was decided that his petition should be filed by
the Attorney General's office in the criminal division of the district court in which he was tried
and sentenced. This policy remains in effect today. Judge B; Physician F, supra note 184.
Judge B is probate judge in a Colorado district court. A large residential treatment center
is in his district.
327. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979).
328. Id.
329. Physician D, supra note 112.
330. Attorney D, supra note 253.
331. One judge commented that he was more apt to medicate on a short-term basis and less
apt to order medication on a long-term basis or if the medication would have to be continued in
the community. Judge C, supra note 306.
332. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge B, supra note 326; Judge C, supra note 306. Side effects
were very clearly present in most of the patients appearing for medication hearings in one court.
Judge B, supra note 326.
One commentator has questioned the ability ofjudges to rule in the area of mental health
treatment. "lJ]udges who presumably lack specialized medical and psychiatric training can
hardly be expected to rule swiftly and correctly upon the appropriateness of-treatments given to
the mentally ill. There are certainly no 'specific, judicially ascertainable and manageable standards' for measuring the adequacy or appropriateness of treatment." Schoenfeld, supra note
286, at 19.
333. Attorney D, supra note 253.
334. Id.
335. Judge B, supra note 326. Adverse consequences can result from the denial of involuntary medication by the court. One woman became violent in the hospital two days after the
court denied medication. Physician D, supra note 112. Another chronic schizophrenic was
gravely disabled and could not function on his own. The patient refused medication, but had
committed no recent overt act. An order for medication was denied, and because the hospital
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Medication may be ordered for the length of the period of the certification, 336 or its use may be limited to a relatively short period of time pending
review by the court. 337 In one instance, medication was ordered, but the
implementation of the order was delayed until the physician could obtain
338
more history about the patient.
If the treating facility or physician does not petition for a medication
hearing or the court upholds the patient's refusal, the right to refuse medication may have further consequences for the patient, the mental health professionals, the mental health treatment system, and the community at large.
The length of hospitalization of mentally ill persons who refuse medication is
increased. 339 The average hospital stay is only ten days when medication is
accepted, but if the patient refuses medication, he may be hospitalized thirty
days or longer 34° while his condition settles down to the point where he can
be released. If the condition deteriorates, or at least does not improve, he
341
may be hospitalized with relatively little treatment for a very long time.
He may, in effect, be warehoused. Some hospitals have waiting lists, and
34 2
other persons who need the institution's care may be unable to receive it.
In addition, the cost of treating the patient is greatly increased in proportion
to the length of stay.343 Patients who refuse medication not only are a burden to society so far as the expense of hospitalization, but they also impose
344
substantial economic costs on society because they are nonproductive.
With medication, however, it is likely they can become contributing members of society. 345 A further adverse effect is that physicians may leave staff
positions at hospitals because of the impediments to effective treatment of
patients caused by the right to refuse treatment. Staff turnover is detrimental to an institution's patients, and especially to those who need long-term,
346
intensive therapy.
If the patient refuses medication but his condition nevertheless imcould not treat the patient without medication, the certification was terminated. The patient's
brother was forced to take the patient unwillingly. Physician F, supra note 184.

336. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge B,supra note 326; Judge C,supra note 306. One patient
who had side effects resulting from prolonged use of antipsychotic medication believed they
resulted from malaria, which the patient did not have. Judge A, supra note 256.

337. Judge C, supra note 306.
338. Id. &e Example 8, supra note 279.
339. Since the introduction of psychotropic drugs, the length of hospitalization for psychotic
episodes has been reduced by two-thirds. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 323.
340. Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra
note 246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
341. Peele, Chodoff & Taub, Involuntay Hospitaization and Treatability. Observationsfrom the
Dirtrictof Colunbia Experzence, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 744, 749 (1974); Saphire, supra note 15, at
243-50. See Example 12, supra note 308.
342. Judge C, supra note 306; Physician G, supra note 227; Attorney D, supra note 253; Psychiatric Nurse C, supra note 255. Because of the waiting list, this institution no longer will

accept patients on an emergency basis. Patients who need immediate treatment are often
forced to return to their families, who initially brought them in for treatment because of their
deteriorated condition, or must stay in jails until beds become available. Psychiatric Nurse C,
supra note 255.
343. &e Example 5, supra note 261.
344. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 10; Stone, supra note 247, at 267.
345. Physician B, sepra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note
246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
346. Physician B, supra note 47.
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proves, he may be released. The release of stabilized patients without therapeutic treatment may have several negative ramifications. One consequence
of the release of essentially untreated individuals into society is an acceleration of the "revolving door" phenomenon. Chronic patients who take medication when hospitalized become stable and functional and return to the
community. After some time in the community, many feel they no longer
34 7
Their condition deteriorates to the
need medication and stop taking it.
348
point where they have to be rehospitalized, and the cycle begins again.
The numbers of patients being released into the community without medicacondition is likely to
tion will become part of this phenomenon, but their3 49
deteriorate more rapidly, thus speeding up the cycle.
Another consequence of releasing untreated but stabilized persons into
the community is that a number may end up in the ghettos of mentally ill
350
Many mentally
persons which have resulted from deinstitutionalization.
ill persons who are released into the community have little ability to look
after themselves, limited coping capacities, and no friends or relatives with
whom to live. 35 1 Communities are unwilling to have group homes and halfway houses for the deinstitutionalized mentally ill in residential neighbor353
While the
hoods. 352 Nursing homes and boarding homes are closing.
need for more community mental health services increases, community resources are diminishing as citizens are increasingly reluctant to pay increased
35 4
The right to refuse medication will contribtaxes to fund these services.
ute to this dilemma, as even more persons will be requiring support from
355
already overtaxed and underfunded community mental health centers.
347. Studies have shown that between one-quarter and one-half of patients stop taking required medication after several months. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 371; Lipton & Burnett,
supra note 18, at 334. In addition, 25-30% of outpatients receiving active medications drop out
of treatment. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 357. Up to 70% of patients who have had at least one
acute schizophrenic episode will relapse within three months to a year after they stop taking
medication. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 334, 337.
348. Saphire, supra note 15, at 249; Interview with Mental Health Worker A. Mental
Health Worker A is the team leader of an after-care treatment team associated with a residential treatment center. She has a master's degree and has worked in the field of mental health for
more than ten years. The team has 245 clients, in nursing homes, halfway houses, supervised
apartments, and family settings.
349. Physician A, supra note 8. See DuBose, supra note 53, at 1206-08.
350. Mental Health Worker A, supra note 348; Mechanic, supra note 11, at 272.
It has been estimated that of patients hospitalized for an acute episode of schizophrenia,
60% will be socially recovered five years later, 30% will show some psychopathology but will live
in the community, and the remaining 10% will be rehospitalized. Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 323.
351. Bellak, supra note 53, at 5. The lack of community support often leads to exacerbation
of symptoms. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 53.
352. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 93, 104. This feeling has contributed in large measure to
the enactment of zoning restrictions against group homes. Id. at 93.
353. Physician B, supra note 47; Mental Health Worker A, supra note 348.
354. Physician E, supra note 162.
355. Stone, supra note 11, at 291.
"There is no question that the current cure provided to chronic patients in the community,
whether deinstitutionalized or never admitted, is inadequate." Talbott, Care ofthe Chronically
Mentally ll--St4ll a Nattonal Disgrace, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 688 (1979).
What . . . is happening . . . is that the right to treatment, coupled with other

developments, is leading to an abdication of responsibility for the treatment of the
chronically mentally ill in America. The civil libertarian strategy . . . has been a
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Unmedicated persons released into the community may be caught between the criminal and mental health systems. 356 Even if they are not dangerous, their behavior is often not within the tolerance of society. 357 They
may end up in the criminal system for acts that are annoying or fall within
such criminal classifications as trespass, disturbance, or harassment. 358 They
often end up in jail where the conditions may be far worse than in the old
mental hospitals 359 and where there is no treatment available. 36° These marginal members of society are not wanted in the criminal system. 36 1 They
may be placed on probation on the condition they receive mental health
3 62
treatment, but often do not cooperate.
The mentally ill population of the jails throughout Colorado is increassmashing success. But what has become obvious in this tragic process is that the mentally ill are not political prisoners, they are not people who have been railroaded; they
are simply outcasts, persons whom nobody wants....
Stone, supra note I1, at 289.
356. Attorney D, supra note 253; R. Warner, The Impact of the Right to Refuse Psychiatric
Treatment Rulings on Local Jails, at 4 (Oct. 24-25, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at the
Fourth A.M.A. National Conference on Medical Care and Health Services in Correctional Institutions, Chicago, Illinois).
357. Physician A, supra note 8; Warner, supra note 356, at 4. People feel burdened by having people around whose behavior might be classed as peculiar, and the behavior of the mentally ill often has a negative effect on those around them. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 104;
Bellak, supra note 53, at 7; Stone, supra note 247, at 566.
Ralph Goedecke, whose case established the right to refuse treatment in Colorado, spent
several months in jail in 1980 as a result of behavior which might have been eliminated had he
not refused medication. Physician A, supra note 8.
358. Attorney A, supra note 197; Attorney D, supra note 253. "Many mentally ill persons
• . . have particular difficulty in accepting responsibility for their own actions and in conforming their behavior within socially prescribed bounds." Cameron, supra note 243, at 726.
There is . . . between madness and badness a large gray area which, depending on
cultural values and administrative practice, might be labelled as criminal or mental.
The major legal difficulty . . . is that in the gray area it might be possible to confine
someone simply by changing his label to conform to whichever allows the easier route
to confinement.
A. STONE, supra note 55, at 6.
359. Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 5; Warner, supra note 356, at 4. In a large city jail,
"lolne schizophrenic, for example, was found to be locked in a darkened linen closet which
served, so the staff said, as a 'secure room.' Such abuses of the mentally ill in U.S. jails are not
uncommon." Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 5.
360. Attorney B, supra note 202; Attorney D, supra note 253. It has been estimated that as
many as eight percent of jail inmates are functionally psychotic. Warner, supra note 356. In
addition, because of the lack of beds for treatment of the mentally ill on an emergency basis,
persons may spend up to five days in jail awaiting placement. Psychiatric Nurse C, supra note
255.
361. Physician E, supra note 162.
362. Example 14:
A young man held in the county jail on misdemeanor charges was evaluated by a
mental health center staff as suffering from schizophrenia. His charges were dropped
and he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital for treatment but refused medication.
Drug-free treatment in a residential program in the community was attempted as soon
as the patient was thought to be sufficiently cooperative, but he soon eloped, committed another crime, and returned to jail. The criminal court judge, with some anger at
the mental health system, held the young man in jail pending transfer to the forensic
unit of the state hospital for evaluation of his competency to stand trial.
Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 4.
For borderline mentally ill persons who refuse to cooperate with treatment efforts and repeatedly are picked up for minor offenses, the criminal system may have a therapeutic effect in
that they may be forced to accept responsibility for their actions. Mental illness is often used as
an excuse by such persons for their actions. Psychiatric Nurse C, supra note 255.
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ing.363 This same pattern was observed in California shortly after the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of 1968 became effective. This law embodied stricter
criteria for hospitalization, emphasized community treatment, and included
the right to refuse treatment. After its enactment the use of civil commitment drastically declined while the number of criminal commitments due to
findings of incompetency to stand trial dramatically increased. 364 In addition, a study of patients before and after the right to refuse medication was
implemented in California showed a significant increase in the number of
patients jailed after being able to refuse treatment.3 65 Another study of 500
previously hospitalized patients who were arrested showed that their offenses
generally derived from acute psychotic processes or from the poor judgment
366
and impulsive behavior characteristic of mental illness.
Finally, potentially dangerous individuals are being released into the
community as a result of the right to refuse treatment. Dangerousness is very
hard to predict. In fact, studies have demonstrated a marked tendency toward overprediction. 367 Other studies have concluded that mentally ill per3 68
sons are generally no more dangerous than other members of society;
however, as more untreated mentally ill persons are released into society, the
number of persons who are mentally ill and may commit violent crimes increases proportionately. 36 9 Persons who are dangerous are rational most of
the time; their violent acts are often the result of diminished impulse control. 3 70 What will trigger a violent reaction in any individual cannot be
37
predicted with any accuracy. '
363. Attorney D, supra note 253.
364. Abrahamson, The Crimmalzation of Menta4ly Disordered Behavior. Possible Side-Effect of A
New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCH. 101 (1972).
365. J. Waters, J. Kindle & S. Rothman, Civil versus Criminal Confinement: Parallel Systems of Social Control of the Mentally Ill, at I I (Apr. 4, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at
Mental Health and the Law: A Symposium, Boulder, Colo.).
366. Id. at 12.
367. A. STONE, supra note 55, at 25-40; Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 58, at 1085; Ennis
ra note
& Litwack, supra note 188, at 711; Griffith & Griffith, supra note 58, at 257; Monahan,
58, at 201; Peszke, Is Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitments?, 132 AM. J.
PSYCH. 825, 826 (1975); Shah, supra note 58, at 504; Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental
Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674, 705 (1974).
368. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1210; Shah, supra note 58, at 503; Zitrin, Crime and Violence
Among Mental Patients, 133 AM.J. PSYCH. 142, 147 (1976). One study found that a prediction of
dangerousness in the context of civil commitment was related to the length of the term for
which commitment was sought. Monahan, supra note 58, at 200.
369. Sosowsky, supra note 58, at 40.
370. Attorney D, supra note 253.
371. It is fairly easy to predict that violent behavior will occur within a short period of time,
for example, 72 hours, but it is very difficult to predict violence on a long-term basis. Physician
C, supra note 104. There is a certain group of patients with a previous history of committing
dangerous acts that one could predict would be possibly dangerous in the future. A. STONE,
supra note 55, at 33. However,
It is too often forgotten that dangerousness is an attribute not only of persons but of
situations and environmental factors; more correctly, dangerousness should be regarded as an outcome of the interaction of these various factors ...
This point, that of "interaction" between personal characteristics and situations,
cannot be stressed strongly enough.
Clinical Aspects, supra note 58, at 25.
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CONCLUSION

The treatment of mental illness has progressed within the past twenty
years from primarily institutional care to community-based treatment combined with short-term hospitalization. This has been made possible in large
measure by the use of medication to treat mental illness. In addition, mental
patients have acquired a number of rights which have freed them from the
barren existence of confinement in an institution. Mentally ill persons in
Colorado have a recognized right to refuse medication, under which medication cannot be administered without their consent unless an emergency situation exists or a court order is obtained. The exercise of this right to refuse
medication seems to be changing the direction of the treatment of mental
illness.
First, doctors are going to court only in very limited circumstances to
obtain orders for medication for the most seriously ill or dangerous patients.
As a consequence, many mental patients who might benefit from drug therapy are not receiving any medication. Second, patients who could be productive with the use of medication become a burden on society, both in
terms of the increased length of hospitalization required to stabilize their
condition and because they are likely to be unproductive upon their release.
Third, mentally ill persons are increasingly being placed in the criminal system, which does not want them and which provides no treatment for them.
Fourth, the mental health treatment system is being forced to regress, with
the increased use of restraints and seclusion, the inability to return patients
to society as soon as possible, and the increase in long-term hospitalization.
Several alternatives exist for unmedicated patients. They may improve
without medication, or they may continue to be hospitalized and remain
essentially untreatable-in effect, warehoused-while their condition deteriorates. Their condition may stabilize to the point where they may be released into the community. Possibly, they will be able to function well in the
community, or they may fall among the marginal members of society caught
between the mental health and the criminal justice systems. Alternatively
they may simply exist in the ghettos of deinstitutionalized mental patients
in rundown urban areas. If their behavior becomes out of control in the
hospital, they may be forcibly medicated under emergency procedures or
placed in restraints or in seclusion. If they become out of control in the
community, they are likely to end up in jail.
Their refusal of medication is often justified in light of the many side
effects of drugs used in the treatment of mental illness. The question then
becomes whether the unwanted side effects are more burdensome to the patients than being restrained, being jailed, or living a marginal existence in
society.
The Colorado requirement that a court order be obtained before medication can be administered involuntarily has placed burdens on both the
courts and the mental health facilities. Three alternatives to court hearings
on the issue of medication have been adopted by courts in other states which
have recognized the right to refuse medication. The first, which has been
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adopted in Massachusetts3 72 and Oklahoma,37 3 provides for the appointment of a guardian if it is determined in a court hearing that the patient is
incapable of making informed decisions regarding treatment. Initially, this
solution presents some of the same problems as the Colorado approach-for
3 74
example, the difficulty in getting into court within a short period of time
and the reluctance of physicians to go to court.3 75 An additional difficulty
would be the availability of a pool of guardians who would be able to be
appointed to serve both in an immediate crisis and over the term of treatment. It is very likely that there would not be enough persons willing to
serve in this capacity.3 76 The guardian approach, however, would relieve
the courts from successive court hearings in the event additional decisions
would have to be made regarding the patient's refusal of medication.
Another alternative is the solution utilized in the Utah case of Colyer v.

District Court, 377 in which it was held that before a mentally ill person can be
involuntarily hospitalized, the court must find that the person is unable to
make a rational decision as to the need for treatment. 3 78 This requirement
was subsequently codified, and the state must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient "lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as
demonstrated by the evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and
benefits of treatment. ' 379 Once a person is hospitalized, all treatment decisions would be made by the institution and treating physician, and a consultation would not be necessary. 380 A drawback to this solution is the fact that
mentally ill persons are not necessarily incompetent to make treatment decisions, although they may meet other criteria for involuntary hospitaliza38 1
tion.
The final alternative for allowing the use of medication to treat a mentally ill person who has refused such treatment has been adopted in the states
of New Jersey 38 2 and Ohio.3 8 3 In New Jersey, Rennie v. Klein dictated that
the review be conducted by a psychiatrist outside the hospital:
The court . . .finds that independent review by psychiatrists,
372. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1364 (D. Mass. 1979).
373. In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980).
374. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1363 (D. Mass. 1979).

375. Id.
376. Gutheil, Legal Guardianshtp in Drug Refusal: An /llusoov Solution, 137 AM. J. PSYCH. 347,

350 (1980).
377. 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979).
378. Id.
379. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10)(c) (Supp. 1979).

In addition to the determination of

the patient's inability to make rational decisions regarding mental treatment, the court must
also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient has a mental illness, that because of the
illness the patient poses an immediate danger of physicial injury to others or self (including the
inability to provide the basic necessities of life), that there is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to court-ordered hospitalization, and that the hospital or mental health facility in which
the individual is to be hospitalized can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate
and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. Id. § 64-7-36(10)(a), (b), (d), (e).
380. A.E. v. Mitchell, No. C 78-466 (D. Utah 1980).
381. Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Stone, supra note 247, at 569-70; Warner, supra note 356, at 6.
382. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
383. Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (U.S.D.C., Ohio, Sept. 16, 1980).
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rather than by judges, lawyers or laypersons, would provide the
most accurate analyses of patient interests. Review within the profession would also create far less resentment among physicians and
staff whose decisions are questioned. . . . Informal inquiries
would be superior to formal procedures because the latter would
require more time and resources and often be more disruptive of
patient-doctor relations, but would
not significantly decrease the
38 4
risk of erroneous determinations.
38 5
It has been suggested that the "competent tribunal" required by Goedecke
386
does not necessarily mean a court of law, but could be a review panel.
The United States Supreme Court held in Parhamv.jR. 387 that "[d]ue process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of
fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. . . . Surely, this is
the case as to medical decisions, for 'neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.' "388 It is important, however, that the person reviewing requests for
medication be truly independent; that is, be compensated by someone other
than the institution whose petition for medication is being reviewed.
The court in Rennie v. Klein proposed a balancing test to evaluate
whether the patient's refusal of medication will prevail. The four elements of
the test are "(1) [the patient's] physical threat to [other] patients and staff at
the institution; (2) the patient's capacity to decide on his particular treatment; (3) whether any less restrictive treatments exist; and (4) the risk of
permanent side effects from the proposed treatment. ' 38 9 This solution
would appear to provide a much better method of meeting the needs of the
patier s, the doctors and hospital staff, the institutions, and society than the
present requirement in Colorado that a court order must be obtained to administer medication on an involuntary basis.
Slightly more than a year has passed since the right to refuse medication
was recognized in Colorado. Its effect has been to turn the treatment of
mental illness in a regressive direction, while at the same time giving mental
patients the right to be free of very uncomfortable side effects of medication
if they so choose. Many issues have been raised about the direction in which
the mental health treatment system is going. A balance will have to be
achieved between the needs of the patients, the needs of society, and the
goals of mental health treatment if progress is going to continue to be made
in the treatment of mental illness.

384. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D.N.J. 1978).
385. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
386. Attorney D, supra note 253.

387. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
388. Id. at 607.
389. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148 (D.N.J. 1978).

BRAIN DEATH AND PROLONGED STATES OF
IMPAIRED RESPONSIVENESS
STUART

A.

SCHNECK,

M.D.*

INTRODUCTION

The related issues of brain death and prolonged states of impaired consciousness were recently addressed in the significant decision of Lovato v. Distnct Court,1 delivered by Justice Groves of the Supreme Court of Colorado,
on October 15, 1979. This article will discuss these and related questions
from the perspective of a clinical neurologist active in a university teaching
hospital who confronts these issues very frequently and is required to render
an operational decision for particular patients. The author wishes to caution
readers that many viewpoints in this work are personal and encourage those
who may wish to explore these topics further to consult the published proceedings of the New York Academy of Sciences meeting held in November
1978,2 which is an excellent source for medical, legal, and ethical information.
I.

BRAIN DEATH

For clarity, certain terms will be defined now, while others will be explained as they occur later in the discussion. The brain stem is composed of
the midbrain (mesencephalon), pons, and medulla. It contains nerve cell
groups and pathways that are intimately involved with basic cardiac and
respiratory functions, with reflex activities such as eye movements and responses to light and other stimuli, and with those reactions to the environment that are understood by such terms as responsiveness, awareness, or
consciousness (though the latter term has philosophical implications that are
beyond the scope of this article). Spinal reflexes are reactions that depend
only on the functional integrity of the spinal cord and hence can exist in the
absence of a functioning brain. The term death is equated to an irreversible
loss of function, either in part or whole, of an organ or of the human organism itself. Cerebral death refers specifically to death of the cerebral hemispheres but not of the brain stem, and patients so afflicted may remain in a
prolonged state of impaired responsiveness. Clinically, this condition usually
equates to the persistent vegetative state, about which more will be said
later. An important distinction is that cerebral death is not a synonym for
brain death. Brain death, medically and legally, implies irreversible cessation of function of the whole brain, which includes the cerebral hemispheres
and the brain stem. The French term, coma d~pass6, is an equivalent term
* Professor, Neurology & Neuro-pathology, University of Colorado, School of Medicine.
I. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979).
2. Seegenerally Brain Death:- Interrelated Medical and Social Issues, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
Scl. 1-454 (J. Korein ed. 1978).
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which encompasses not only absence of clinical function but absence of elec3
trophysiologic activity and cerebral blood flow as well.
In Lovato, there was never any doubt about the presence of brain death
in the seventeen-month-old child as determined by the attending physician,
a consulting neurologist, and a court-appointed neurologist. The issue was
whether in Colorado the death of an individual should be determined by the
standards of past centuries, or whether contemporary standards could be applied despite the absence of legislative statutes setting forth the criteria for
such a determination. Did society in general, and physicians in particular,
have to abide by the cardio-respiratory description of death as expressed in
Black's Law Dictionary-"A total stoppage of the circulation of the blood
and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc." 4 -or could an additional, not a substitute, definition apply in some instances? Justice Groves announced that the court
was adopting as a rule, "until otherwise changed legislatively or judicially,"
the provisions of the Uniform Brain Death Act. This act was accepted in
August 1978 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Its provisions state: "For legal and medical purposes, an individual with irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including
the brain stem, is dead. Determinations of death under this act shall be
5
made in accordance with reasonable medical standards."
Inasmuch as physicians in Colorado may now follow "reasonable medical standards" in determining when the brain is dead, it becomes necessary
to define, with as much precision as possible, just what these standards might
be. While perhaps having some merit in our current litigious society, Sir
Peter Medawar's criterion of brain death-that a man is legally dead "when
he has undergone irreversible changes of the type that make it impossible for
him to seek to litigate" 6 -may not be universally applicable. A vague or
poorly drawn set of medical criteria might err in two ways. Life support
might be abandoned prematurely in some instances or kept up for an unnecessarily long time in others. Hence, I will discuss the evolution of relevant
medical thinking in some detail and will try to define a set of guidelines that
all physicians might use.
In the twelve years since the landmark 1968 report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, 7 physicians, lawyers, and ethicists have worked hard to develop standards of such accuracy that any possible errors would favor the preservation
rather than the cessation of life. These endeavors have been stimulated by
the development in recent decades of machines, such as respirators, and therapeutic techniques which allow the maintenance of cardiac and respiratory
function for a long time, despite natural failure of heart and lungs. In addi3. Mollaret & Goulon, Le Coma Dipassi, 101 REVUE NEUROLOGIQUE 3 (1959).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

5. Cranford, Unifonn Brain Death Act, 29 NEUROLOGY 417 (1979).
6.

MEDAWAR, THE UNIQUENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL (1957).

7. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, .4 Defntihon of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968) [hereinafter cited as fieversibit

Coma].
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tion, the realization by society that its fiscal resources were not infinite provided an economic impetus, often the most compelling of all reasons, to
address further this most complex problem.
What the Harvard Committee did was to offer a definition of irreversible coma which they called a new criterion of death. Such a state was defined as one in which "irreversible cardiac arrest will inevitably follow
regardless of the maintenance of all resuscitative measures."'8 Subsequent
studies have confirmed that the heart will stop beating in an adult within
seven days despite any therapy once brain death has occurred. 9 How long
the heart of an infant or a very young child may continue to beat following
brain death is somewhat less certain. The hearts of most brain dead children
will stop beating within two to three weeks.' 0 The longest duration of cardiac activity that I have been able to find in the medical literature in a child
with clinical findings of brain death and absent cerebral circulation as established by radiographic techniques was thirty-two days." Justice Groves accepted the view that the seventeen-month-old Lovato child would
spontaneously develop cardiac arrest "within a month or so" of disconnection from life support systems, and this judgment appears sound. Hence,
when we discuss the abandonment of such systems in the case of a brain
dead person, we are talking about a step that moves up the inevitable cessation of the heart by only a few days in adults and a somewhat longer period
in young children. It is when we consider true states of irreversible impairment of responsiveness or cognition, which differ from brain death and
which are exemplified by the condition of Karen Quinlan, or make attempts
to predict outcome for the brain and the entire organism within a few days
of a catastrophic medical event that we move onto less certain ground.
The 1968 Harvard Committee 12 adopted a set of very stringent medical
criteria to identify those patients who had no discernible brain and spinal
cord activity, and who despite a beating heart could never return to a feeling, consciously responsive existence. The patient had to be unreceptive of,
and unresponsive to, any stimulus including pain. Spontaneous respirations
had to be absent for at least three minutes. All spinal reflexes (such as the
knee jerk) and all cephalic reflexes (such as pupillary responses to light, the
corneal blink reflex, and ocular response to ice water instilled into the external ear canal) had to be absent. An electroencephalogram (EEG), to be
repeated at a twenty-four hour interval when the clinical tests were also to
be repeated, could be utilized but was not considered to be mandatory.
Since central nervous system depressant drugs, such as barbiturates, and hypothermia could introduce possible errors into the assessment, these factors
had to be absent. These standards were felt to be consistent with the view
stated by Pope Pius XII that "it remains for the doctor
8.

. . .

to give a clear

Korein, The Problem of Brai'n Death. Development and Histog, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.

Sd. 19 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Ingvar, Brun, Johansson & Samuelsson, Suwvival After Severe CerebralAnoxia wih Destruclion of the Cerebral Cortex: The Apalli Syndrome, 315 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 184 (1978).
11. Id. at 211-14.
12. Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
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and precise definition of 'death' and the 'moment of death' of a patient who
' 3
passes away in a state of unconsciousness."'
The widespread application of these Harvard standards led quickly to a
realization that irreversible coma and brain death were not always synonymous, that some of the given criteria of brain death were not completely
accurate, and that modifications of these guidelines to meet particular circumstances were desirable. For example, from approximately one-half of
"brain dead" individuals, spinal reflexes may be elicited. 14 A twenty-four
hour delay in determining death may jeopardize the viability of organs, such
as the kidney, which might be donated to needy recipients. Consequently,
alternatives to the Harvard criteria were put forth from Minnesota,' 5 Japan, 16 Sweden, 17 and from a collaborative study in this country supported
by the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke.' 8 In addition,
much investigation has been devoted to rapid laboratory tests that might
possibly be infallible arbiters of brain death, such as the use of cerebral angiography' 9 and the injection of radioactive tracers as indicators of cerebral
20
blood flow.
With the results of all these studies and investigations in mind, I would
offer the following as "reasonable medical standards" for the diagnosis of
brain death.
1. The decision about brain death is ultimately a clinical one.2 l In most instances, no ambiguity exists in declaring the presence and time of death by
traditional cardio-respiratory and/or neurological criteria. Laboratory tests
are ancillary procedures that are not required to establish brain death, but
they are useful in some instances to resolve uncertainties. These tests should
not be regarded as a substitute for the clinical criteria outlined below or for
the critical degree of judgment required in interpreting these criteria.
2. It is essential that all historicalinformation in a case be evaluated and that
appropriatediagnosticprocedures be carriedout, so as to define as speci*ally as possible
the cause or causes of the patient's condition. In some instances, the use of the CT
scanner, the EEG, or other laboratory aids, if available, may be of assistance
in identifying the specific diagnosis. All therapeutic procedures appropriate
13. Address by Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 396
(Nov. 24, 1957).
14. Allen & Burkholder, Clzniial Criterza of Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 70

(1978).
15. Mohandas & Chou, Brain Death: A Clinical and Pathological Study, 35 J. NEUROSURG.
211 (1971).
16. Address to the Fifth International Congress of Neurological Surgery (Oct. 7-13, 1973)
(paper entitled Clinical Study of Brain Death, by K. Ueki, K. Takeuchi & K. Katsurada).
17. Ingvar & Widen, Brain Death: Summary of a Sympostin, 69 LAKARTIDNINGEN 3804
(1972).
18.

Bickford, An Apprairalof the Criteriaof CerebralDeath: A Summary Statement, A Collaborative

Study, 237 J.A.M.A. 982 (1977); Molinari, Review of Clinical Criteria of Brain Death, 315 ANNALS
N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 62 (1978).
19. Kricheff, AngiographicFindingsin Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCl. 168 (1978).
20. Braunstein, Korein, Kricheff & Lieberman, Evaluation of the Crittcal Defwi of Cerebral
Circulation Using Radioactive Tracers (Bolus Technique), 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scl. 143 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Braunstein].
21. Ad Hoc Colorado General Hospital Committee, Procedure for Brain Death DecisionMaking for Patients Whose Organs May Be Transplanted (Aug. 27, 1979) (unpublished).

BRAIN DEATH

19811

to the patient's condition also should have been instituted. The details of
what is therapeutically appropriate should be determined by the attending
physician, in consultation with responsible family members. It is obvious
that if the diagnosis of a potentially reversible medical condition is made,
therapeutic efforts would be exerted to the maximum degree, whereas if an
irreversible event, such as massive trauma to the head, had occurred such
efforts might be minimal.
3. The patient must be in coma and unresponsive in any purposefl way to any
stimulus, such as severe pain. The emphasis here is on the word purposeful,
inasmuch as experience has shown that in a few brain dead patients reflex
flexor spasms (withdrawal movements) of the legs or reflex decerebrate or
decorticate movements may be induced by some stimuli.2 2 Not all agree,
however, that the presence of spontaneous or stimulus-induced decorticate or
decerebrate movements is compatible with a diagnosis of brain death. 23 The
decerebrate movement consists of extensor thrusting of arms and legs, while
the decorticate movement involves arm flexion and leg extension. Spontaneous motor movements usually are absent in brain dead individuals, but may
24
be present rarely as isolated jerks of a limb.
4. Spontaneous respiration must be absent and no efforts must be made by the
patient to triggera respirator. Such a loss of respiration is called apnea. While
initially it was thought that testing for apnea would be simple, it has been
realized that false observations may occur unless precautions are taken. In
addition, an improperly performed test in a patient who is not brain dead
may further injure the brain.
Two physiological stimuli basic to reflex respiration are an increase in
the carbon dioxide (G02) content or a decrease of the oxygen content in the
blood. Concern has been expressed about the possibility that a patient who
had been hyperventilated on a respirator and hence depleted of C02, while
at the same time a high oxygen concentration had been inspired, might
have both respiratory drives blunted.2 5 In such a situation, when the respirator is disconnected, apnea in a patient not truly brain dead might persist
longer than the 3-minute test suggested by the Harvard criteria, 2 6 or longer
even than the 15-minute test suggested by a Northwestern University
study. 27 This result would be due to a slow build up of C02 from a very low
blood level and a slow fall of oxygen from a very high blood level. In two
actual instances, spontaneous ventilation returned in patients with flat
EEG's (no electrical activity noted) after 5 minutes, while in one instance it
returned after 9 minutes. 28 An additional problem with this testing for ap22.
23.
24.
25.

Allen & Burkholder, supra note 14, at 76.
Se Sweet, Brain Death, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 410 (1978).
Allen & Burkholder, supra note 14, at 76.
Posner, Coma and Oiher Staies of Conscujnewss. The Differential Diagnosis of Brain Death, 315

ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 215 (1978).

26. Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
27. Schafer & Caronna, Duration ofApnea Needed to Conjonm Brain Death, 28
(1978).
28.
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Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 241 (1978).
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nea is that a patient who is not brain dead might be injured further by the
hypoxia induced by the disconnection of the respirator.
To avoid these problems, simple precautions must be instituted. One
test consists of artifically ventilating the patient at a normal rate of 20
breaths/minute with a flow of 7 liters of 100% oxygen/minute for at least 1560 minutes to wash out 50% or more of the total body nitrogen. 29 This procedure greatly elevates the amount of oxygen in the blood, while maintaining a normal C02 level. The respirator is then turned off while either a fine
tracheal catheter or an endotracheal tube is used to continuously introduce
100% oxygen at a rate in adults of 4-6 liters/minute. 30 The test may be
continued for 10 to 15 minutes, during which time the arterial C02 pressure
(which is the most potent stimulator of breathing) will rise to a level which
should trigger respiration from an intact respiratory center in the brain stem.
During the test period, the arterial oxygen pressure will not fall to hypoxic
levels, and no additional brain damage will be sustained. Facilities for the
measurement of arterial blood gases and pH are available in almost every
modern hospital today. Such measurements should be made before and/or
after the disconnection test to provide additional data for its validation. If
the pressure of arterial C02 prior to the test is at least 30 mm Hg, 10 minutes of apnea will always raise it above 60 mm Hg, the minimal level needed
before one can say with certainty that respiration is absent. 3 1 Unless one
knows the arterial C02 pressure at either the start or the termination of the
test, there is no way to be certain that the test has been sufficiently provocative with any time period utilized.
5. Certain cephalic reflexes (light, corneal, oculovestibular, and oculocephalic)
must be absent. Cephalic reflexes traverse a variety of pathways through the
brain stem, and thus their presence or absence is of considerable importance
in determining whether that structure is intact. Some cephalic reflexes are
light, corneal, oculocephalic, oculovestibular, audio-ocular, snout, pharyngeal, swallow, cough, and jaw. Studies have established that the absence of
the pupillary light reflex (not necessarily associated with the presence of dilated pupils), oculovestibular reflex (eye movement in relation to ice water in
the ear), oculocephalic reflex (eye movement in response to rapid head turning) and corneal reflex (blink) have the greatest degree of correlation with
brain death. 32 Only rarely are they present in patients who are apneic, comatose, and without electroencephalographic activity for more than twentyfour hours, and then only transiently. Some of the other cephalic reflexes,
such as the audio-ocular, are too sensitive, since they disappear early in patients who are not brain dead. Others, such as the snout and jaw reflexes,
33
are too insensitive and may persist in cases of presumptive brain death.
6. The absence of spinal reflex activity is not necessaty for a diagnosis of brain
death. Such reflexes, particularly in the arms, may be present or absent at
29. Id. at 243.
30. Milhaud, Riboulot & Gayet, supra note 28; Posner, supra note 25, at 217.
31. Schafer & Caronna, supra note 27, at 666.
32. Allen & Burkholder, supra note 14, at 94.

33. Id.
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different times following the occurrence of brain death, and, hence, are of no
34
value in the documentation of this entity.
7. Szgnifiant hypothermia must be absent. This condition may mask other
clinical signs, and, consequently at the time of testing, the patient's rectal
temperature should be no lower than 97-98 degrees F. The temperature is
usually normal to elevated in most brain dead individuals but may fall
slightly in some. One study ascertained that approximately 17% of brain
dead patients had temperatures below 95 degrees F. and only 2/114 had
temperatures below 90 degrees F.3 5 Warming of such patients prior to testing would be required.
8. Drug intoxication must be absent. Inasmuch as drugs may depress respiration and many of the reflex responses noted above, as well as producing
coma, a blood and urine screen for sedatives, narcotics, psychoactive drugs,
and alcohol should be obtained, if possible. Where such tests are not possible, a careful inquiry must be made with regard to these agents. The use of
deliberately induced barbiturate coma as therapy for certain severe brain
injuries and diseases makes it mandatory that blood levels of the drugs used
be known before tests for brain death can be considered valid.
9. The EEG is an aid in the diagnosis of brain death, but its use is not
mandatoay. British 36 and American studies37 of brain death have made this
point, but in actual practice the use of the EEG as an ancillary aid is very
frequent. It is of particular value when traumatic injury to the head and
face makes testing of cephalic reflexes difficult. Unfortunately, and possibly
as a way of abdicating personal responsibility, many physicians seem to desire to use this study in place of, rather than in addition to, the clinical criteria listed above. If the test is easily available, if it is done properly for at least
30 minutes by knowledgeable technicians in conformity with the guidelines
for recording put forward by the American EEG Society, 38 if it is evaluated
by physicians conversant with the possible technical pitfalls of the study and
also conversant with the clinical problem at hand, 39 then the test is one
which can buttress the clinical impression of brain death and further guard
against the possibility of error.
These are several reasons why the EEG should not be used as the sole
basis for decision-making. "In the state of brain death, the EEG is always
silent; however, ECS [electrocerebral silence] does not always mean brain
death." 4 For example, just as drug intoxication and hypothermia may
34.
35.
36.
Death].
37.

Id.
Id. at 72.
Diagnosis ofBrain Death, 2 LANCET 1069 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Diagnosis of Brazn
Beecher, After the "Definition ofIrreversible Coma," 281 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1070 (1969).

38. AMERICAN ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, MINIMUM
DARDS FOR EEG RECORDING IN SUSPECTED CEREBRAL DEATH (1976).

TECHNICAL

STAN-

39. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the American Electroencephalographic Society on
EEG Criteria for Determination of Cerebral Death, CerebralDeath and the Electroencephalogram,
209 J.A.M.A. 1505 (1969).
40. Bennett, The EEG bn Detenrmnation of Brain Death. 315 ANNAL's N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 110
(1978).
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mask clinical signs of life, these conditions may also cause ECS.4 1 In the case
of drugs, 24 hours of ECS has been followed occasionally by full recovery. In
man, temperatures under 29 degrees C (84.2 degrees F) seem to be necessary
to produce significant change in the EEG, but ECS does not likely occur
until body temperatures go below 20 degrees C (68 degrees F). Recording of
ECS without drug intoxication or hypothermia with subsequent recovery of
some electrical activity in the brain, and in a few instances clinical recovery,
has been reported. Such cases are very rare and the duration in hours (2 to
8?) of clear ECS which can precede brain and clinical recovery is not
known. 4 2 ECS, however, when recorded in a setting consistent with the
clinical criteria of brain death noted above is strong, presumptive, and additional evidence of brain death.
The EEG ordinarily is recorded from scalp electrodes, and, thus, it is
possible to have ECS occur from brains that actually have existing deep subcortical electrical activity, both spontaneous and evoked. 43 Such a finding
would suggest that the brain stem is not dead, and, hence, such patients
would not be legally brain dead. Cases of ECS associated with clinical signs
of brain stem function, though rare, have been reported. 44 Such cases might
imply that the neocortex (the gray matter of most of the cerebral hemispheres) was dead while the brain stem was alive and raise philosophical
questions for the present and legal problems for the future that are beyond
the scope of this discussion. It should be apparent, therefore, that sole reliance on electrically silent EEG's to diagnose brain death would be improper.
Even more rarely, it seems possible that the combination of a dead brain
stem and some cortical electrical activity may occur, again emphasizing the
need for clinical judgment to be the final arbiter of brain death.
10. Additional laboratory tests may be used to provide further data about brain
death, but must be correlated with clzincalfmdings. The evaluation of methods to
rapidly and accurately determine the absence of cerebral circulation, a condition incompatible with recovery of electrical activity or clinical function, is
under current investigation. 45 A bedside bolus technique using radioactive
tracers has been advocated, especially in cases in which drug intoxication
may be suspected. 46 It is sometimes difficult, and often time consuming, to
clarify the question of drug intoxication, especially when the nature of the
drug in question is unknown. In addition, drug intoxication may co-exist
with other causes of coma, and, hence, be overlooked. Such a technique
may, therefore, prove to be of value. Cerebral angiography, 47 brain scanning techniques, 48 pharmacologic tests (such as one using atropine to deter41. See Hughes, Lbnitatonsof the EEG in Coma and Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sm.

121 (1978).
42.
43.
44.
45.
(1978).
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 124, 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 129.
Walker, Anctllary Studies in the Diagnosis of Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Smt. 228
Braunstein, supra note 20.
Kricheff, supra note 19.
Goodman, Discussion, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 259 (1978).
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mine viability of brain stem centers that accelerate cardiac rate), 49 and
blood gas studies50 also have been evaluated as measures of cerebral circulation. They may be particularly useful in infants and young children for
whom the length of possible cardiac activity in a brain dead state may be
more lengthy than that in adults. The current lack of availability to physicians in many hospitals of some of these tests and the lack of extensive validation for others, however, would put them outside the pale of "reasonable
medical standards," which should be standards that can be employed readily by the non-neurologist.
11. With few exceptions, at least six to twelve hours shouldelapsefollowing the
onset of apnea and coma before thefmal determination ofbrain death. A critical question relates to the rapidity with which brain death can be declared, especially in cases in which organ transplantation is contemplated. By contrast
with the Harvard criteria, 5 ' some recent studies have advised waiting only
six hours after the onset of coma and apnea, 52 while others advocate waiting
at least twelve hours. 53 In those instances where the specific time of onset of
the apnea is not known, it has been recommended that at least six to twelve
hours pass between two formal evaluations of the clinical and electroencephalographic criteria of brain death. 54 The majority of Colorado
neurologists polled recently felt that twelve hours should be the minimum
time of observation. 55 It is important to emphasize that a second complete
clinical examination for brain death should be performed after the minimum six to twelve hour time period, in order not to overlook the slightest
sign of genuine brain activity.
In a few special circumstances, a certain degree of leeway for judgment
would also seem practical. 56 When a patient has sustained massive, obviously fatal head trauma, such as from a large caliber gunshot wound
through the head, the time interval for observation may be shortened appropriately. By contrast, in other instances it may be necessary to observe the
patient for much longer than twelve hours before outcome can be predicted
clearly.
12. All the examinations, both laboratoy and chnical, should be documented in
the chartnot only by date, but by time as well. The actual time of death should be
documented clearly, because of potentially important legal considerations.
13. No physicianengaged in the process ofprocuring or transplantingorgansfrom
the patient involved should be a party to the determination of brain death. This stricture should be scrupulously observed for obvious reasons.
Adhering strictly to these criteria, which I believe are reasonable and
49. Ouaknine, Cardiacanzd Metabotic Aternattons in Brain Death: Discussion Paper, 315 ANNALS
N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 252 (1978).
50. Walker, supra note 45, at 229.
51. Irreversibte Coma, supra note 7.
52. Bickford, supra note 18, at 985.
53. Mohandas & Chou, supra note 15, at 212.
54. Suter & Brush, Clinical Problems of Brain Death and Coma in Intensive Care Units, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 398 (1978).
55. Interview with E.C. Hutchins, President of Colorado Society of Neurologists (1980).
56. Diagnosis of Brain Death, supra note 36, at 1070.
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which can be carried out by any physician without unduly specialized or
costly help, brain death can justly be equated to legal death without fear of
error. As Posner has indicated, "there is no differential diagnosis of brain
death since the criteria have been so drawn that all patients whose brains are
'5 7
not dead are eliminated from consideration.
II.

PROLONGED STATES OF IMPAIRED RESPONSIVENESS

The remainder of this paper will attempt to grapple with issues that are
much more difficult than those that relate to brain death. This is because
they are less well defined medically, and, consequently, have scarcely been
approached legislatively or judicially. 58 In a long footnote, Justice Groves
avoided addressing the issue of irreversible coma, inasmuch as it was not
applicable to the Lovato case. 59 He correctly pointed out that irreversible
coma is not synonymous with either death or brain death. The same is true
for a number of other states, and, hence, our discussion must examine additional conditions which do not meet the medical definition of true coma (a
sleep-like state of eyes-closed, unarousable unresponsiveness, without evident
psychological awareness of self or environment).
Patients who survive for long periods in states of impaired responsiveness to their environment sometimes may be thought to be in coma, while
others clearly are not. Initially, such patients have stormy courses for days or
weeks during which, for a time, brain stem functions may appear to be lost.
They then stabilize and persist as described below. A variety of terms such
as akinetic mutism, coma vigile, apallic syndrome, dyspallic syndrome, neocortical death, persistent vegetative state, and the locked-in syndrome have
been used by authors in various countries in an attempt to bring semantic
precision to these complex conditions. None of these labels precisely fit every
case, and, hence, a knowledge of each is required to understand why the
legal issues surrounding this area are not likely to be resolved for quite some
time. Probably the most common nontraumatic cause for these conditions is
cerebral anoxia or hypoxia (a complete absence or deficiency of oxygenation
of the brain). Events such as sudden heart attacks with cardiac arrest, intoxication with carbon monoxide, hanging, or drowning would be common examples of causation of cerebral anoxia. Other frequent causes of vegetative
states are strokes, failure of the liver or other vital organs, pressure sequelae
from tumors, or infections.
The number of patients in these terrible conditions appears to be increasing, probably as a result of wide-spread use of resuscitative techniques
by both professional and lay people. Fortunately for some and unfortunately for others, emergency resuscitation is attempted for just about any
individual who collapses under almost any circumstance. There is no question that many lives are saved in this way and that full recovery of the patient often ensues. An unfortunate by-product, however, is that some brains
57. Posner, supra note 25, at 216.
58. Schneck, Brain Death, thePerststenl Vegetative State and Medical Decision-Maki'ng, 11 INT'L
Soc. BARRISTERS 201 (1976).
59. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 n.6 (Colo. 1979).
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are so damaged by the catastrophic event which precipitated the resuscitative action that although the individual survives, there may be permanent
loss of cognition and responsiveness. Nerve cells in the brain begin to die
after approximately five minutes of oxygen deprivation, and no mechanism
exists for their replacement. The cerebral cortex is much more sensitive to
oxygen deprivation than is the brain stem, and, hence, survival of the organism with loss of those cognitive functions dependent on the cortex is no surprise. Ideally, if one knew just how long the brain had been deprived of
oxygen before a resuscitation was attempted, one might make a judgment as
to whether to proceed. Only rarely is this time known accurately (cardiac
arrest during an operation would be one example). Likewise, the efficacy of
a resuscitative attempt in providing well oxygenated blood to the brain is
rarely measured. It seems likely that eager but unskilled volunteers with
little practical experience in resuscitation may not be as effective physiologically as might be desired.
The term akinetic mutism, originally coined in England in 1941,60 describes patients who, while often asleep, at times appear awake; who while
not paralyzed, are immobile except for occasional random, slow, and inconstant motor responses to auditory, painful, and other stimuli; who, while not
always silent, have no significant spontaneous verbal communications; who
rarely follow objects or people with their eyes; and who often give the impression that in some way they are aware of their environment, though not
responsive to it. Thus, brain stem functions obviously are intact in these
patients. If electroencephalography is performed, the record is usually diffusely slow, but is occasionally near normal unlike the ECS of a brain dead
person. It is apparent that these individuals may not always be akinetic or
mute, and some have lived in this tragic condition for weeks, months, or
years. Rare patients with reversible causes for this state, such as resectable
tumors, have recovered with no memory of the time spent in it. A French
term, coma vigile, is essentially a synonym for akinetic mutism.
61
A German author, in 1940, first used the term apallic syndrome.
These patients have a complete loss of speech, voluntary motor activity, and
emotional and other reactions to their environment, but they retain brain
stem functions including respiration. 62 They may respond to some stimuli
with involuntary movements and changes in respiration, and they may exhibit chewing and swallowing movements. The EEG is usually quite depressed and sometimes exhibits ECS. Individuals may survive a long time in
this condition, with one reported patient existing 17 years. 6 3 Cerebral blood
flow is reduced to about 20% of normal. Incomplete syndromes in terms of
their clinical, EEG, and cerebral metabolic features have been called dyspallic. The major pathological change is severe anoxic damage to the cerebral
cortical nerve cells while the brain stem remains relatively preserved. Ne-

60. Cairns, Oldfield, Pennybacker & Whitteridge, Akinetic Mutism With An Epdemoid Cyst of

the 3rd

entnde, 64 BRAIN 273 (1941).

61. Kretschmer, Das Apalliuche Syndrom, 169 Z. GESAMTE NEUROLOGY PSYCHIATRY 576
(1940).
62. Ingvar, Brun, Johansson & Samueisson, supra note 10, at 184.
63. Id. at 203.
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ocortical death, an English term, 64 also refers to widespread, irreversible
damage to the gray matter of the cerebral hemispheres, while the intact
brain stem is able to contribute to prolonged survival of the patient.
The term persistent vegetative state was coined in 1972,65 and has rapidly gained acceptance in this country and in England. Patients so named
have a complete loss of cognitive function and are, in lay terminology, "vegetables." This state differs from coma in that at times the eyes are open, and
sleep-wake cycles are present. Spontaneous and apparently reflex eye and
limb movements may occur in response to environmental stimuli. Occasionally, the eyes will open in response to verbal stimuli. No comprehensible
word or communication is ever expressed, and complex behavior is never
initiated. Brain stem functions, such as temperature regulation, intestinal
mobility, and respiration, are present. Karen Quinlan exists in this state,
"awake but not aware." 66 At no time did she ever meet any of the criteria
for brain death, and on examination six months after her initial episode of
anoxia, she still possessed a variety of cephalic reflexes. 67 Spontaneous respirations were present, EEG activity was recorded, and normal intracranial
circulation confirmed by angiography was found. The differences from
brain death are obvious, though the differences between features encompassed by the term persistent vegetative state as compared to the other terms
discussed here may at times seem small. In the final analysis of the neuropathologist, a variety of lesions in a variety of locations may produce relatively
similar clinical pictures. What is most important to realize, and I hope that
the repeated emphasis may be forgiven, is that these patients fit no current
criteria for legal death.
Finally, quite distinct from brain death and from states of prolonged
unresponsiveness is a condition perhaps described as early as 1875, but definitely named in 1965, as the locked-in syndrome. 68 It has also been called
pseudocoma, the de-efferented state or cerebromedullospinal disconnection.
Such patients usually have lost all limb and facial movements, but jaw, lid,
and eye movements characteristically are preserved and, most importantly,
the capacity for awareness and responsiveness is undeniably intact. Meaningful communication may be established through eye blink codes with these
unfortunate individuals. Most such patients have suffered strokes, though
trauma or demyelination (loss of the fatty insulating covering of nerve fibers)
may be the cause in a few. Since such patients are aware, responsive, and
alive by every medical and legal criterion, we shall not discuss them further.
A question now to be considered is: Should the legal definition of death
cover irreversible loss of cognitive function, whether the condition be called
a persistent vegetative state, the apallic syndrome, akinetic mutism, or
whatever? In 1975, the New Jersey court dealing with the Quinlan case ap64. Brierley, ./ at , Neocortical Death after CardiacArrest, 2 LANCET 560 (1976).
65. Jennett & Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage..A Syndrome in Search of a
Name, I LANCET 734 (1972).
66. F. PLUM & D. LEVY, Outcome From Severe Neurological Illness; Should It Infiance Medical
Decisions?, in BRAIN AND MIND 267 (CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM 69, 1979).
67. Korein, Editois Comment, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 320 (1978).
68. F. PLUM & J. POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 6 (2d ed. 1972).
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parently made "cognition," not brain death as we have discussed it, an all
important point in decision-making. 69 "It formulated a procedure to permit
withdrawal of a presumptively life-supporting respirator following a medical
determination that cognition was irretrievably lost. The court thus established a legal precedent for terminating care of those adults who, while retaining vegetative neurological functions, lack the capacity to interact with
the external environment."' 70 This view may create enormous problems for
patients, families, physicians, and society. How does one end the life of a
patient whose heart beats, whose lungs move adequately, and whose homeostatic mechanisms are preserved, without committing homicide? What does
one do if the view of family and physician differ with regard to the degree of
effort to be exerted to maintain life, especially when the mere discontinuance
of a respirator does not solve the problem (as it did not for Quinlan and as it
would not for most such patients)? Inasmuch as only rare patients are
known to have recovered to a variable degree from a vegetative state (almost
all of whom were post-traumatic), 7 1 how much credence should be given to
those who believe that any chance for recovery, no matter how small, is
worth all the cost and effort that goes into the care of such patients? And
finally, should the court, a hospital or community committee, or an individual physician have the final decision-making authority in such difficult
cases?
Taking the last question first, my personal, pragmatic view is that the
physician, and not the court, is in the best position to give advice to the
concerned family and to chart a course of action with them. The doctor is
best able, utilizing special help from consultants or from a hospital committee of experts if needed, to ascertain the cause of the condition and to predict, within the limits of scientific knowledge, an outcome. He or she can
support the family in its grief, answer questions, and sometimes educate or
even arbitrate. Flexibility of action with regard to the maintenance or institution of various forms of treatment, as well as their omission, can be agreed
upon to the general satisfaction of all. While this methodology will not
avoid disagreement in every case, my experience leads me to believe that
most rational and caring physicians and families can reach a modus operandi
that will avoid a Quinlan-type confrontation, in which the family wanted to
discontinue support and the physicians refused. The age-old basis on which
good physicians have acted is discretionary, and not authoritative, care. It
would be wrong, in my opinion, to substitute either legislative or judicial fiat
for this type of flexibility. Formalization and standardization of action for
patients in prolonged noncognitive states would invade the area of personal
belief in a way that would harm freedom of choice. While the patient can
69. Beresford, The Quinlan Dcirion Problems and Legislative Alternatives, 2 ANNALS NEUROLoGY 74, 75 (1977).
70. Beresford, Cogntive Death: Differential Problas and Legal Ooertones, 315 ANNALS N.Y.

ACAD. Sci. 339 (1978).
71. For a general discussion of the prospects for recovery after coma see A. BRICOLO, Prolonged Post-Traunati Coma, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 699 (1976); Levy, KnillJones & Plum, The Vegetatite State and Its PrognosisFollowing Nontrawnatic Coma, 315 ANNALS N.Y.
AcAD. Sci. 293 (1978); Rosenberg, Johnson & Brenner, Recooery of CognitionAfter Prolonged Vegetatir State, 2 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 167 (1977).
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no longer express a choice, families and physicians can. If well documented
statements from the patient, either verbal or in the form of a so-called living
will, are available, the position so stated can be taken into consideration.
My belief is that the end result of such reasoning together will, in most instances, provide an acceptable solution to a tragic problem.
Attempts to decide upon courses of action by courts in such cases likely
will prove to be cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive. In a recent
case involving an 83-year-old Marist brother who went into a coma after a
cardiac arrest, 72 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
ruled that court approval must be obtained every time physicians want to
stop life-supporting treatment for patients unable to make such a decision
for themselves. Testimony by the patient's family, and his or her physician,
and a hospital committee of three doctors, and a guardian appointed by the
court, and the Attorney General or the District Attorney who shall be given
the opportunity to have examinations conducted by physicians of his own
choosing is to be taken in each case before a court decision is rendered. This
ruling was given, despite the plea of the patient's twelve nieces and nephews
and his religious superior to terminate mechanical respiration. The patient
died after 114 days during the legal proceedings. His medical bill was
$87,000, and his legal fees were $20,000, despite donation of some of their
time by attorneys. 73 Further appeal is in progress.
A neurologist who has been a leader in attempts to delineate and clarify
the persistent vegetative state has stated that "[d]ecisions about who shall
live and who shall die cannot be left to doctors alone."' 74 He suggests that it
is society that decides how physicians should act in these circumstances, taking cognizance of the best scientific information available. The practical
problem, however, is that our society has not yet reached a consensus opinion at this moment in time, and all the data that are needed for rational
decision-making in every case have not yet been gathered. It appears unlikely to me that any court or legislative body at the present time will be able
to define specific standards precise enough to cover all forms of medical and
social responses to prolonged states of impaired cognition.
The question as to whether patients who exist in a vegetative state
should be considered legally dead is certain to engender strong emotions,
regardless of which way it is answered. Personally, I do not believe they
should be considered legally dead, since I doubt very much that most physicians, based on the descriptions given above, would consider them medically
dead. If this is the case, how might this difficult problem be managed? To
begin with, such individuals fall into two groups-those who are in the unstable initial stages of their neurological problem and are not yet fixed in a
vegetative state, and those who have survived for about a month and for
whom past experience would indicate that there is practically no chance for
75
further improvement of significance.
72. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
73. 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
74.
75.

F. PLUM & D. LEvY,supra note 66.
Levy, Knill-Jones & Plum, supra note 71, at 302.
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For the first group, it would be useful if doctors possessed the ability to
make reasonably accurate judgments of outcome very early after an acute
catastrophic brain event for humanitarian and economic reasons. If such
judgments predicted with great validity not only death but also the likelihood of occurrence of a vegetative state, then resuscitative efforts might be
abandoned early and with a predictable effect rather than late. Most of the
people who finally enter a relatively stable vegetative state do so after passing through a few turbulent weeks of cardiac, respiratory, chemical, and
neurologic instability which requires a great deal of therapy, attention, and
expense, usually in an intensive care unit, to maintain survival. Ideally, the
first few hours would be best for this determination since the longer one
waits to make the decision not to treat vigorously, the harder it is for all
concerned to implement that decision. 76 The methods that physicians currently use, however, to estimate outcome are not refined enough, particularly
in cases of non-traumatic coma, to always accurately predict the future
based on observations in this short period of time. In only about one-quarter
of such patients can favorable or unfavorable outcomes be predicted in the
first six hours with a 95% confidence limit, and accuracy during a twentyfour-hour period is not much better. 77 By contrast, it now appears that
coma or a vegetative state at seven days "is rarely associated with return of
78
independence."
Recent evidence suggests that in many cases three days may be the time
period needed for valid judgments of prognosis. Of nine patients at the Denver General Hospital who remained unresponsive for at least three days and
who survived to be discharged, four remained in a vegetative state, two required total nursing care, and three were unemployable due to major or79
ganic mental defects.
A recent study of non-traumatic states, such as coma due to cardiac
arrest from myocardial infarction (heart attack), seems of even more practical value.80 Using four clinical parameters (pupillary light reflex, corneal
blink reflex, withdrawal movements of the limbs, and verbalization of any
type) in 261 patients evaluated three days following their acute cerebral insult, it was determined that when all four parameters were present 74% of
patients made either a good recovery or had only a moderate degree of disability, 26% remained severely disabled, and no patients died or entered a
vegetative state. By contrast, if after three days none of these parameters
existed, 96% of such patients either died or entered a vegetative state, and
the remaining 4% were severely disabled. This careful study, together with
the knowledge that patients remaining in a vegetative state for more than a
76.

F. PLUM & D. LEVY, supra note 66.

77. Id.
78. Levy, Knill-Jones & Plum, supra note 71, at 303.
79. Yarnell, Neurological Outcome ofProlongedComa Survivors of Out-of-HospitalCardiac Arrest, 7
STROKE 279, 281 (1976).
80. D. Levy & F. Plum, Evaluating Prognosis in Nontraumatic Coma. Interview with D.
Levy, Associate Professor, Cornell University, and F. Plum, Chairman of the Dep't of Neurology, Cornell University, in Boston (Sept. 7-10, 1980), Poster Presentation 58, Meeting of the

American Neurological Association.
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month following an anoxic event have essentially no chance for recovery,"'
provides an operational approach, for the present, for many patients. If this
data is discussed with a family, most families in my opinion, would not wish
to continue vigorous resuscitative efforts, such as restarting the heart after a
cardiac arrest, antibiotic treatment of significant infections, or the continuance of mechanical respiration. By contrast, some families would desire this
type of vigorous therapy, and, if the physician agreed, resuscitative efforts
could be continued. If the physician and family disagreed on the course of
action, then another physician could be sought to take over the case. Outcomes for very young children and young adults in whom the potential for
recovery is much greater remain to be ascertained, but undoubtedly will be
forthcoming.
Unlike the absolutes associated with prediction of brain death, it may
never be possible to do better than the figures quoted above. Obviously,
further studies involving a larger number of patients are needed to corroborate and possibly refine this data. Even if the 4% figure is looked upon as an
error rate, it should be realized that such surviving patients are unlikely to
be productive citizens and that most will require permanent and near total
care. Hence, it could be argued that no real error of prediction of outcome
has been made if we are talking about the ability to function compared with
an individual's prior state. A much higher error rate of 20% actually was
made in the reverse direction when those individuals considered to have a
good prognosis after three days later were evaluated. 8 2 The hardest patients
to assess continue to be those who possess only one or two of the clinical signs
after three days. At the present time, there is no certain way to tell who
among those will live or die, become functional or be vegetative. Whether to
continue to treat such patients after three days will have to be decided on an
individual basis by the physician and family.
An additional important consideration in assessment of outcome is the
cause of the problem itself. Those patients with a metabolic cause, such as
liver failure, tend to have better outcomes than do those with structural injury, such as derived from a stroke or hypoxia. In one study of 500 patients
who had non-traumatic coma,8 3 the chances for the survivors to recover to a
fully independent existence was three times greater for those who had metabolic causes when compared to hypoxic patients and four times greater when
compared to stroke patients.
For the second group of noncognitive patients, fixed after a month or so
in a vegetative limbo, only minimal medical and nursing care, such as feeding, turning, and cleansing, is needed to maintain them in a stable condition.
I do not believe that most physicians and nurses would be willing to take the
active step of stopping this basal care to end their lives, and I can, in fact,
recall the acute discomfort experienced by the medical and nursing staff
when a brain dead patient, disconnected from a respirator, continued to
have cardiac action for many hours while the family insisted that the giving
81.

F. PLUM & D. LEVY, supra note 66.

82.
83.

Levy & Plum, supra note 80.
F. PLUM & D. LEVY, supra note 66.
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of intravenous fluid be discontinued. When a significant infection or other
complication occurs, however, which ordinarily would call for further active
treatment measures, then the physician and family may again consider a
restrained course of action. This decision would be no different, in my opinion, from similar ones made frequently for patients terminally ill from cancer
and other serious illnesses. If a collaborative decision is made to treat vigorously, it will be taken in full knowledge of the fact8 4 that recovery from a
month-long vegetative state essentially never occurs.
Justice Groves, paraphrasing William Cullen Bryant's poem of 1817,
"Thanatopsis," spoke of the innumerable caravan moving to their chambers
in the silent halls of death.8 5 We now know that some individuals tragically
pause in limbo during this journey, for what must seem to their families to
' 86
As with all
be an eternity before they can lie "down to pleasant dreams."
the difficult questions that face an ever-changing society, time, trial, and
experience will eventually clarify the management of these irreversible states
of cognitive loss. Operational, rather than legal or legislative methods, probably will solve most such situations. That some errors will be made is undeniable, since all physicians will wish to err on the side of life rather than
death. I believe, however, that such errors will be infrequent and in keeping
with the injunction carried in the heart of all physicians-above all, do no
harm to your patient. 87

84. Levy, Knill-Jones & Plum, supra note 71, at 302.
85. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Colo. 1975) (citing W. C. Bryant, Thana(1817)).
topsis
86. W.C. Bryant, Thanatopsts (1817).
87. For further references in the general subject area of brain death, see Black, Brain Death,
299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 338, 393-401 (1978); Higashi, Sakata, Hatano, Abiko, Ihara, Katayama,
Wakuta, Okamura, Ueda, Zenke & Aoki, Epidemiological Studies on Patients wth a Persistent
40 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIAT. 876 (1977); Levy, Bates, Caronna, CarVegetaie State,
tlidge, Knill-Jones, Shaw & Plum, Recovery From Nontraumatic Coma, 103 TRANSACTIONS AM.
for Human Death. An Anaysis and
NEUROLOGICAL A. 104 (1978); Stickel, The Brain Death Criterion
Rejections on the1977 New York Conference on Brain Death, 6 ETHICS SCI. MED. 177 (1979).

LOVATO v DISTRICT COURT: THE DILEMMA
OF DEFINING DEATH

INTRODUCTION

Medical and technological advances, such as the transplantation of a
heart from one human being to another and the artificial maintenance of
circulatory and respiratory functions, have created a growing uncertainty as
to when life ends and death occurs. One thing has become increasingly certain: the common law definition of death as "[a] total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."' can no longer be
considered accurate.

The Colorado Supreme Court faced the dilemma of defining death for
seventeen-month-old Jerry Trujillo in Lovato v. Distr'ct Court.2 The child had
been grossly abused 3 and was not breathing.

He was hospitalized and

placed on a mechanical respirator.
The trial court determined, upon the testimony of the court-appointed

neurologist, the child's attending physician, and his consulting neurologist,
that the child had suffered total brain death caused by extensive brain damage resulting from head trauma. 4 The respondent district court ordered the
guardians ad lilem to execute a document authorizing the treating physician
and the hospital involved to remove all life-support equipment if in the doc-

tor's opinion the child was legally dead, as defined by the court. 5 The
mother and guardians ad litem of the child petitioned the Colorado Supreme
Court to review the order.
The court, after an extensive discussion of modern scientific views, judi-

cial decisions, and recent legislation in other states, adopted the provisions of
the Uniform Brain Death Act. 6 The holding did not preclude a determina-

tion of death according to the traditional criteria of cessation of respiration
and circulation.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).

2. 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979).
3. The child's mother, petitioner Rosalie Lovato, was arrested for child abuse. Guardians
ad lilen
were appointed for Jerry Trujillo.
4. The child was completely comatose, was not breathing spontaneously, had no reflexes,
did not respond to even the most intense pain, had no cephalic responses (corneal, pharyngeal,
swallowing, and blinking), had fixed and dilated pupils, had a negative toxicological screen, and
had electrocerebral silence. Record, Exhibit I at 4, 44-47.
5. "ITihe legal definition of death in Colorado is that state which occurs when it is determined by a physician, based on reasonable medical standards, that there is no spontaneous
brain function and either spontaneous respiratory function or spontaneous circulatory function
cannot be restored by resuscitation or supportive maintenance." 601 P.2d at 1074.
6. "For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation
of all functioning of the brain, including the brainstem, is dead. A determination under this
section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards." 12 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOr. 5 (Supp. 1980).
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

Medical Studies

In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death published its report. 7 The report defined for the first time irreversible coma as a criterion for death. 8 The
following criteria were presented as establishing brain death: 1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to even the most intensely painful stimuli; 2) an absence of spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration; 3) no
reflexes; and 4) a flat electroencephalogram (EEG). 9 The report also stated
that hypothermia and'central nervous system depressants must be ruled out
as the cause of the coma. The EEG was not regarded as mandatory but was
viewed as having great confirmatory value. The criteria evaluate both
higher brain functions as well as lower brainstem (vegetative) functions.
The Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics,
and the Life Sciences published a report in 1972 assessing the Harvard criteria.10 The report concluded that the criteria and procedures were reasonable and appropriate. A collaborative study group published its statement
of the criteria of cerebral death in 197711 in which the Harvard criteria were
slightly relaxed.
B.

Leg'slation

2
Since 1970, when Kansas enacted the first brain death statute,'
twenty-four other states have enacted brain death statutes1 3 and two states

7. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Deftinition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Irreversible
Coma ].

8. Since the Harvard report, the medical community has distinguished between brain
death and irreversible coma. Brain death implies total destruction of brain function with both
volitional and reflex responses absent. Irreversible coma refers to a vegetative state where all
higher brain functions are lost but certain vital functions such as respiration, temperature, and
blood pressure regulation may be retained. A Collaborative Study, An Appraisalof the Criteriaof
Cerebral Death, 237 J.A.M.A. 982, 982 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CerebralDeath].
9. "Flat" electroencephalograph has been termed "electrocerebral silence" by the American Electroencephalographic Society to distinguish between low voltage activity in which patients can recover and no brain activity in which patients are brain dead and cannot recover.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the-American Electroencephalographic Society on EEG
Criteria for the Determination of Cerebral Death, CerebralDeath and the Electroencephalogram, 209

J.A.M.A. 1505, 1506 (1969).
10. Report by the Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and
the Life Sciences, Refments in Cn'teriafor the Deermmnattion of Death.- An Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A.

48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Refiements].
11. See Cerebral Death, supra note 8.

12. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
13. ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1980); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1980); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1979);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139i(b) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1 (1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, § 302(b) (1978); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp.
1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980 Repl. Vol.); MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.1021 (1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-301(g)
(Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087 (1980 Repl. Vol.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1977
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have judicially sanctioned a concept of brain death. 14 The statutes are of
three general types: 1) those which define death as occurring when a person
has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function;' 5 2) those
which define death as occurring with either an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation or irreversible cessation of brain function;' 6 and 3) those which define death as the cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions or in the event these functions are being artificially
maintained death occurs with the total and irreversible cessation of brain

function. 17
Three organizations have drafted models for brain death statutes: the
Repl. Vol.); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 54-325.7
(Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1980).
14. State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373
Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. denid, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
15. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The state statutes are cited in
note 13 supra. California's statute is typical:
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician that the
person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function. There shall be
an independent confirmation of the death by another physician.
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other usual and

customary procedures for determining death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a
person dead.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1979).

16. Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. The state statutes are cited in
note 13 supra. Kansas statute is typical:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiration and cardiac function and, because of the disease or condition which
caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time
since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in
this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have
occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this
state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977 & Supp. 1979).

17. Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and Texas. The state statutes
are cited in note 13 supra. Iowa's statute is typical:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based on
ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has experienced an irreversible
cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, a
person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of two physicians, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has experienced an irreversible
cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time when
the relevant functions ceased.
IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979).

This statute is almost identical to the proposal by Capron and Kass with the distinction
that the proposal did not require that two physicians participate in determining brain death.
Capron & Kass, A Statutory Defmitn ofthe Szandardsfor Detemiunng Hwnan Death.- An Appraisaland
a Pro/"ral, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Statuliy Defiition].
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American Bar Association,' 8 the American Medical Association,2019 and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
C.

Colorado'sRecognition of Brain Death

In 1979, House Bill 1416, which would have statutorily recognized
brain death, was introduced and passed by the Colorado House of Representatives.2 I The bill was essentially the Uniform Brain Death Act 22 with
the distinction that it added as an alternative definition of death: "an absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function." ' 23 The Senate Judiciary Committee amended the bill, adopting the American Bar Association
model, primarily upon the testimony of McCarthy DeMere, a lawyer-physician and the American Bar Association's advisor to the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 2 4 The bill, as amended, did not
pass out of the senate committee.
Lovalo presented a fact pattern which necessitated either judicial recognition or rejection of a concept of brain death. The court acknowledged the
authority of the General Assembly to recognize statutorily the standards by
which death is to be determined and seemed to try to adhere to the 1979
proposal of the Colorado House Judiciary Committee.
18. "For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered
dead." 61 A.B.A. J. 464 (1975). This model was adopted by Montana and Tennessee. The
state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
19. The AMA changed its position on the necessity of brain death legislation when it developed a model bill in January 1979. The model, as modified in December 1979, provides:
"An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, shall be considered
dead. A determination of death pursuant to this section shall be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards." Position Paper of the American Medical Association, Legislative
Department, Public Affairs Division (Dec. 13, 1979).
20. See note 6 upra.
21. For legal and medical purposes, an individual is dead if: (a) he has sustained
irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brainstem; or (b) he
has an absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function. A determination of
death under this section shall be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards.
H.B. No. 1416, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979).
22. See note 6 supra.
23. H.B. No. 1416, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979).
24. Dr. DeMere believes that the common law definition of death is incorrect and that
there is a need for a legal definition of death. DeMere advocates the ABA model. See note 18
slpra .
Dr. DeMere's criticisms of H.B. No. 1416 are:
1. The title says, "Determination of death;" it is a definition and not a determination.
"Determination" is a medical term.
2. It is wrong to establish medical purposes in law.
3. "Individual" is ambiguous; it should be "human body."
4. There is a difference between functioning of the brain and brain function.
5. The bill varied the Uniform Brain Death Act by adding an alternative definition of
death. The absence of spontaneous respiration is not death if the brain is functioning. (For
example, polio victims.)
6. "Reasonable medical standards" should be "usual and customary standards." Heanngs
on H.B. No. 1416 Before the Colorado Senate Judiaivy Comm., 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., April 16,
1979, Tape Top Meter 13:50:33 [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings I]. See also Hamlon &
A Step Forward... or Backward?, 62 MINN. MED. 363
Burns, Minnesota "BrainDeath" Legislatio
(1979). But setUniform Brain Death Act, 29 NEUROLOGY 417 (1979).

19811

]LOVA TO V DISTRICT COURT
II.

ANALYSIS

Lovalo sanctioned a concept of brain death. This concept prescribes
that a physician who determines that a person meets the criteria of brain
death, as established by the medical community, pronounce the person
dead. It is crucial to realize that Lovalo is not a part of the In re Qutnlan line
of right-to-die cases25 which allow life-support systems to be withdrawn
where a patient is in an irreversible coma. 26 It is important to keep the
ethical question, "When should a person be allowed to die?," separate from
the medical question, "When should a person be pronounced dead?" ' 2 7 Six
states with brain death statutes specifically mandate that death be pronounced before means of supporting respiratory and circulatory functions
28
are terminated.
Much of the opposition to the concept of brain death, both among those
in the medical community and laymen, stems from a misconception that
persons can recover from a complete cessation of brain function. 29 In every
instance in which a person has been found to recover from "an absence of

brain function" the criteria had not been fulfilled. 30

Thus, the validity of

the criteria must be considered to be established with as much certainty as is

possible in medicine. 31 Opposition also arises among laymen who try to link
brain death with euthanasia.

Euthanasia is the "act or practice of painlessly

putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease"

32

as an act of mercy, whereas brain death criteria merely allow a physician to
pronounce death.
Criticism has also revolved around the variation in statutes and propos-

als. 3 3 The critics maintain that if agreement cannot be reached, it is premature to draft legislation. 34 While it is true that there has not been agreement
25. Eg., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184,
423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.), affd &modifedssub nom., Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). Other cases following Qianan allow a terminal patient to refuse medical
treatment. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
26. See note 8 supra.
27. Refinements, supra note 10. See alsoManning & Vogel, The Case for "'BrainDeath" Legislation, A Response to the Critics, 62 MINN. MED. 121 (1979).
28. Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The state statutes
are cited in note 13 supra.
29. See, e.g., Byrne, O'Reilly & Quay, Brain Death-An Opposing Viewpoint, 242 J.A.M.A.
1985 (1979). The article speaks of hypothermia victims and victims of depressant poisons being
"resurrected from the dead." Hypothermia is specifically excluded from the brain death criteria.See Iareoer~rieComa, supra note 7.
Testimony of William G. Small of the Colorado Knights of Columbus, an organization of
Catholic laymen, refers to a condition where the detectable functioning of the brain has been
suspended by drugs, heavy anesthesia, or hypothermia. See Senate Heanngs I, supra note 24. Patients who have had central nervous system depressants or who are suffering from hypothermia
are specifically excluded from the brain death criteria. See Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
30. Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain Death, 238 J.A.M.A. 1651,
1652 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brain Death].
31. Id.
32. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 654 (4th ed. 1968).
33. See notes 13, 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Heanngs on H.B. No. 1116 Before the Colorado Senate Judiriary Con
, 52d Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess., May 14, 1979, Tape Top Meter 16:01:16 (testimony of Mary Urbisch of
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in the drafting of statutes, there has been agreement on the medical criteria
which determine brain death.3 5 Although it might be ideal for all states to
adopt a uniform definition of brain death,3 6 the lack of an acceptable uniform definition is not sufficient grounds for rejecting the concept of brain
death.
This lack of uniformity was not the reason House Bill 1416 was rejected.
The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee did not pass the bill primarily
because the committee felt that there was a lack of a demonstrated need for
the bill. 37 The Colorado Supreme Court, in Lovato, found a demonstrated
need.3 8 Lovato presented precisely the fact pattern which would necessitate
the recognition of brain death: a human being who is clearly brain dead and
a person with an interest so adverse as to challenge a determination of
death. 39 Lovato is perhaps less controversial than other cases which have
considered brain death, as the victims in the other cases had been removed
from life-support systems prior to the court's ruling.' Many cases were further complicated by the victim's organs being removed for transplantation. 4 '
Colorado Right to Life) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings If]; Hamlon & Burns, Mnnesota
"Brain Death" Legislation. A Step Forward . . .or Backward?, 62 MINN. MED. 363 (1979).
35. See Irreversible Coma, supra note 7; Refmements, supra note 10; Cerebral Death, supra note 8;
Brain Death, supra note 30. See generally Beecher, After the "Definition of Irreversible Coma," NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1070 (1969) (editorial); Black, Brain Death (Part II), 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393
(1978); Black, From Heart to Brain: The New DefMitions of Death, 99 AM. HEART J. 279 (1980)

(editorial).
36. The American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are working together on a model which
would be acceptable to all three organizations. Telephone interview with Jeffery M. Stokols,
Legislative Attorney, Department of State Legislation, American Medical Association.
37. The committee relied on the testimony of Dr. Richard Weil, III, transplant surgeon at
the University of Colorado Medial Center, and Dr. Earl C. Hutchins, neurologist. They testified that in the absence of a statute, patients were being declared dead on the basis of brain
death criteria. See Senate Hearings I, supra note 24.
38. In the absence of all other medical testimony, after reading the affidavit of Thomas
Reichert, Jerry Trujillo's attending physician, who could doubt that the child was dead?
Currently a putrefying odor emanates from the baby's body through a trach tube
inserted in its throat. The stench becomes stronger day by day. Nurses and technicians must leave the vicinity of the body to recouperate [sic] from time to time. For
the past few weeks he has laid limp with no neurologic activity from his brain, brainstem or spinal cord. He has bilateral detached retinas. He makes no tears. They must
be given to him artifically every hour to prevent his eyes from drying out. He feels no
pain though the people attending him are overcome with it. His face, eyelids, and
conjunctiva are swollen due to poor circulation, lack of normal brain mechanisms and
lack of muscle tone. He has been unable to maintain normal temperature without
heating blankets. . . . During all of this his brain has never functioned - - - - not in

the slightest degree. Not even for one second.
Record, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dr. Thomas Reichert.
39. In Lovato, it was established that Jerry Trujillo was brain dead. See note 4 supra. The
petitioner, Rosalie Lovato, faced criminal charges for child abuse which could be changed to
murder or manslaughter if the child died.
40. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979) (defendant convicted of firstdegree murder); State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977) (defendant convicted of
first-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978) (defendant convicted of first-degree murder); People v. Vanderford,
77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter);
State v. Brown, 8 Or. App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1971) (defendant convicted of second-degree
murder); Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978) (plaintiff convicted of firstdegree murder).
41. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gol-
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The Colorado Supreme Court cannot be accused of balancing the interests
of the petitioner with those of medical personnel who could be subject to
42
criminal charges for terminating a patient's life.
The extensive discussion of the development of the concept of brain
death indicates that the Colorado Supreme Court understood the problem
before it. 4 3 The major flaw in the opinion is that the court, after discussing
the various statutes and models for defining brain death, adopted the provisions of the Uniform Brain Death Act, 4 4 while acknowledging that only one
state had adopted the act. 45 By adopting the model with the least support,
the court's holding seems hasty. Implicitly, the court was trying to adhere to
the intent of the Colorado legislature. 46 The court seems to have been unaware of the criticisms of the proposal which led to its defeat. 4 7 Regrettably,
the court failed to address the relative merits of the various definitions of
brain death.
The purpose of each of the statutes is to allow new criteria, as determined by the medical community, to be used to determine death. The approaches taken by the statutes vary: some statutes set forth what the
alternatives are;48 some statutes set forth when the alternatives will be
used; 4 9 some statutes set forth the definition of brain death and then state
that this definition does not preclude use of the traditional criteria for determining death; 50 and some statutes set forth only a definition of brain
death. 5 1 The first type of statute is criticized because it gives the appearance
that there are separate phenomena of death. 52 This fault is most serious
when the brain death alternative specifically mentions organ transplantation: it can create a belief that a separate definition of death has been created permitting death to be declared prematurely to allow organs to be used
more beneficially. Other statutes state that death occurs when respiration
and circulation cease or, in the event these functions are being artificially
maintained, death occurs upon irreversible cessation of brain function. This
definition can be criticized because it is inaccurate and redundant. Death
does not occur when respiration and circulation cease; a polio victim, for
ston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); Cranmore v.
State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978).
42. At the time of the hearing, the child's vital functions were being maintained by artifi-

cial means. 601 P.2d at 1074.
43. Part of the reason H.B. No. 1416 did not pass seems to be that the Senate Judiciary
Committee did not understand the purpose of the bill. See Senate Hearings 11, supra note 34.
44. See note 6 supra.
45. Two states, Nevada and West Virginia, have adopted the Uniform Brain Death Act.
West Virginia adopted the act in the 1980 legislative session. The state statutes are cited in note
13 supra.

46. 601 P.2d at 1081.
47. See note 24 supra.

48. See note 16 stpra.
49. See note 17 supra.

50. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and North Carolina. The state statutes are
cited in note 13 supra.
51. Arkansas, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
52. See generaly Statutoq Dfvitton, note 17 supra; Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death, 285
NEW ENG. J. MED. 946 (1971); McCaman & Hirsh, Brain Death: Legal Issues, 8 HEART & LUNG
1098 (1979).
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example, may never spontaneously respire, but the brain can continue to
function if the patient is maintained on a mechanical respirator. 53 The definition is redundant because one of the criteria of brain death is the absence
of spontaneous respiration; 54 therefore, it need not be denominated in the
statute. The statutes which state that the concept of brain death does not
preclude the use of traditional criteria of death can create the feeling that
there are alternative definitions of death. 55 The statutes which define death
each
solely in terms of brain death may wrongly create the impression that
56
death must be determined according to the criteria of brain death.
In 1968, when the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to
57
Examine the Definition of Brain Death made its report, it stated that no
statutory change in the law would be necessary unless the medical community failed to agree about the standards of brain death. Despite apparent
agreement in the medical community, however, twenty-five states have
passed brain death statutes. 58 Prior to the brain death statutes, the definition of death was a matter of common law. 59 As more states adopt brain
death statutes there is increasing pressure on the other states to follow suit in
defining death statutorily. The statutes themselves point out the difficulties
in drafting a statute which will define death.
A review of the various statutes and proposals will make evident that
there is no ideal definition of death. Every death could be determined according to the "irreversible cessation of brain function" test. The irreversible
cessation of cardiopulmonary functions is not death so long as the person is
resuscitable: death occurs when the brain has been deprived too long of
oxygen. As Capron and Kass point out, however, there are disadvantages to
adopting a statute which speaks of death only in terms of brain function: it
would be a sharp break from tradition, and, in most instances, the tradi6°
tional methods of determining death are perfectly adequate.
Brain death criteria in determining death are applicable almost entirely
to terminal patients who are connected to life-support equipment. Their
impact will also be felt in cases where there is a question of survivorship and
53. See, e.g., Senate Hear:ngsI, supra note 24.
54. See IrreversibleComa, supra note 7.
55. The statutes are actually trying to provide for different means of detecting death.
56. The criteria for determining brain death are specific. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See also Refinements, supra note 10; CerebralDeath, supra note 8. Cardiopulmonary tests
are perfectly adequate for determining death in most instances. Statutog Defrmitin, supra note
17, at 113.
57. Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
58. The state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
59. The reluctance to discard the traditional signs of life, respiratory and circulatory functions, is vividly demonstrated in Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952). This case was a
will contest involving a question of the survivorship of Mr. and Mrs. Gugel. They were in an
automobile that was hit by a train. Mrs. Gugel was decapitated; there was blood gushing from
her body in spurts. "Realistically, a person is dead when there has been a complete decapitation of the head .... " Id. at 497. Nevertheless, the court concluded, in reliance upon medical
testimony, that a body is not dead so long as there is a heartbeat as evidenced by blood gushing
from the body in spurts. This is so even though the brain may have quit functioning. Thus, the
court specifically rejected brain death.
60. Statutory Defnition, supra note 17.
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evidence of a heartbeat in a victim is introduced. 6 ' Lovato overruled Sauers v.
StokZ62 to the extent that the latter negated a concept of brain death. The
court in Sauers held that evidence of a faint pulse and blood spurting from
the cracked skull of one of the accident victims refuted the application of the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 63 Medical testimony received in Lovato
stated that the heart is an autonomous organ which can continue to beat
even with complete destruction of the brain or brain functions. 64 It would
appear that eyewitness testimony regarding the presence of circulation will
no longer be enough to prove life. 65 One article suggests that cessation of
cardiac function is a cause of death and not a component of the definition of
death. ,6
Although it is questionable whether there is a need for a statute defining
death, 6 7 there is a need to recognize legally the concept of brain death. The
courts, as part of an adversary process, are perhaps more subject to an accusation of engaging in a balancing game, for example, balancing the interests
of the medical community against the interests of a criminal defendant. Any
statute concerning brain death should make the determination of death
mandatory. The word "may" in a statute has the connotation that the determination is dependent upon the consent of relatives or the attending physician. Furthermore, despite the problems with alternative standards of
determining death, it is probably advisable for a statute to have alternative
68
standards: it makes the statute more acceptable to the medical community
and the general public. By codifying the definition of death, a statute which
does not specifically mention the standards of cardiopulmonary functions
may be viewed as excluding this standard. Although this article has repeatedly attempted to show that the absence of respiratory and circulatory functions is not death, but rather that death occurs when these functions cannot
be resuscitated, the author does not believe it is necessary for a statute to
specify that these functions must not be resuscitable. A statute defining
death should be flexible enough to keep pace with medical and technological
advances but certain enough to protect the interests involved. Ultimately,
the medical profession will be responsible for ensuring that customary and
usual standards are followed in determining when each human being has
died.
61. See, e.g., Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952); Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn.

207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938) (a constricted heart empty of blood indicates that the heart kept
bleeding; thus, the victim was alive even though her viscera, including the cerebrum, were
strewn along the train track).
62. 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).
63. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-613 (1973). The statute specifies how property shall be
disposed of if there is not sufficient evidence to show that the parties in question died other than
simultaneously.
64. 601 P.2d at 1081.
65. Nonmedical testimony regarding the presence of respiration would be enough to establish life because one of the criteria of brain death is the absence of respiration. See note 7 supra.
66. Brain Death, supra note 30, at 1654.
67. The statutes have not put an end to litigation. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244,
574 P.2d 205 (1977); People v. Vanderford, 77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977). There
will also undoubtedly be challenges as to whether the criteria of brain death were properly
applied.
68. Set note 19 supra.
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CONCLUSION

The facts of Lovato necessitated that the court either accept or reject a
concept of brain death. The court rightly accepted the concept. Despite the
court's encouragement of brain death legislation, it is unlikely that the legislature will attempt to redefine brain death in the absence of an acceptable
uniform definition due to the inherent problems in drafting a statute defining death. The definition which the court adopted may not have been the
best one, but it should safely allow a physician to pronounce a person dead
according to brain death criteria and thus uphold the dignity of life-and
death.
Stacie L. Glass

RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS: "OFFHAND COMMENTS"
OR "INTERROGATION"?

INTRODUCTION
In the past fourteen years, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to add gloss to the controversial standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona. 1 That decision required that any person subjected to "custodial
interrogation" be apprised of his right to remain silent, of the fact that any
statement could be used against him, and of his right to counsel, retained or
2
appointed.
In the years immediately following Miranda, the Warren Court read
these requirements liberally, and in borderline cases tended to find confessions inadmissible. 3 With the Burger Court came a reluctance to extend
Miranda principles beyond those set forth by the Warren Court. Although
the Burger Court repeatedly has been criticized for retreating from the principles articulated in Miranda,4 many of the criticized decisions have reflected
more a reluctance to extend the Miranda principles than a retreat from
5
them.
Many of the post-Miranda decisions have been aimed at determining the
definition of "custodial interrogation," for Miranda applies only to such interrogation. Prior to Rhode Islandv. Innis,6 all fifth amendment cases had been
concerned with the question of "custody." 7 Innis is the first Supreme Court
case to address itself to the definition of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes. The definition of "interrogation" that the Court formulated includes
either express questioning or its "functional equivalent." 8 The purpose of
this comment is to examine both the context out of which the decision in
Inni's arose and the implications of the decision for the future.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2.

Id at 444.

3. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968).
4. See generally Keefe, Confessions, Admissions, and the Recent Curtailment of Fifth Amendment
Protection, 51 CONN. B.J. 266 (1977); Picou, Miranda and Escobedo: Warren v. Burger Court Decisions on Fifth Amendment Rights, 4 S.U.L. REv. 175 (1978); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 99. But see Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and ConstitutionalPrinciple: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 171 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (warnings not necessary for questioning in police station when suspect had come voluntarily and was free to leave);
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (IRS agent who gave inadequate warnings held
not to have violated suspect's rights during questioning in a private residence).
6.. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
7. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
8. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
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BACKGROUND

Development of the Privilege

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[N]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself."9 This "privilege against self-incrimination" had its origins
in opposition to the oath ex offico used by the English ecclesiastical courts,
the Court of the Star Chamber, and the Court of the High Commission.' 0
This oath allowed officials to cause an individual to be brought before the
court and made to respond to any questions put to him. One who refused to
be sworn, or, having been sworn, refused to testify, was declared pro confesso-the legal equivalent of having confessed and been convicted.
A landmark case in the development of the privilege was the trial of
John Lilburn, who refused to take the oath or to answer against himself. I
In 1645, the House of Lords ordered his sentence vacated as "illegal, most
unjust, and against the liberty of the subject and law of the land, and Magna
Charta, and unfit to continue upon record.' 2 Within five years of this decision, the privilege was established in the New England states and in Virginia.' 3 It evolved through colonial history as a privilege against physical
compulsion and against the moral compulsion that an oath to one's God
commands.' 4 Upon independence, seven of the new states incorporated the
privilege into their constitutions. '5 In all of the debates on the federal constitution there were few allusions to the privilege, but when6 it was mentioned, it was in reference to confessions exacted by torture.'
It is not clear whether the privilege originally extended beyond protecting a defendant in his own criminal trial. In 1892, however, the Supreme
Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,' 7 made it clear that the privilege extended
to grand jury proceedings and suggested that it might extend even further.' 8
Until 1964, the fifth amendment privilege was not binding on the
9.
10.
America,
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Pittman, The Colonialand ConstitutionalHistogy of the Privilege Against Setf-Incmination in
21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
Id. at 770.
Morgan, The Privilege Agaitst &lf-Insnmnatton, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1949).
Pittman, supra note 10, at 781.
Id at 783.

15. Id at 764-65.
16. Id at 788.
17. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
18. The Court stated:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional privilege can only be, that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. . . . It would doubtless
cover such cases, but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure that a person
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it
seeks to guard.
Id. at 562.
Judge Friendly argues that once the phrase, "in any criminal case," has been read out of
the amendment, it has been all too tempting to take equal liberties with the term "compelled."
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow. The Casefor Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV.
671 (1968).
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states.' 9 Convictions in state courts based on confessions were invalidated
only if they were obtained under such conditions as to violate principles of
due process under the fourteenth amendment. 20 This standard changed,
however, when the Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan,2 ' decided that the
fourteenth amendment "secures against state invasion the same privilege
22
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement."
Given this brief background of the development of the privilege, the
question arises of precisely what is protected by the privilege. The language
and history of the amendment provide some answers. For example, it is
clear that the privilege protects a defendant from being called to the witness
stand by the prosecution and being subjected under oath to questions
designed to incriminate him. It also protects him against being forced by
torture to confess. Beyond this, the language and history give little aid in
determining the scope of the privilege and we must turn to the interpretations of it by the Supreme Court.
B.

The Miranda Rule

Prior to the decision in Miranda, the critical question in determining
whether a confession was obtained in violation of the Constitution was
whether it was "voluntary."' 23 This determination was made by an examination of the "totality of the circumstances. ' 24 The voluntariness test necessitated an ad hoc inquiry into the facts of each case, resulting in a rather
subjective determination, as well as providing only very amorphous guidelines for police interrogators as to what conduct was permissible.
In Miranda, the court fashioned aper se rule to be applied in the determination of the validity of confessions. Concluding that the process of custodial interrogation is "inherently compelling," the Court held that a suspect
must be "adequately and effectively" apprised of his rights,2 5 and that the
19. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
20. Eg., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
21. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. Id at 7-8. Despite the Court's trend of expanding the scope of the fifth amendment,
some commentators, including Wigmore, Corwin, Pound, and Morgan have actually called for
the curtailment or elimination of the privilege. Friendly, supra note 18, at 672. McCormick
expressed his hope that:
as [the courts] become more conversant with the history of the privilege [they] will see
that it is a survival that has outlived the context that gave it meaning, and that its
application today is not to be extended under the influence of a vague sentimentality
but is to be kept within the limits of realism and common sense.
McCormick, Some Problems and Developments inthe Admissibiliy of Confessions, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239,
277 (1946).
Judge Friendly questions why it is more cruel to compel a man to testify against himself in
a misdemeanor trial than it is to compel him to testify against his mother on trial for her life.
Friendly, supra note 18, at 680.
This is not to suggest that these opinions in any way represent the majority view, only that
there is not unanimity among authorities about the scope and importance of the privilege.
23. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
24. Id at 514.
25. This is true regardless of whether the suspect in fact knew his rights. The Court stated:
[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of
his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with the authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
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exercise of those rights must be fully honored.2 6 Miranda requires that the
suspect be informed of his right to remain silent and that anything he says
can and will be used against him in court. 27 Further, the suspect must be
advised that he has the right to consult an attorney prior to questioning and
also to have counsel present during questioning. 28 The suspect must also be
29
advised that if he is indigent he has the right to an appointed attorney.
These protections are applicable once an individual is in custody at the police station or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 30 After the warnings have been given, if the suspect indicates either
prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must end. 3 ' The Court concluded that any statement taken after the
invocation of the privilege "cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
32
subtle or otherwise."
One of the principal questions presented by Miranda is under what circumstances must the warnings be given. It is clear that a suspect who has
33
The application
been arrested and is in custody is entitled to the warnings.
of the privilege, however, to one who has been "deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way" has created a great deal of uncertainty. All of
the Supreme Court cases that have dealt with the definition of custodial
interrogation prior to Inni's have involved the definition of "custody" rather
than of "interrogation." ' 34 While some lower courts have addressed the issue,
35
they have reached inconsistent results.
II.

FACTS OF RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS

On the night of January 16, 1975, the body of John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island, cab driver, was discovered in a shallow grave four days
after he disappeared. He had been shot in the back of the head with a shotgun. On January 17, shortly after midnigh, Gerald Aubin, also a taxi
driver, reported to police that he had just been robbed by a man carrying a
sawed-off shotgun, and had dropped the man off in the Mount Pleasant area
384 U.S. at 468-69. It is not clear why every man is presumed to know the law, but presumed
not to know his rights.
26. Id. at 467.
27. Id.at 469.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id. at 477.
31. Id at 473-74.
32. Id. at 474.
33. Id. at 444.
34. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that the subject of a
routine investigation should have been given Miranda warnings because at the time of the questioning he was in jail for an unrelated crime. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the
Court held Miranda applicable to questioning which took place in the accused's bedroom, because although no actual arrest had occurred, the accused was not free to leave. In Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam), Miranda warnings were held not to be necessary
for questioning that took place in a police station when the suspect had come in voluntarily and
was free to go at any time. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), an IRS agent
who gave warnings that would have been inadequate under Miranda wa's held not to have violated a suspect's rights when the questioning took place in a private residence.
35. See notes 81-85 infa and accompanying text.
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of Providence. While at the police station, Aubin noticed a picture of his
assailant on a bulletin board and notified one of the police officers.
At approximately 4:30 a.m., a cruising patrolman spotted Innis, who
was arrested and advised of his rights. At that time, Innis was unarmed.
Within a few minutes a police sergeant arrived at the scene and once again
advised Innis of his rights. Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden arrived
with other police officers. Captain Leyden also gave Innis the Miranda warn36
ings. At this point, Innis stated that he wished to speak to an attorney.
Captain Leyden then ordered Innis to be taken to the police station and
assigned Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna to accompany Innis
to the station. 37 Captain Leyden instructed the officers not to interrogate
Innis or to intimidate him in any way.
Apparently, almost immediately after the patrol car left the scene of the
arrest, Patrolman Gleckman began to talk with Patrolman McKenna about
the missing shotgun. Gleckman stated that there was a school for retarded
children in the area where they suspected that the shotgun was hidden, and
that "God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they
' 38
might hurt themselves."
At this point, Innis interrupted the officers, telling them that they
should turn the car around and he would show them where the gun was
located. The police car returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for
the shotgun was underway. Once again, Captain Leyden advised Innis of
his rights. Innis stated that he understood his rights but that he wanted to
help find the gun because of his concern for the children. He then led the
police to where he had hidden the shotgun.
On March 20, 1976, Innis was indicted for kidnapping, robbery, and
murder. Prior to the trial, Innis' attorney moved to suppress the shotgun
and the statements made to the police. Finding that Innis had been "repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights," the judge concluded that
Innis' decision to lead the police to the shotgun was an intelligent waiver of
his rights. The trial judge did not address the question of whether Innis had
in fact been "interrogated." Innis was convicted on all counts.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, set aside the conviction, 39 holding that Innis had invoked his right to counsel and that, contrary to the mandate of Miranda,4° the police had continued to interrogate
him without a valid waiver of his rights. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that Innis was subjected to "subtle coercion" that was the equivalent
of interrogation, and also that the state had not carried its burden of estab4
lishing that there had been a waiver. '
36. 100 S. Ct. at 1686.
37. This was apparently an unusual procedure. Generally only two patrolmen would accompany a prisoner. Id at 1697 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1686. The precise wording is unclear. Patrolman Williams testified that it would
be too bad if "a little girl" should hurt herself. Id at 1687.
39. 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978).
40. The Court in Miranda stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 474.
41. 391 A.2d at 1162-63. The Miranda Court stated that "[i]f the interrogation continues
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SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING

42

In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Recognizing that "interrogation"
under Miranda covers more than express questioning, the Court nonetheless
held that Innis had not been interrogated for Miranda purposes. The Court
held that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus43
tody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.1
The functional equivalent of questioning includes "any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." ' 44 The Court observed that any
knowledge on the part of police of a defendant's unusual susceptibility to a
particular form of conduct might be an important factor in determining
whether the police should have known that their conduct was likely to elicit

a response.

45

The Court held that the circumstances of this case did not suggest that
Innis was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. The
Court found nothing in the record to suggest that the police knew that the
defendant was peculiarly susceptible to appeals to his conscience, nor was
there anything to suggest that they knew he was unusually disoriented or
upset. Furthermore, the Court held that the "offhand comments" were not
the sort of lengthy harangue calculated to overbear the will of a suspect.
The Court concluded that "[tihe Rhode Island Supreme Court erred . . . in
'46
equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation."
without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." 384 U.S. at 475.
42. justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and White joined. Justice White filed a concurring opinion stating that Innis had
waived his rights. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissent.
43. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
44. Id (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 1690 n.8.
46. Id at 1691. Had the Court decided that Innis had been interrogated, the question of
waiver would have arisen. In light of the fact that Innis invoked his rights and the police
continued to interrogate him, the Court would probably not have found that Innis had voluntarily waived his rights, because such a situation would have amounted to a refusal of the police to
honor Innis' request to terminate the questioning.
The question of waiver is beyond the scope of this comment, but it does raise some interesting issues. For example, precisely what is being waived? Waiver is generally spoken of as a
waiver of the right to remain silent, or of the right to counsel. Yet if custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive, and if appeals to one's conscience are a form of "subtle compulsion," a
waiver in such cases must be a waiver of the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.
This reasoning is escapable only if one accepts the proposition that the giving of Miranda warnings completely dispels the compulsion of custodial interrogation. It is difficult to see, however,
how the recital of a thirty second warning can burst the bubble of coercion assertedly associated
with all such interrogation.
Professor Jerold Israel has pointed out that if the Court feels the need to respond to the
arguments of those who urge a limitation on the exclusion of evidence under Miranda, it could
most effectively meet that need by enlarging its concept of "waiver." Thus, a waiver would not
necessarily be rendered invalid by the police's urging the suspect to confess, explaining the
evidence against him, or asking him to reconsider his decision to remain silent. This concept
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Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment only, 47 stated his unwillingness to overrule, disparage, or expand Miranda. He did, however, express concern that the Court's test required a police officer to evaluate the
suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. In addition to his concern
that police officers are not trained to make such judgments, he expressed his
feeling that the Court's test puts an additional burden on trial judges. 48
Justice Marshall's dissent agreed that the majority had correctly defined
49
"interrogation," but disagreed with its application of the test to the facts.
He found Officer Gleckman's statements concerning the possibility of the
death of a helpless, handicapped girl to be a strong appeal to the conscience,
and stated that policemen are "chargeable with knowledge of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which they [create]." 50 Although nominally
concurring with the test of the majority, this last statement seems to put
more responsibility on the police because it makes the police responsible for
any conduct which in fact evokes a statement, whether or not the police
"should have known" that it would.
In this respect, Justice Marshall's dissent parallels that of Justice Stevens who argued for a broader definition of "functional equivalent of interrogation." Taking issue with the majority's view that makes a finding of
interrogation dependent upon whether the police should have known that
what they were saying was likely to elicit a response, Justice Stevens argued
that the test should be whether a statement would normally be understood
by the average listener as calling for a response. 51 Therefore, he argues, any
police conduct or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in the
suspect's position as calling for a response must be considered "interrogation." Justice Stevens appears to go even further by stating that the definition of interrogation must include police conduct or statements that have the
52
same "purpose or effect" as a direct question.
In the case below, 53 the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on standards set forth in Brewer v. W1illiams, 54 a 1977 case with facts superficially
similar to those in Innzs. Brewer involved a suspect who had been arrested
and arraigned in Davenport, Iowa, for the abduction, rape, and murder of a
ten-year-old girl. After his lawyer told police that Williams was not to be
interrogated, Williams was driven back to Des Moines. During the trip
back, one of the policemen made an appeal to Williams' conscience by what
has come to be known as the "Christian Burial Speech, ' 55 after which, Wilwould allow the Court to meet many of the objections of prosecutors, yet there would be no
need to modify most of the procedural safeguards announced in Miranda. Israel, Crrina/a Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1386 (1977).
47. 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
48. Id (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49. Id at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 1695 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978).
54. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
55. Detective Learning said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're travelling down the
road. . . . I want you to observe the weather conditions. . . . They are predicting
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liams led the police to the girl's body. The Supreme Court ruled that Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated because the
detective had deliberately elicited the statement from Williams outside the
presence of counsel after adversary proceedings had begun.
In Innis, the Supreme Court rejected the Rhode Island court's reliance
on Brewer, stating that since judicial proceedings had not been initiated
against Innis, the protection of the sixth amendment had not attached. Furthermore, the Court stated that because of the different policies underlying
the fifth and sixth amendments, the definitions of interrogation under the
two amendments are different, if in fact the term "interrogation" has any
56
meaning at all in the sixth amendment context.

IV.

MIRANDA, INNS, AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Undoubtedly, much ink will be spilled decrying the result in Innis and
characterizing it as one more instance of the Burger Court's trampling on
individual rights. Before we resign ourselves to a police state and prepare
ourselves for a revival of the Star Chamber, however, we should try dispassionately to examine precisely what has happened: A man unquestionably
guilty of murder was convicted, based at least in part on a confession which
is difficult to describe as anything but voluntary, using the ordinary meaning
of the word. Unfortunately, however, the Court used some rather strained
logic in its first application of the test announced.
Even conceding that the reason behind Patrolman Gleckman's statement was a faint hope that such an appeal to Innis' conscience would yield a
confession, it is difficult to argue that such a statement was "compelled" in
the fifth amendment sense of the word. Innis was not tortured, threatened,
intimidated, tricked, or in any way made to feel that a refusal to talk would
produce adverse consequences. Although not overruling or even expressly
limiting Miranda, this case may reflect a feeling by some members of the
Court that the varnish of Mtranda and its progeny has obscured the underlying grain of the fifth amendment.
It seems to be a closer question whether Innis' Miranda rights were violated than whether he was compelled to testify against himself. The Miranda
Court stated that custodial interrogation "contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," and that in
order to combat those pressures he must be advised of his rights and the
57
exercise of those rights must be honored.
Since one of the rationales for the Miranda holding was that custodial
several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that
knows where this little girl's body is...
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself
may be unable to find it ....
[T]he parents of this little girl should be entitled to a
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas
[ELve and murdered.
Id at 392-93. Learning then stated "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it
any further. Just think about it as we're driving down the road." Id
56. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
57. 384 U.S. at 467.
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interrogation in the absence of adequate warnings or a valid waiver is inherently coercive, it might be relevant to inquire into the pressures on the suspect to speak to determine whether he was interrogated. That is, if all such
custodial interrogation is coercive, if it is found that the subject was not coerced, he could not have been interrogated in violation of his rights.
In the instant case, it is likely that Innis felt less pressure on himself to
speak than did those suspects in Miranda and its companion cases who were
subjected to long periods of incommunicado interrogation. It is also reasonable to assume that a suspect feels less pressure to speak when confronted
with indirect, rather than direct, appeals. The difficulty lies in deciding
whether the pressure is diminished to such an extent that it no longer constitutes compulsion.
One difficulty in defining "interrogation" in terms of compulsion is that
the definition being sought is in turn dependent upon another term difficult
to define-"compulsion." "Compulsion" could be defined strictly as physical force or the threat thereof, or it could include more "subtle compulsion,"
even compulsion so subtle that it might more accurately be described as "encouragement." In fact, for some supporters of the Miranda decision, the definition of "compulsion" actually does include "encouragement." 5'1
Undoubtedly, Innis received encouragement to speak, at least from his perspective, but it is more difficult to argue that he was compelled to speak.
The Court's decision in Innis may reflect a reluctance to read the fifth
amendment as stating that: "No person shall be encouraged to testify
against himself."
A further factor that the Court might have considered was that Innis
had been advised of his Miranda rights four times before he showed the police
where the shotgun was hidden. Although technically irrelevant because if
no interrogation took place it does not matter whether he was given the
warnings, the fact that he was given repeated warnings may be viewed as
putting Innis under less pressure to talk.
That the question of a violation of Miranda may be more difficult to
determine than the question of a violation of the fifth amendment, suggests
that Miranda may, at least in part, be predicated on grounds other than the
fifth amendment. 59 There is language in Miranda and in more recent decisions to support this proposition. In Miranda, the Court stated that "we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process
as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a straitjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
58. Professor Kamisar states:
If the police conduct is designed and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a
tug on," a suspect to incriminate himself.., then that conduct is "compulsion" as
Miranda defines the self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intenst s the tolerable level of stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by unadulterated arrest and detention to the impermissible level of "compulsion."
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 23 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
59. See Sunderland, supra note 4, at 204.
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effect." 60
Further support for at least a partial nonconstitutional basis for Miranda
is found in the conclusive presumption that the Court created that, in any
given instance, if a defendant was not given warnings, he was not aware of
his rights. 6 ' If the fifth amendment requires that a suspect have an opportunity to exercise his rights in a knowing fashion, surely the critical question
should be whether he fully understands those rights, rather than whether a
particular formality was observed. This position is supported by cases holding that even if Miranda warnings were given, they are defective unless they
62
were understood.
In Michigan v. Tucker, 63 the Court was presented with the question of
whether the testimony of a witness in a rape trial should be excluded because
police had learned the identity of the witness by questioning the suspect
when he had not been given the full Miranda warnings.6 In an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated, "We will therefore first consider
whether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated
only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right."'65 The Tucker Court further characterized the Miranda rules as "recommended 'procedural safeguards,' "66 and went on to say "The [Miranda] Court recognized that these
procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
' 67
self-incrimination was protected.
The question of whether verbatim Miranda warnings are actually mandated by the Constitution is of great significance. If these warnings are not
themselves constitutionally required, then federal courts may not reverse
state court judgments on the ground that the Miranda warnings were not
given or were in some way deficient; the federal courts may only inquire
68
whether the right against compulsory self-incrimination was violated.
Moreover, the point has recently been made that even the supervisory
powers of the federal courts over federal prosecutions may be limited. In
oral arguments before the Supreme Court in the search-and-seizure case of
UnitedStates v. Payner,69 Solicitor General Wade H. McCree, Jr., argued that
Federal Rule of Evidence 40270 places stringent limits on the federal courts'
60. 384 U.S. at 467.
61. See note 25 supra. As a result of this rule, if Chief Justice Warren, the author of the
Miranda opinion, had been arrested and not given the warnings, there would have been a conclusive presumption that he was unaware of them.
62. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976) (statements made by intoxicated suspect inadmissible), rev'don othergrounds, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
63. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
64. Tucker had been advised of all his rights except that he would be furnished counsel
free of charge if he could not afford to pay for assistance himself. Id. at 436.
65. Id at 439 (emphasis added).
66. Id at 443.
67. Id at 444.
68. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972).
69. 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
70.

FED. R.

EVID. 402 states:

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
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exercise of their supervisory powers to suppress relevant evidence. 7 ' Therefore, he argued, in the absence of some statutory or constitutional provision
permitting it, the federal courts may not exclude relevant evidence. 72 Finding that the lower court had violated the already established rule that a
court may not exclude evidence under the fourth amendment unless the defendant's own constitutional rights were violated, 73 the Court apparently
found it unnecessary to address the rule 402 argument. This does point up,
however, the significant consequences of finding that Miranda is based upon
the supervisory power rather than the constitution.
V.

ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE

INNIS

TEST

The preceding discussion was intended to explore some possible reasons
for the Court's holding in Innis. It is now pertinent to discuss some problems
associated with the test formulated by the Court.
While the particular result in Innis may appear to be an aberration in
terms of the application of the test to the facts, 74 the test laid down in the
opinion seems to be a sound compromise between the rights of the suspect
and the need for effective police work. There are some ironies involved,
however. By defining interrogation as express questioning or "any words or
actions on the part of the police. . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect," 7 5 the Court
is implicitly condoning the use of techniques that the police reasonably believe are unlikely to evoke an incriminating response. In other words, it is
permissible for the police to take a long shot, but not for them to use techniques with a reasonable probability of success. Intent on the part of the
police to elicit a statement, though not irrelevant, is not determinative. 76
The Court does state, however, that intent might have a bearing on whether
the police should have known that their words or actions were likely to elicit
77
a response.
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his concurrence, the Court's test
may introduce a new element of uncertainty into police work because the
police must evaluate the susceptibility of an accused. This is a very real
concern since it is not necessary that the police knew that their conduct was
likely to elicit a response; it is enough that they should have known. This
test seems to mean that if the police had stopped to think, it would have
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.
71. 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4212 (1980).
72. In response to a question by Justice Stevens asking if Solicitor General McCree was
asking the Court to overrule Miranda, McCree replied in the negative because of his belief that
Miranda seems to have some fifth amendment underpinning. Id at 4213.
73. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2442 (1980).

74. 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 1689 (footnotes omitted).
76. Id.at 1690 n.7.
77. It is likely that a practice which is designed to elicit a response will be one which the
police should have known was likely to have that effect. Id.
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occurred to them. It is not always possible, however, for police to stop to
think.
The Court added even more confusion when it stated that the definition
of interrogation "focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police." 78 It is not clear precisely what this
means. It appears to mean that if the suspect perceives that the police
should have known that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, then the police conduct constitutes interrogation. This
is not an easy test to apply. The difficulty with this standard can be illustrated by slightly varying the facts of the Innis case. Suppose Innis had a
mentally retarded daughter at the school for handicapped children in the
neighborhood where the gun was hidden, and he erroneously assumed that
the police had found out about her during their investigation. It would
probably appear to Innis that the police should have known that their statements were likely to elicit a response; yet, the police would have no way of
knowing that this was a situation any different from the actual facts of lnnis.
In light of the Court's view that deterrence of illegal police conduct is the
major reason for Miranda,79 it seems somewhat anomalous to base a decision
whether a confession should be excluded on factors over which the police
have no control and which they have no way of assessing.
VI.

THE IMPACT OF INNIS ON THE FUTURE

Since Miranda also condemned the use of psychological ploys that do
not amount to direct questioning,80 it might seem, at first glance, that Inni's
adds little to the law of confessions. There is one line of confession cases,
however, on which the decision in Inni's may have a significant impact.
These are cases where the suspect is shown evidence against him, either prior
to Miranda warnings or after he has invoked his right to remain silent. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed this question, a number of
lower courts have, with varying results.
In Combs v. Wingo, 8 ' after the defendant was arrested for murder and his
Miranda rights were explained to him, he told police that he wanted to make
a statement, but wanted to talk to an attorney first. The policeman agreed,
but immediately read the ballistics report to Combs, who then began to talk.
The court held that Combs' rights had been violated.
A similar result was reached in Commonwealth v. Hamilton ,82 in which the
defendant made incriminating statements after being confronted with the
confession of a co-conspirator. The court held that the relevant inquiry in
determining whether there had been interrogation was whether a confession
was expected or reasonably likely to be elicited. The court held the statements inadmissible.
Contrary results have been reached in other cases. In United States v.
78. Id at 1689-90.
79. E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
80. 384 U.S. at 450.

81.

465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972).

82.

445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
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Hodge, 83 the suspect was arrested for armed robbery on a military base. After Hodge invoked his rights, the investigator terminated the interview and
then informed Hodge of the military procedure to obtain counsel and explained the charges and the evidence against him. Hodge then changed his
mind and volunteered a statement. The court held that his subsequent
statements were admissible.
In United States v. Davis, 84 the suspect in a bank robbery invoked his
right to remain silent. An F.B.I. agent then showed Davis a picture of Davis
at the bank during the robbery and asked "Are you sure you don't want to
reconsider?" Davis studied the picture and then said, "Well, I guess you've
got me." His subsequent statements were ruled admissible, the court holding that the F.B.I. agent merely asked Davis if he wanted to reconsider his
decision, and that the interrogation did not resume until after Davis had
voluntarily agreed that it should.
In United States v. Pheaster,85 the court similarly held that statements
evoked by an objective, undistorted presentation of the evidence were not
products of interrogation.
Given the test announced in Innis, it seems fairly clear that all statements elicited by a presentation to a suspect of the evidence against him
should be considered the product of interrogation. The police should know
that showing a suspect the evidence against him is likely to elicit an incriminating response, and in fact, that is probably their reason for doing so.
Whether such action involves actual compulsion is another matter. Certainly it is an encouragement to speak, but it is not as clear that the suspect's
will is overborne to such an extent that his decision to speak is a product of
compulsion.
At this writing, two state courts have applied the Innis test to such cases
and have held that the statements elicited were the products of interrogation.8 6 In Nebraska v. Durand,8 7 the defendant was arrested and given the
Miranda warnings. When asked whether he would like to make a statement,
he replied in the negative. He was then shown police reports of other crimes
of which he was suspected and again advised of his rights. The statement he
then gave was held inadmissible under Innzs, because it was elicited by the
"functional equivalent" of interrogation, and the police should have known
that showing Durand the police reports was likely to evoke an incriminating
response.
In People v. Bodner,8 8 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
83. 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973).
84. 527 F.2d I 110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976).
85. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
86. A third case has been decided based upon Innti, but the facts in that case are somewhat
different. In State v. Jones, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2342 (June 23, 1980), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the comments by a policeman to a man suspected of killing his child
to the effect that "God takes care of little babies" and that "the baby was already in heaven"
were more in the nature of consolation than interrogation. Moreover, the court held that even
if the comments were interrogation, the admission of the statements elicited constituted harmless error.
87. 406 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980).
88. 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980).
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Court reached a similar result. In that case, a seventeen-year-old mentally
retarded youth named Dwayne voluntarily went to the police station and
told a detective whom he knew well that his cousin had intentionally started
a series of fires. Dwayne took the detective around and showed him where
and how his cousin had supposedly set the fires. The detective told Dwayne
to go home and then went to interview the cousin. The interview convinced
the detective that the cousin was innocent, so the detective summoned
Dwayne and one of his parents back to the police station. The detective told
Dwayne, "We checked out your cousin's alibi, and he was telling the truth."
Dwayne responded, "I did. I lied to you." At that point he was given Miranda warnings, and shortly thereafter he signed a full confession.8 9
The court applied Innz' and held that the policeman's statement was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and since the court
found that the "interrogation" had occurred in a custodial setting, it should
have been preceded by the Miranda warnings. The court stated that telling
Dwayne that his cousin could not have set the fires was the same as telling
Dwayne that he knew Dwayne was lying and had set the fires himself.9°
Although lower courts have heretofore differed on the admissibility of
statements elicited by the disclosure to suspects of incriminating evidence,
the Inni's opinion will probably result in a general exclusion of statements so
obtained. 9 ' There can be little doubt about the motives of the police in
disclosing the evidence and they should know that disclosure is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response.
CONCLUSION

The result in Innis may be illustrative of a disenchantment of a majority
of the Court with the Mranda rules and the Court's reluctance to rule inadmissible statements obtained in the absence of actual coercion or highly improper police techniques. Innis reflects the Court's movement toward a
'voluntariness-totality of the circumstances" test in situations that do not
fall squarely within the ambit of the Miranda decision.
Although the test in Innis may be quite reasonable, the application of
the test to the facts is less so. Despite the fact that the Court found that
Patrolman Gleckman's statement consisted merely of a few "offhand remarks," it defies credibility to assert that he had not considered the possible
impact of his statement on Innis. Although the result in this case may have
squared with the fifth amendment, it is difficult to reconcile the result in the
case with the test announced by the Court.
Constitutionally, there appears to be no reason not to abandon Miranda,
and look in each case to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a suspect was actually compelled to be a witness against himself.
Practically, however, this would likely have the effect of increasing the bur89. Id
90. Arguably, under the rationale of Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per
curiam), Dwayne was not in custody.
91. Unless, of course, the Court is willing to expand its definition of "waiver." See note 46
supra.
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den on federal courts by requiring an inquiry into the specific facts of each
case. 9 2 Yet, it is questionable whether administrative convenience is sufficient justification for the intrusion on state sovereignty that adherence to
Miranda in state court proceedings entails.
The primary impact of Innis will likely be in those cases in which the
police present incriminating evidence to the suspect either prior to the Miranda warnings being given, or after an invocation by the suspect of his
rights. A reasoned application of the test announced in Inni's will result in
exclusion of evidence so obtained. In a sense, it is ironic that the primary
impact of this decision-a decision which will almost certainly be heavily
criticized by civil libertarians-will probably be to afford suspects a greater
measure of protection while they are in police custody than they previously
enjoyed.
Kingsley R. Browne

92. It should be borne in mind, however, that Miranda does not completely abolish the
need to look into the totality of the circumstances; it merely prescribes one element that must be
present in order to hold a confession admissible. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

GENERAL TELEPHONE CO. v EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION: SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE EEOC
INTRODUCTION

The Fifth and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals reached different
conclusions' about whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must be certified as the class representative in suits brought in
its name under section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 as
4
amended in 1972. 3 In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court
settled the conflict by affirming the Ninth Circuit's holding; thus, the EEOC
may bring a section 706 action seeking relief for a group of aggrieved individuals without obtaining class certification pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 The dissenters agreed with the Fifth Circuit
court's reasoning in EEOC7 v. D.H Holmes Co .6 and would have reversed the
appellate court's decision.
1. In EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. dented, 436 U.S.
962 (1978), the court held that certification was required. In EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599
F.2d 322, 333 (9th Cir. 1979), aj'd, 446 U.S. 318 (1980), the court held that certification was not
required.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976)).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976).
4. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
6. 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), crt. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
7. 446 U.S. at 334.
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EEOC

The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating discrimination based on
8
color, sex, religion, race, or national origin. As originally conceived, the
Commission could only conciliate, mediate, or persuade a business to change
9
its employment practices.
Two methods of judicial enforcement were available under the Act.
Section 706 allowed an individual to seek an injunction against or back pay
from an employer. Section 707 "pattern-or-practice" suits could be brought
only by the Attorney General. The statute did not expressly include back
pay as a remedy.10 Only sixty-nine suits were brought between 1965 and the
1972 amendments, I and back pay was not awarded in a section 707 action
until 1972.12
In 1972, Congress deemed it imperative to provide the EEOC with
more effective enforcement powers to help reduce employment discrimination. As originally proposed, the amendments to the 1964 Act would have
given the EEOC authority, comparable to that of the National Labor Rela13
As finally enacted,
tions Board (NLRB), to issue cease-and-desist orders.
the amendments allowed the EEOC to bring civil suits in its own name in
federal court under either section 706 or section 707.14 A major reason for
choosing the court system was the time factor; it was thought that the federal
courts could provide relief more quickly than an administrative agency.
Furthermore, the legislators believed that the rules and procedures of the
federal courts would be more effective. 15
The EEOC now has various opportunities to litigate. Under section
706, an individual must initiate the procedure by filing a charge with the
8. See generally Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Ciil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
9. Section 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (currently at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976)), authorized an aggrieved individual to file a charge with the EEOC. After an investigation, if the
EEOC found that there was "reasonable cause" to believe the charge was true, the Commission
could use "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to settle the conflict.
If the Commission were unsuccessful in achieving voluntary compliance, the charging party
could bring suit against the employer; the EEOC, however, could not. The EEOC could only
recommend to the Attorney General that a pattern-or-practice suit be brought.
10. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261 (1964)
(prior to 1972 amendment).
11. 118 CONG. REC. 4080 (1972).
12. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1973). Georgia
Power was followed in other circuits, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 314 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977), and remains the standard for federal courts.
13. 118 CONG. REC. 3965-79, 4047-83 (1972) reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 118, 248, 279, 589, 645, 690 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, see Bumpass, The Application of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureto Actions Brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 343 (1979).
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 §§ 706-707, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -6
(1976).
15. See 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 122, 201, 226, 229, 278, 549, 688,
690, 694, 697, 794-95, 797, 988-89, 1270-71, 1347, 1694.
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Commission. During the ensuing 180 days, the EEOC alone may sue. Subsequently, the Commission may proceed only if the individual has not
brought suit. 16 No time limit is imposed on the EEOC's authority to commence an action based on an individual's complaint. ' 7 If the charging party
does sue, the EEOC may intervene with the.permission of the court, and the
suit may be expanded, at the discretion of the trial judge, to allow the EEOC
to redress additional incidents of employment discrimination discovered in
the original investigation. 18
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF GENERAL TELEPHONE

The EEOC, rather than the Attorney General, now brings the section
707 pattern-or-practice suits. The question of class certification in a section
707 action has not been carefully considered by a court. 19 The debate over
class certification for the EEOC in section 706 actions has been raging for
eight years; by statutory directive, all section 707 actions are to be conducted
in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 706.20 Interestingly,
the debate has not touched section 707 suits. With the Court's decision in
General Telephone, however, section 707 has become, as Senator Williams said
2
during the 1972 debates, "a redundancy in the law." '
A.

The Facts

Four women employed in the Beaverton, Oregon, facility of General
Telephone Company of the Northwest, Inc. (General Telephone) filed
charges with the EEOC alleging employment discrimination based on sex.
Specifically, the employees claimed discrimination with respect to restric16. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), provides:
(a) The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or
2000e-3 of this title.
(b) Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer . . .has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the
charge . . .on such employer . . .within ten days, and shall make an investigation
thereof. . . .If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge. . . . If
the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion . . . .The Commission shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable under
subsection (c)or (d) of this section, from the date upon which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to the charge.
17. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
18. E.g., EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
19. &e generally Certifation of EEOC Clas Suas Under Rule 23, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 690
(1979).
20. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 707(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1976),
provides: "All such actions [§ 707] shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set
forth in section 2000e-5 [§ 706] of this title."
21. 118 CONG. REc. 4081 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 1590.
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tions on maternity leave and appointments to craft jobs and management
positions. After investigating the charges, the EEOC sued General Telephone, its subsidiary, West Coast Telephone Company of California, Inc.,
and a local union of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in
April 1977.22 The EEOC's complaint, brought under section 706(0(1) of
Title VII, 23 sought injunctive relief and back pay for all women who might
have been affected by the alleged unlawful practices. Included in this category were all female workers, all female job applicants, and all women who
might have applied for jobs but were dissuaded by the challenged activities.
Presumably, 116 General Telephone facilities in five different states would
not call the suit a class action nor
be affected by the action. The EEOC did
2 4
did it mention rule 23 in the complaint.
In August 1977, the EEOC sought an order bifurcating the issue of class
liability from the issue of individual damages, and the company requested
dismissal of the "class action aspects" of the complaint. The district court
25
In his
referred the motions to a magistrate according to section 706(0(5).
report, the magistrate listed three reasons for his recommendation that rule
23 should not apply to the EEOC's section 706 suits: (1) the EEOC has
never been required to comply with rule 23 in section 707 suits and should
be treated no differently in section 706 suits; (2) the statute gives the EEOC
the authority to bring suit on behalf of a class; and (3) it is "undesirable and
22. EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1979).
23. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706(l(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)
(1976), states:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section,
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against
any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision
named in the charge . . . .The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to
intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . If a charge filed with the
Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section. . . the Commission . . .shall so
notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a
civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the
Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged
unlawful employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such
circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such
complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, cost, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission . . . to intervene in such civil action upon certification
that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its
discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or
further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
24. 446 U.S. at 321-22.
25. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5)
(1976), provides:
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this subsection to assign the
case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every
way expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial within one hundred
and twenty days after issue has been joined, that judge may appoint a master pursuant
to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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impractical" to require EEOC compliance with rule 23.26 The district court
Telephone's
accepted the magistrate's recommendations, denied General
27
motion, and certified the question for interlocutory appeal.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Title VII gives the
EEOC standing to sue on behalf of discriminatees, and that Congress did not
expressly mandate that a section 706 action comply with rule 23. The court
also ruled that no distinction need be drawn between the procedures in section 706 and in section 707 actions. 28 Thus, since section 707 actions have
never been subject to the strictures of rule 23, section 706 actions should not
be so bound. In affirming the lower court's holding, the appeals court stated
and
that "[t]he certification process would be time consuming and costly,
29
would serve no useful purpose in the final disposition of the case."
The court's ruling conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's decision in EEOCV.
D.H. Holmes Co. 30 and represents an area where a great amount of judicial
time has been spent. 31 Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and heard oral arguments in March 1980.32
B.

The Fifth Ci'rcut's Position

Before Holmes, five district courts considered the question raised in Gen33
The Fifth
eral Telephone and found rule 23 inapplicable to EEOC suits.
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reached the opposite conclusion in a
comprehensive opinion. 34 Although the EEOC complaint in Holmes was not
styled as a class action, the EEOC argued that the suit sought "broad relief
for a class of persons." 35 After reviewing the 1972 legislative history and the
history and purposes of rule 23, the court dismissed the EEOC's contentions
that Congress had created a statutory class action independent of rule 23
and that the EEOC, which is never a member of the class suffering injury,
36
could not comply with the rule.
The Fifth Circuit expressed particular concern for the defendant's procedural rights, noting that the defendant company did not know, even eighteen months after the initial complaint was filed, "against whom and upon
what ground precisely it must defend." ' 37 The EEOC's push for "class action
26. EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. at 327-28, 333.
29. Id. at 334.
30. 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
31. See note 48 infa.
32. 446 U.S. at 320.
33. EEOC v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 852 (W.D.N.C. 1976);
EEOC v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wash. 1976); EEOC v.
Rexene Polymers Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 61 (W.D. Tex. 1975); EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp.,
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1973). But see EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 412 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Tex.
1975), a'd inpart, 570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Reiter, TheA pphabiity of Rule 23
to EEOCSuits: An Examinzatin of EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 741 (1977).
34. EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 793 (quoting brief of EEOC at 4).
36. Id. at 796.
37. Id.
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discovery privileges without submitting to class action controls (and, in fact,
resisting them)"' 38 offended the court's sense of fair play.
The salient points in the court's interpretation of section 706 were two:
(1) Congress did not expressly exempt the EEOC from compliance with rule
23 as it did the NLRB; 39 the EEOC has standing to sue to the same extent as
aggrieved individuals; 40 and, (2) Congress has previously created federal actions with procedures different from the federal rules and could have done so
in this instance. 4 ' The Holmes court maintained that a pattern-or-practice
suit can be brought if class certification for the EEOC fails and systemic
discrimination still seems to exist. Therefore, it concluded that the substan42
tive rights of employees and job applicants would be protected.
After Holmes, the EEOC continued its quest to pursue section 706 suits
43
without class certification. Some courts followed the Holmes approach;
some ruled that the EEOC could never be a class representative so the rule
obviously could not apply;44 and one held that compliance with the rule
would constitute interference with the congressionally created EEOC policies. 45 EEOC v. Akron National Bank & Trust Co .46 held that a class action
must be brought under section 707. The statutory design was far from obvious. Although Justice White, writing for the majority in General Telephone,
stated that a "straightforward reading" of the statute dictates rule 23's inapplicability to the EEOC's section 706 actions, 4 7 many jurists across the na48
tion might disagree.
C.

Previrous Title VII Decisions

The Supreme Court's previous resolutions of Title VII procedural disputes foreshadowed the result in General Telephone. Major themes in Title
38. Id. at 795.
39. Id. at 794.
40. Id. at 795 n. 12.
41. Special rules govern procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 792 n.8.
42. Id.
43. E.g., EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
44. EEOC v. Stroh Brewery Co., 83 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Mich. 1979); EEOC v. Whirlpool
Corp., 80 F.R.D. 10 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
45. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 84 F.R.D. 337 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
46. 78 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
47. 446 U.S. at 324.
48. District court cases in which rule 23 was held to apply in § 706 actions brought by the
EEOC include: EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill.1978);
EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Neidhardt v. D.H.
Holmes Co., No. 72-2395 (E.D. La. 1976), affd sub nom., EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d
787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
District court cases in which rule 23 was held inapplicable to § 706 suits brought by the
EEOC include: EEOC v. Stroh Brewery Co., 83 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Mich. 1979); EEOC v. MidCity Care Center, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec.
30,275 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); EEOC v. Bumble Bee
Seafoods Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
9160 (D. Ore. 1979); EEOC v. Singer Controls Co. of
America, 80 F.R.D. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 80 F.R.D. 10 (N.D. Ind.
1978); EEOC v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo. 1978); EEOC v.
General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476 (W.D. Wash. 1977); EEOC v. Pinkerton's Inc.,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 852 (W.D.N.C. 1976); EEOC v. Vinell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575
(E.D. Wash. 1976); Stuart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Mich. 1975); EEOC v.
Lutheran Hosp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
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VII cases have been the plenary power of federal courts in such actions, the
restitutionary equitable relief available, and the public's interest in eliminat49
ing employment discrimination.
Plaintiffs, whether individuals, a class, or the EEOC, have been given
procedural advantages in prior cases. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 5°
held that the plaintiff is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief; although other relief may be available, Title VII remedies remain independent of them. In a class action suit, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,5 1 the
Supreme Court held that full relief may be awarded to plaintiffs without
exhaustion of administrative remedies by unnamed class members. Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC 52 dealt with the time limits placed on the EEOC
for filing a section 706 suit; the Court interpreted the statute as imposing no
time limit on the EEOC's ability to file suit in federal court. In a strong
dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that where Congress is silent about a
time period in a federal statute, the Court has traditionally applied the state
statute of limitations. The Court, however, in its allegiance to the legislative
mandate to eliminate employment discrimination through EEOC enforcement actions, treated the EEOC in a new and special way.
In a 1974 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that a union member
subject to binding arbitration on employment matters may bring a section
706 action if the arbitration goes against his interests. The employer is
bound by the arbitration agreement, according to the rationale in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,53 but the employee has Title VII remedies available to
him, which are not affected by a "binding arbitration" clause. Formerly, the
Court had maintained that labor arbitration was the preferred means of settling industrial disputes and that the decision should be final, binding all
parties. 54 The ruling in Alexander, as in other cases, 55 highlights the overriding importance the Court assigns to Title VII actions.
The Supreme Court will apparently stop short of allowing the EEOC to
create new policies not in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the
statutory design, however. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 56 for example, upheld the
provision for filing within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. The
EEOC was not allowed to manipulate the filing time for the charging party
since the maneuver did not comport with the Court's literal reading of the
57
statute and its interpretation of the legislative intent.
49. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). See aLso United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
50. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
51. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
52. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
53. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
54. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These decisions were
implicitly affirmed in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a.fdby an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
55. Ste cases cited in note 49 supra.

56. 100 S. Ct. 2486 (1980).
57. Lower courts have treated the EEOC mandates liberally. They have consistently upheld departures from the statutory provision stating that "right to sue" letters will automatically
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THE GENERAL TELEPHONE RATIONALE

In its affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's holding that rule 23 does not
apply to the EEOC's section 706 suits, the majority, comprised of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White, relied on "the language
of Title VII, the legislative intent underlying the 1972 amendments to Title
VII, and the enforcement procedures under Title VII prior to the amendments. '"58 Based on its understanding of the 1972 statute, the Court held
that rule 23 is not applicable to an enforcement action, however it is characterized, brought by the EEOC to halt unlawful employment practices.
The Court stated that rule 23 was not designed to encompass an administrative enforcement action and that a distortion of the rule would result
from applying it in section 706 actions. Its major concern was advancement
of the public interest in preventing discrimination in employment opportunities. Without encumbering the agency by invoking the class action rule,
the decision gives the EEOC the freedom to pursue its statutorily-defined
objectives. The decision does not apply to other federal rules.5 9
The Court first outlined the procedure that an individual complainant
and the EEOC must follow in a section 706 action. The authorization of
back pay as a remedy should not, in the Court's opinion, trigger rule 23.
Next, the Court examined the purpose of the 1972 amendments. Because
the charging party retains certain private rights, such as intervening in the
EEOC suit or bringing his own civil suit at the end of the EEOC's exclusive,
180-day jurisdiction, the Court inferred from the statutory language that the
EEOC is not simply a representative of the discriminatee, as a class representative might be, but is a supplemental force for the private action and bears
the primary litigation burden.
Repeating a theme sounded in many lower courts,6° Justice White,
writing for the majority, stated: "When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest
of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the pub/ic
interest in preventing employment discrimination." 6 ' In reviewing the pertinent legislative history, the majority found it "clear" that the EEOC should
proceed in section 706 suits just as it proceeds in section 707 suits (that is,
without rule 23 certification) and said it is "clear" that Senator Javits' reference to class suits in debate 6 2 was to the "availability of relief" and not to the
"procedure" to be applied.
be sent if the EEOC chooses not to sue. E.g., Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d
483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); EEOC v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F.2d 1364
(8th Cir. 1975).
58. 446 U.S. at 323.
59. Id. at 334 n.16.
60. See cases cited in note 48 supra.
61. 446 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
62. The following remarks were made during the floor debate about transfer of enforcement power from the Attorney General to the EEOC, as provided in § 707. These remarks have
been the subject of great debate in the district courts' review of the rule 23 certification issue in
§ 706 actions. Senator Javits said:
These are essentially class actions, and if they [the EEOC] can sue for an individual claimant, then they can sue for a group of claimants.
It seems to me that this is provided for by the rules of civil procedure in the
Federal courts. . . . I have referred to the rules of civil procedure. I now refer specifically to rule 23 of those rules, which is entitled Class Actions and which give [sic] the
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The second part of the opinion discussed rule 23. Neither the history
nor the practical uses for this class action rule were considered; it was characterized as a stumbling block to the EEOC's enforcement responsibilities.
The Court mentioned the problems of numerosity, typicality, and representativeness and again raised the "public interest" idea to justify its finding
rule 23 undesirable in such suits. Although it noted the defendant employer's objective in seeking a judgment binding on all class members, the
Court did not want to deviate from its interpretation of the statutory design.
Finally, the Court directed the lower courts to use their equitable powers to prevent double recovery or re-litigation by any individual receiving
benefits. The importance of this admonition, more a suggestion than a mandate, cannot be overemphasized. The equitable powers of the federal courts
will stand as the critical check on the EEOC's future actions.
Although well-organized, the majority's opinion failed to address the
concerns of the dissenters, the Chief Justice, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens. It did not discuss important policy considerations such as preventing piecemeal suits, saving time and money, and protecting defendant employers from inconsistent adjudications. The Holmes court considered the
interests of both plaintiff and defendant and questioned whether a certification requirement would impose a burden on the EEOC. 63 The Supreme
Court did not focus on these two ideas.
IV.

A.

THE IMPACT OF GEvERAL TELEPIhONE

From the EEOC's Perspectitwe

The significance of General Telephone for the EEOC is that the federal
courts now have a uniform rule to follow in section 706 actions brought by
the EEOC on behalf of a group of individuals; that rule benefits the EEOC.
For eight years, procedural questions flowing from the 1972 amendments
have been argued. A critical one has now been decided.
According to the present EEOC Chairman, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
the 1960's focused on law making, the 1970's focused on law development,
and the 1980's will focus on law application. 64 Since procedure should allow
substantive law to work, the EEOC can now utilize this new tool to proceed
with its emphasis on "comparable pay for comparable work" and to accomplish its added tasks of enforcing the Equal Pay Act 65 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.6 The General Telephone decision will allow the
EEOC to direct its enforcement efforts against major employers practicing
opportunity to engage in the Federal Court in class actions by properly suing parties.

We ourselves have given permission to the EEOC to be a properly suing party.
118 CONG. REC. 4081-82 (1972).

63. 556 F.2d at 795-97.
64. Brisbon, Comparable Work Should Mean Comparable Pay, 6 EQUATOR No. 7, at 3 (1980).

65. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
66. 26 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, Exec.

Order No. 12,106, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. 11 1978) and in 92
Stat. 3781 (1978).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:3

systemic discrimination without encountering the procedural difficulties
presented by class certification. A negative effect on settlement negotiations
might result, however; an employer might be more likely to settle with the
EEOC if the Commission were the certified class representative and the class
67
members were bound by the settlement terms.
The EEOC has consistently brought actions under section 706 for classtype relief even though section 707 was available. Perhaps because the statutory language of section 707 does not provide for back pay as a remedy,
section 707 has not been used more extensively. Class certification has not
been required in section 707 actions; this procedural wrangle could have
been avoided by bringing a pattern-or-practice suit. Perhaps there was concern that the Supreme Court would follow a strict reading of the statute and
not allow back pay. To be sure, the importance of back pay as a stimulus for
employers to eliminate discriminatory employment practices cannot be overstated.68 Furthermore, the burden of proof is different in section 706 and
section 707 actions. As expressed in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co .69 and
in Teamsters v. United States,70 the section 706 burden of proof is met by demonstrating the existence of a pattern and practice of discrimination, which
establishes a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to
prove that the individuals involved were not in fact victims of discrimination. In a section 707 suit, however, when the government alleges a practice
or pattern of discrimination, it must prove by a preponderance of the evi71
dence that the discrimination is the employer's standard business practice.
Whatever its motivation, the EEOC has finally accomplished its goal.
In section 706 actions it can now avoid compliance with rule 23 class certification requirements.
B.

From the Employer's Perspective

The Court's opinion in General Telephone reflects a lack of concern for the
defendant employer's due process rights. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to every civil action not exempted by rule 81.72 Since the NLRB
is exempted, 73 so could the EEOC have been. The major concern expressed
by the spokesman for General Telephone during the oral arguments was
that without rule 23 procedures, an employee might decline an award obtained by the EEOC and bring a private suit against the employer to recover
a larger award . 74 Another concern was the tremendous discovery powers
available to the EEOC without certification. If a charging party files a complaint and the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discriminatory practices are taking place, the EEOC can use the liberal discovery techniques
67.

68.
L. REV.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1107 (1976).

See Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy tn Thte VII Class Acitns: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA.
781 (1974).
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Id.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 1.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5).
48 U.S.L.W. 3653, 3654 (Mar. 25-26, 1980).
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allowed by the federal rules to gain access to all the employer's departments
and branches.
The Supreme Court called on the trial courts to use their equitable
powers. Certainly the employers have some protection from a frivolous suit
because they can recover their attorney's fees in such an instance. 75 The
EEOC should have been called on, though, to exercise care and reason in
lodging its complaints. An overzealous claim, for example, was filed in
EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co .76 On the basis of one complaint filed by a female employee, the EEOC leveled a multi-faceted charge, limited neither by
time nor by class of employee, against Delaware Trust. All personnel practices including hiring, recruitment, job classification, training, and promotion were mentioned, but none of the asserted flaws in these areas were
described. 77 Without the constraints of rule 23 in a situation such as this,
the courts will have to exercise firm and wise control over the boundaries of
the case.
C.

Rule 23

The class action rule was extensively revised in 1966, and rule 23(b)(2)
was enacted in part to assure that the class action device would be available
for enforcement of the civil rights statutes. 78 The Advisory Committee of
the Judicial Conference submitted the changes to the Supreme Court; the
revised rules took effect following the Court's approval and a congressional
vote. 79 The Court in General Telephone was remiss in not reconciling its holding with the mandate in rule 1 that all civil actions shall be governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80
Title VII promotes the concept of a class as individuals sharing a common characteristic that subjects them to harmful treatment, an "entity class"
as one commentator describes it."' Title VII advocates a public policy forbidding employment discrimination against individuals because of their
membership in such an entity class. As a member of such a class, an individual (or the EEOC) bringing suit on his own behalf because of discrimination
based on his entity class characteristic seems also to be bringing suit on behalf of all who share that feature. Perhaps this explains why the courts have
reshaped rule 23(b)(2) and why they have been fairly lenient in applying the
82
rule's requirements of numerosity, typicality, and commonality.
75, See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
76,

18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521 (D. Del. 1979).

77. Id.
78. 3B J. M X)RE FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.02[2.-6] (2d ed. 1980). See also Developments in
the Lau-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1319 (1976).
79. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966) (amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
80.

FED. R. Civ. P. I.

81, Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions under the Federal Rules of Cive Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23 (b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979).
82. Id. For the Court's discussion of its treatment of rule 23 suits, see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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The Pub/'c Interest

Eliminating discrimination is undoubtedly in the public interest. The
Supreme Court's major thrust in Title VII cases has been to vindicate that
interest. For example, by liberally construing the filing provisions of section
706 in Love v. Pullman ,83 the Court aided litigants who might be unaware of
the second filing required when an initial filing mistake is made. And, by reaffirming the independence of Title VII remedies available to aggrieved employees in Johnson v. Raz/way Express Agency, Inc.,84 employees are more assured of full relief. With its decision in General Telephone, which removed the
need for the EEOC to become certified as a class representative in section
706 actions, the Court has enabled the EEOC to function more efficiently in
carrying out its statutory duties.
The public interest is served not only by the EEOC but also by private
litigants. The private right of action has many public interest characteristics; among them are attorney's fees, affirmative action remedies, back pay,
and appointment of counsel at the discretion of the court. A private litigant
not only redresses his own injury but also serves the congressional policy of
fighting employment discrimination. Certainly an aggrieved individual can
serve as a class representative. 85 In General Telephone, the EEOC could have
sought class certification. Had certification been denied, the Commission
86
could have brought suit on behalf of the four individual charging parties.
One of the individuals could have served as a class representative. Alternatively, the EEOC could have brought a section 707 suit. The public interest
could have been served without sidestepping the procedures outlined in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The public interest in eradicating job discrimination is only one of several. One of the overriding interests in our legal system is that of a fair trial
for all parties. If a defendant's right to a suit conducted according to the
federal rules can be set aside with such aplomb, the public interest in fair
play in court is not served. The public has an interest in employers' providing jobs and achieving high levels of production, but it has no interest in
having business earnings spent unnecessarily on piecemeal suits arising because an EEOC suit did not decisively settle an issue. In fact, the burden on
the business community created by duplicative suits might well be something our economy cannot afford.
CONCLUSION

As George Orwell penned in Animal Farm, "all animals are equal, but
some animals are more equal than others." The EEOC is treated as a "special animal" in General Telephone. Although the agency is not expressly exempted from complying with rule 23 in section 706 class type actions, the
Supreme Court held that rule 23 was not meant to apply to such actions and
83.
84.
85.

404 U.S. 522 (1972).
421 U.S. 454 (1975).
Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 870

(1976). See East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
86. See note 23 supra.
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would be distorted if it were. Fairness to the defendant employer should be
supplied through the equitable powers of the federal courts rather than
through this procedural safeguard. Undoubtedly this standard will be applied to other enforcement proceedings brought by federal agencies. After
eight years of motions, arguments, and conflicting court decisions on this
issue, the decision is welcomed for its finality.

Chrstine Kirkpatrick Trti

THE LONG ARM SHRINKS:

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

PROBLEM OF THE NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT
IN WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN
CORP. V WOODSON
INTRODUCTION

In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,' the United States Supreme
Court attempted to unravel one of the knottiest paradoxes of long-arm jurisdiction: When may a state court constitutionally obtain jurisdiction over a
tortfeasor who at no time was physically present in that state, who had no
contacts with that state, but whose product caused injury there?
As Justice Goldberg stated in Rosenblatt v. Amerzcan Cyanamid Corp. ,2 the
cases questioning the application of long-arm statutes did so where "the foreign defendant was never physically present in the forum state, and the tortious act there was unintentional."' 3 Indeed, the issue was more than ripe for
resolution, or at least guidance, long before the highway disaster that precipitated the litigation in World-Wide. The nation's courts have been divided in
regard to the problem of the distant defendant whose contacts with the forum state amounted solely to the injury produced there by a product he sold
to the plaintiff.
This article will explore the positions taken by various courts prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide. At the same time, this article
will attempt to assess the implications of a decision which may change the
face of jurisdiction in products liability actions.
I.

THE DECISION

In September 1977, Kay Robinson, an ex-New Jersey resident, was driving with her two children to their new home in Arizona. While traveling
through Oklahoma, the Robinsons' Audi was struck from behind by another
vehicle. The Audi's gasoline tank ruptured, and the resulting fire spread to
the passenger compartment, severely injuring Mrs. Robinson and the children.
The Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma against the Audi's manufacturer, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft; the importer, Volkswagen of
America, Inc.; the regional distributor for Connecticut, New York, and New
Jersey, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (World-Wide); and the retail
dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway).
1. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a further discussion of the case, see Woods, Pennoyer's Dtmre."
PersonalJurisdicionAfter Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Predction Regarding World-Wide Volk-

swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiZ. L. REV. 861, 907-13 (1978).
2. 86 S. Ct. I (stay denied) (Goldberg, J., in chambers), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 110

(1965).
3. Id at 4.

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 58:3

The plaintiffs attempted to obtain Oklahoma jurisdiction over the defendants through two sections of the Oklahoma long-arm statute:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for
relief arising from the person's:
(3) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state . .. .4
World-Wide and Seaway contended that the district court could not
obtain jurisdiction over them since they had no minimal contacts with the
State of Oklahoma. 5 Judge Woodson denied their motion to dismiss and the
6
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed his ruling.
Justice Barnes of the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
over World-Wide and Seaway was justified on the basis of section
1701.03(a)(4) of the Oklahoma long-arm statute. 7 The trial court, he concluded, could infer that World-Wide and Seaway derived "substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this state," 8 and hence, could be
subjected to Oklahoma jurisdiction. The rationale was that the defendants
could foresee the plaintiffs' Audi being driven in or through Oklahoma during the course of its mechanical life, and thus, because of the retail value of
the automobile, the defendants derived substantial revenue from cars used in
9
Oklahoma.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's ruling. Justice White, speaking for the Court, asserted that the record was devoid of "those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state court jurisdiction."' 0 The Supreme Court
decided, in effect, that basing jurisdiction on a single injury inflicted in the
forum state by a product sold elsewhere violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V

A.

International Shoe v. Washington

WOODSON

World-Wide represents another chapter of the minimum contacts saga
4. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(3), (4) (West 1980). A corporation is deemed to
be a person for the purposes of the Oklahoma long-arm statute. See id. § 1701.01.
5. 444 U.S. at 289.
6. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
7. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(3), (4) (West 1980).
8. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
9. Id at 354-55.
10. 444 U.S. at 295. The Court based its decision on the fact that the automobile accident
was the petitioner's sole contact with the State of Oklahoma. The petitioner had conducted no
sales, services, advertising, or other business activities in Oklahoma, nor had it availed itself of
the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. Id.
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that began with International Shoe v. Washington.II International Shoe intro-

duced the modern due process requirements in regard to obtaining jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, ifhe be not present within the territogy of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenanceof
the suit does not ofend traditionalnotions offair play and substantialjustice. 12

In recent years, the Supreme Court has vigorously opposed state court
attempts to restrict the application of the "minimum contacts" test.' 3 In
Shaffer v.Heitner, 14 where the principles of InternationalShoe were extended to
cover quasi in rem actions as well as those in personam, the Court flatly stated
that "[tihe standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the mini15
mum contacts standard elucidated in InternationalShoe."
The Supreme Court also has applied the requirement that there be a
sufficient connection between defendant and forum in cases involving domestic matters,' 6 in cases where jurisdiction is attempted through garnishment of a defendant's insurance policy, 17 and, finally, in World-Wide, in a
products liability action where the plaintiffs attempted to serve process on
the nonresident distributors and dealers as well as on the manufacturer and
importer.
B.

Products Liability Actions Before World-Wide

In Hanson v. Denckla, l a the Supreme Court cautioned that it is only by
the acts of the defendant-not the plaintiff-that minimum contacts are created between the defendant and the forum. In sustaining the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court stated that "it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 9
Before the decision in World-Wide, there was controversy as to whether
the Hanson rule, as cited above, applied to products liability actions. If the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be "purposeful," that is, intentionally initiated by the defendant himself, jurisdiction could not be
based on an injury in the forum state caused by a defective product brought
there by the plaintiff. For example, New York could not provide relief in its
11.326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id at 316 (emphasis added).
13. Se Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In one
instance, the Court did adopt a liberal interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine. See
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
14. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15. Id at 207.
16. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
17. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
18. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19. Id at 253.
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courts to a resident poisoned by tainted food he bought in California and
consumed back in New York.
In Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court ,20 and in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court,2t the California Supreme Court applied the Hanson rule to products
liability actions (even though jurisdiction in Buckeye was sustained on other
grounds) .22 On the other hand, some courts have insisted that applying the
Hanson rule to products liability actions creates a mechanical test ofjurisdiction and violates the spirit of flexibility that characterized the pronouncements of InternationalShoe and its progeny. In Philbps v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 23 the Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with those states that interpreted the "purposeful activity" language of Hanson to refuse jurisdiction in
products liability cases over a defendant who could not foresee the presence
24
of his product within the forum.
The problem illustrated by Fisher, Buckeye, and Philips is that
bility of products within the vast reaches of the American economic
is such that a defective product may unleash its deadly qualities far
place of origin. Many dangerous items have a time bomb effect in
injuries they inflict do not erupt until long after their initial use.

the monetwork
from its
that the

Duignan v. A.H. Robins C0.25 is illustrative of this phenomenon. In that
case, the plaintiff was fitted with an intrauterine device in California. A
Virginia-based corporation manufactured the device. After the plaintiff
moved to Idaho, she contracted an infection, necessitating an operation to
remove a fallopian tube, as well as additional, exploratory surgery. The defendant contended that "[a] forum-shopping plaintiff with a 'portable tort'
should not be able to use Idaho's long-arm statute to sue a corporation
which lacks any other contact with the state." 26 The Idaho Supreme Court
rejected this argument and asserted that because we live in a mobile society,
a negligent party in a products liability action must be prepared to defend
20. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
21. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
22. In Buckeye, the court commented:
Courts and commentators have expressed differing views on whether the statement in Hanson v. Denckla, . . . that jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant
can only be predicated upon activity which the defendant "purposefully" conducts
within the forum state, applies in all cases, including products liability actions against nonresident manufacturers, or islimited to cases factually similar to Hanson . . . . This court has
apparently taken the former and sounder position, that the Hanson formulation of the
"minimum contacts" test . . . is generally applicable.
71 Cal. 2d at 897, 458 P.2d at 63, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
23. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
24. Some state courts have been inconsistent in setting forth what constitutes sufficient
contacts between a defendant and the forum state. Compare Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court,
180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973) with Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177
Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972), and Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d
647 (1967) with Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403
denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966).
P.2d 351 (1965), cert.
25. 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 750 (1977). For an analysis of the constitutional problems
regarding products liability actions involving nonresident manufacturers, see Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Products Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028
(1965).
26. 98 Idaho at 136, 559 P.2d at 752.
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itself "wherever injury should occur." '2 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this doctrine. In Duple
Motor Bodies, Lid v. Holingsworth ,28 itreaffirmed the jurisdiction of the district court for the district of Hawaii over an English corporation that manufactured coach bodies for an English vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle
manufacturer then shipped the finished coaches to Hawaii, where the plaintiffs' injuries occurred.
The appellate court justified jurisdiction over the coach manufacturer
on the ground that even though the defendant itself did not ship the vehicles
to Hawaii, "[tihe bodies were designed and manufactured . . . with the
knowledge that they were to be used in Hawaii and were made with special
modifications to adapt them for use there."' 29 Circuit Judge Ely vigorously
dissented on the basis of the Hanson rule. He attacked "[t]he extension of
30
Hawaii's 'long-arm' statute so that it stretches halfway around the world"
in situations where the defendant did not "purposely avail himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, '' 1 as required by
Hanson.
The question remained, however, whether refusing to apply the Hanson
rule to products liability actions offended the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" 32 extolled in International Shoe. Certainly, there is a
limit beyond which it is unfair to force a manufacturer or dealer corporation
to defend itself in a state to which it did not ship the product in question,
and with which it had no contacts except for the injury caused by that product.
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court expressed concern
that state courts were zealously overreaching the limits imposed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in their efforts to catch elusive
manufacturers and dealers whose products injured residents or guests. 33 By
applying the Hanson rule to products liability actions, the Supreme Court, in
World-Wide, restrained this state court tendency. The Court ruled that a
corporation which purposefully conducts activities within a state is deemed
to have had "clear notice that it is subject to suit there."' 34 Also, a corporation delivering products into the stream of commerce "with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state" 35 may be sub27. Id at 138, 559 P.2d at 754 (citing Dogett v. Electrics Corp., 93 Idaho 26, 31-32, 454
P.2d 63, 68 (1969)).
28. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
29. Id at 234.
30. Id. at 236 (Ely, J., dissenting).
31. Id (Ely, J., dissenting).
32. 326 U.S. at 316.
33. The Court stated:
The concept of minimum contacts. . . can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.
444 U.S. at 291-92.
34. Id at 297.
35. ld at 297-98.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:3

jected to a lawsuit in that state. In World-Wde, however, no such constitutional grounds existed to justify Oklahoma jurisdiction over World-Wide or
Seaway. 36 Thus, a state court may assume jurisdiction in a products liability
action only on the basis of the defendant's role in knowingly bringing, shipping, or selling a product to customers in that state.
The decision in World-Wide also expressly or implicitly dealt with various legal fictions that had been advanced by state and federal courts to justify jurisdiction in products liability actions where affiliations between the
defendant and the forum were absent. Several of these legal fictions are explored in the following pages.
III.

A.

JURISDICTION OVER THE DISTANT DEFENDANT

Foreseeabity

The Oklahoma Supreme Court in World- Wide attempted to justify jurisdiction over defendants World-Wide and Seaway on the basis that, since an
automobile is a mobile product, the defendants could "foresee its possible use
in Oklahoma" 3 7 and hence derived substantial revenue from cars that might
be driven or resold in that state.
Numerous cases have supported the proposition that foreseeability justifies the forum state's jurisdiction over the defendant. The rationale in those
cases is that if a manufacturer or dealer could anticipate a product's ending
up in a given state and injuring someone there, the manufacturer or dealer
has implicitly consented to service of process from that state.
Some courts, however, have displayed a tendency to employ the foreseeability test as a measure of last resort whenever other minimum contacts
standards fail to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction. In Eerley Aircraft Co. v.
i'illian,38 the plaintiff's daughter was injured in Texas by a fall from an
amusement park ride manufactured by Eyerley Aircraft, an Oregon corporation. Eyerley Aircraft had sold the ride twenty years before to a traveling
amusement company in Chicago. The amusement company in turn resold
the ride in North Dakota to a second traveling amusement company.
Eyerley Aircraft had had no contact with the ride since introducing it into
interstate commerce by selling it to the Chicago amusement show. 3 9 There
were some unrelated business contacts between the defendant and the forum. The court, however, which could not base jurisdiction merely upon the
existence of unrelated business transactions, 40 emphasized foreseeability in
upholding in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Eyerley Aircraft, the
court explained, knew that its products were itinerant in nature and "would
'4 1
not come to a permanent rest at the domicile of its original purchaser.
36. Id. at 298.
37. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
38. 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. Id at 595.
40. The court in Eerley Aircrafi determined that the defendant's business contacts with
Texas were not sufficient to sustain Texas jurisdiction over the matter. Had the ride that caused
the injury been shipped into Texas, after having been sold and serviced elsewhere many years
before, due process requirements would have been satisfied. Id
41. Id. at 597.
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Since Eyerley Aircraft could anticipate that the stream of commerce would
carry its products to Texas, the contacts between the corporation and Texas
42
were sufficient to justify Texas jurisdiction over Eyerley.
In Metal-Matic, Inc. v. District Court ,4 3 the court, unlike the court in
Eyerley Aircrafl, was more direct in that it did not painstakingly examine the
sufficiency of the commercial affiliations between the defendant and the forum state. The case involved a boat whose railing, manufactured by the
defendant in Minnesota, collapsed, causing the plaintiffs decedent to drown
in Lake Mead, Nevada. The court decided that a manufacturer of boat
parts reasonably could foresee its products finding markets "where navigable
lakes or waters are located, "' 44 and thus upheld jurisdiction.
In Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac,45 as in World- Wide, the trial court upheld
jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile dealer who had had no contacts
with the forum state except for the injury caused by a product the dealer
sold. As the Oklahoma court in World-Wide attempted to do, the court in
Reilly justified the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of foreseeability:
[T]he Court feels it is not unreasonable to assume Tolkan should
have anticipated that the Pontiac it sold to plaintiff and the jack
within it [which caused the injury] would come to be used in other
States . . . .Tolkan knew that it was selling a product that is distributed, and for which spare parts are available, throughout the
nation . . . .Thus, Tolkan should be prepared to defend on alleged defects in the product it sold which had consequences in New
46
Jersey.
Some of the courts that have attacked the foreseeability test have done
so on the basis of the problem pinpointed in Judge Sobeloff's illustration in
47
Ehrlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills:
[L]et us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if
asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license
plates, knowing he might be required to defend in the courts of
Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy
damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires ....
It is difficult to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to
the free flow of commerce between the states. 48
42. Id.

43. 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966).
44. Id. at 266, 415 P.2d at 619.
45. 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.NJ. 1974).
46. Id. at 1207. Other opinions considering the foreseeability factor in upholding jurisdiction include Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972); Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100
Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Cole v. Doe, 77 Mich. App. 138, 258 N.W.2d 165 (1977); Roche
v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1967), aj'dmem., 51 N.J. 26, 237 A.2d
265 (1968); Gonzalez v. Harris Calorific Co., 64 Misc. 2d 287, 315 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.), af'd
mner., 38 A.D.2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88
Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
47. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
48. Id at 507. Variations of this hypothetical appear in Uppgren v. Executive Aviation
Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn. 1969), and Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp.,
200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968). For other cases criticizing foreseeability as a test ofjurisdiction, see Kerrigan v. Clarke Gravely Corp., 71 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Penn. 1975); Hapner v. Rolf
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The United States Supreme Court, in World-Wide, endorsed the hypothetical in Ehrlanger, and commented that if foreseeability were a deciding
factor in products liability actions, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel."149 Yet the Court did not completely dismiss
foreseeability as a criterion:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and conthat he should reasonably
nection with the forum State are such 50
anticipate being haled into court there.
Thus, in light of World-Wide, foreseeability may not be used as a substitute for the requirement of "purposeful" minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Transient though a product may be, it is the
conduct of the defendant-not of the plaintiff or the product-that creates
the necessary affiliating circumstances upon which jurisdiction is based.
B.

Gray and the Defition of "Tortious Conduct"

Gray v. American Radiator & Standard San'tar, Corp.51 is cited often to support the proposition that, for statutory purposes, a "tortious act" is committed in the forum state if the injury occurred there. The court in Gray relied
upon the legal maxim that "the place of a wrong is where the last event takes
place which is necessary to render the actor liable." ' 52 Logically, the injury is
the last event needed to render the defendant liable; and if the injury occurred in the forum state, the tortious act was committed there.
By this circuitous reasoning, the court in Gray decided that the defendant-who manufactured a defective valve in Ohio that was installed in a hot
water heater in Pennsylvania, after which the hot water heater was sold to
the plaintiff in Illinois--committed a tortious act in Illinois, and hence was
subject to Illinois jurisdiction. A number of courts have adopted this approach to jurisdiction in products liability actions. 53 On the other hand,
many forums have rejected the tendency to equate "tortious act" with "injury." The court in Oliver v. American Motors Corp.54 maintained that the Restatement's definitions of "tortious conduct" and "place of wrong" adopted
in Gray are "given strictly within the framework of the subjects to which they
relate. To apply them uncritically to problems which relate to in personam
Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 273 N.W.2d 822 (1978); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704
(Utah 1974).
49. 444 U.S. at 296.
50. Id. at 297.

51.

22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).

52. Id at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377
(1934)).
53. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876, 878 (D. Minn.
1960); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 578-81, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892-94
(1960); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 472, 403 P.2d

351, 354 (1965).
54. 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
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jurisdiction is to apply them out of [the] context" 5 5 in which they were defined in the Restatement of Torts 56 and the Restatement of Conflict of
57
Laws.
An even more curious definition associates "tortious conduct" with "doing business in the forum state." Yet many courts have justified the exercise
ofjurisdiction through interpretations which state that it is not a violation of
due process to find that if a foreign corporation commits a tort within the
state, it shall be deemed to be doing business in that state and will thereby
have designated the secretary of state as its agent for service of process in
58
that state.
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court did not explore the
issue of what constitutes a tortious act (for jurisdictional purposes) in products liability actions. Nor did it need to, for the Oklahoma Supreme Court
rejected the Gray principle in regard to the Oklahoma long-arm statute, because the statute itself precluded the adoption of such a definition and required additional contacts with Oklahoma if the tortfeasor caused an injury
there "by an act or omission outside" the state. 59
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court did not comment on
the semantic gymnastics of state courts in search of a jurisdictional basis.
Because of the World-Wide decision, however, the minimum contacts standards of InternationalShoe and Hanson, as applied to products liability actions,
may have been reinforced to withstand future attempts to circumvent these
standards through unconventional definitions of legal terms.
C.

The Stream of Commerce and the Forum State's Benevolence

Some courts have insisted that a company introducing products into the
"stream of commerce" automatically incurs liability wherever a defective
product injures someone. Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc. 60 is representative of this trend:
It would be flying in the face of reality if we did not admit knowledge that manufactured products are ordinarily designed for commercial sale in whatever markets may be found for them, without
regard to state lines. They are placedin the stream of commerce,-and when
they reach a foreign state they have the protection of its laws. It is not
unfair to say they should assume the burdens as well as the benefits
. . . and the producer of such products who sends them into anotherstate may
55. Id at 884, 425 P.2d at 653.
56.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6 (1957).

57.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). Other opinions criticizing the

Gray definition of tortious conduct include Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.
Colo. 1966); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1, 3 (M.D.N.C. 1960); LonginesWitmauer v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 A.D.2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1964), alfd, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. dentid, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
58. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 577, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892
(1960). See also Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); Anderson v.
National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 913, 135 N.W.2d 639, 640 (1965); Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1952).
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Okla. 1978).
:'60. 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965).
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According to this trend of thought, manufacturers and dealers who send
their products into interstate channels should answer to the courts wherever
the products cause injury for two reasons: the forum states protect out-ofstate sellers through various laws and benefits,6 2 and these states have a
"manifest state interest" in seeing that their residents obtain relief from non63
resident tortfeasors.
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed this analysis. International Shoe and Hanson established the jurisdictional requirement that the
defendant must initiate the contacts with the forum state "thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 64 And in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. ,65 the Court acknowledged the "manifest interest" a state has "in
,,6
providing effective means of redress for its residents ....
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court cited Gray in affirming
that a corporation delivering its products "into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State" 6 7 constitutionally may be subjected to jurisdiction there.68 A mere
likelihood of sale in the forum state, however, is not enough; the defendant
must have real, substantial connections with the state in order to be answerable to its courts. World-Wide and Seaway might have anticipated that the
cars they sold would be used in Oklahoma, but since the area in which they
operated was restricted and distant from the situs of injury, they were not
subject to the reach of Oklahoma's courts.
D.

The Convenient Forum
For a few courts, jurisdiction is justified by convenience. In Gray, the

61. Id. at 919, 135 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added). See also Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584
F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Eyerley Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414
F.2d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1969); Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1206
(D.NJ. 1974); McCoy v. Wean United, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 491, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969);
Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 138, 559 P.2d 750, 754 (1977); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961); Hapner v.
Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 177, 273 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442,
176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961); Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 919, 135
N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969).
64. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
65. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
66. Id. at 223. Some courts have been quick to find a "manifest state interest" in products
liability actions against nonresidents:
A state has a legitimate interest in providing a meaningful forum for its citizens who
have suffered damages as a result of faulty products being shipped into the state by
foreign corporations.
Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 53 (Okla. 1976); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Okla.
1970); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 57, 558 P.2d 764, 768
(1977).
67. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
68. Id.
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court stated that "[t]he principles of due process relevant to the issue in this
case support jurisdiction in the court where both parties can most conveniently settle their dispute."' 69 As in World- Wide, the injury in Gray occurred
in the forum state, the witnesses resided there, and the evidence as to damages and other elements of the action originated there. Yet, the United
States Supreme Court in World- Wide did not accord consideration to convenience as a factor in long-arm jurisdiction, except to state that minimum contacts, as required by the due process clause, serve in part to protect the
70
defendant against inconvenient litigation.
Convenience, then, may be an element of minimum contacts, to be
weighed along with other factors in deciding the question of whether jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant, but it is no more than that. As
pointed out in Pellegr'niv. Sachs &Sons, 7 1 the problem with applying convenience as a test of jurisdiction is that convenience is a two-way street. 7 2 One
generally cannot render a situation convenient for one party without inconveniencing the other.
E.

The Wave of the Future

The United States Supreme Court in World-Wide once more acknowledged the economic and technological trends that increased the volume of
commerce among the several states and led to the problems of multi-state
litigation.7 3 The Court, however, firmly maintained that it could not accept
"the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes,"
while remaining "faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied
74
in the Constitution.
Many state courts, however, did not feel that a conflict existed between
liberalizing long-arm jurisdiction in response to changing conditions, and
conforming to the federalist principles of the Constitution. The Gray decision reflected an optimism shared by numerous courts in regard to the jurisdictional implications of modernity:
Advanced means of distribution and other commercial activity
have made possible these modern methods of doing business, and
have largely effaced the economic signifwance of State hnes. By the same
token, today's facilities for transportation and communication have
enremoved much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly
5
countered in defending lawsuits brought in other States.
The state courts, by and large, have not exhibited a desire to restrain
their sovereignty in accordance with the spirit of federalism. The Supreme
Court in World-Wide may have borne this in mind as it restated the words of
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
modern

22 Il. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
444 U.S. at 294.
522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974).
Id at 707.
444 U.S. at 292-93.
Id at 293.
22 Ill.
2d at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added). Several courts believed that
conditions called for the further liberalization of jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g.,

Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 917, 135 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1965);

Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 177, 273 N.W.2d 822, 827 (1978) (Moody, J.).
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Hanson to the effect that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts are "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the re' 76
spective States."
CONCLUSION

World-Wide is not a closed chapter in the history of in personam jurisdiction. This decision establishes that purposeful minimum contacts are required to sustain jurisdiction in products liability actions. Additional
questions, however,--some of which are raised in the dissents of Justices
Marshall and Blackmun-remain unresolved. The most important of these
questions is whether local dealers and retailers are on the same jurisdictional
footing as manufacturers.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, maintained that since automobile distributors serve a multistate market and local dealers participate in a nationwide
network of dealerships, they "can fairly expect that the cars they sell may
cause injury in distant States and that they may be called on to defend a
resulting lawsuit there." 7 7 Justice Blackmun concurred:
It therefore seems to me not unreasonable-and certainly not unconstitutional. . . to uphold Oklahoma jurisdiction over this New
York distributor and . . . dealer when the accident happened in
Oklahoma. I see nothing more unfair for them than for the manufacturer and the importer. All are in the business of providing ve78
hicles that spread out over the highways of our several States.
In the future, courts-perhaps even the United States Supreme Courtmay determine whether a defendant's status as a manufacturer or as a dealer
ought to influence the extent to which it is subject to long-arm jurisdiction.
Only then will the ruling of World- Wide be utilized with confidence to solve
the problem of the nonresident, nonaffiliated defendant in products liability
actions.
In addition to the question of whether manufacturers ought to be protected by the same jurisdictional barriers as dealers are, the decision in
World-Wide presented a plaintiff's quandary: Where might a claim for relief
be heard if the state in which the injury occurred cannot compel the
tortfeasor's presence because the requisite affiliations between the two are
lacking?
The plaintiff who chooses the state of his residence as the forum still
faces the same problem that the petitioner in World-Wide faced. Sufficient
minimum contacts must exist to enable any state to exercise jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.
On the other hand, the states in which the defendants reside may be
76. 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
77. 444 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several courts have decided that nonresident

retailers should not be subjected to the same jurisdictional tests as manufacturers are. See, e.g.,
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Minn. 1969); Tilley v.
Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 648-49, 438 P.2d 128, 134 (1968); Pellegrini v.
Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1974); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d
875, 889-90, 425 P.2d 653, 656 (1967).
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unsuitable forums also. A plaintiff suing several defendants could be compelled, at great expense, to file multiple lawsuits in various states in order to
obtain complete relief. Each suit risks being dismissed for want of an indispensable party. Furthermore, it often is impossible or prohibitively expensive to transport witnesses and other evidence from the situs of the injury to a
distant forum.
A plaintiff in a products liability action may be able to obtain relief in a
federal district court, under limited circumstances. The amount of damages
to which the plaintiff is entitled must exceed $10,000; also, there must be
complete diversity of state citizenship between the parties79 or else the matter in controversy must arise "under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." 80 Not every plaintiff is fortunate in having none of the defendants residing in his home state, or in having a lawsuit which incorporates a "federal question," thereby enabling him to sue in a federal court.
In protecting defendants from distant and inconvenient litigation, the
Supreme Court, by its decision in World- Wide, has restricted the plaintiff's
forum alternatives. As a result, the scales of justice may shift in favor of the
due process rights of corporate defendants and against the injured parties'
right to compensation.

Susan R. Harris

79. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
80. Id § 1331.

REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE:

PANKRATZ V DISTRICT COURT

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the first amendment as it relates to the freedom of the press, I it has
stated that the protection is not absolute. 2 In its analysis, the Court will look
to the rights implicated by the individual problem presented and the way in
3
which they relate to the affected public interest.
4
The concept of a reporter's privilege, not recognized at common law,
has only developed in recent years. The privilege presents a conflict between
the importance of newsgathering and the right of the public to be informed
as opposed to the duty to be a witness and the authority of the court to
5
compel a witness' attendance and exact his testimony.

This unresolved conflict has resulted in a trifurcated development of
legal solutions. This comment will examine the three major approaches to
the problem of reporter's privilege as they relate to the case, Pankratz v. Dis6
trict Court.
I.

THE FACT SITUATION

In December 1978, a citation of contempt was issued for Robert C.
Ozer,7 Special Deputy District Attorney for the 1978 Statutory Grand Jury.
An amended citation alleged, inter aha, that Ozer had violated rule 6.2 of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 41(e) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the District Court of the Second Judicial District8 by disclosing
information and details of the grand jury proceedings to Howard Pankratz,
a reporter for the Denver Post.
In January 1979, a subpoena duces tecum adtestifcandum was served on
Pankratz commanding him to appear before the court, give testimony, and
produce all documents related to the alleged meeting with Ozer.
Pankratz moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the requested information, which had never been published, was confidential and
that the enforcement of the subpoena would represent an invasion of his
constitutional rights. 9 Pankratz also asserted that the prosecutor had not
1. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1971); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
2. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 147 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1971).
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton's rev. ed. 1961).

5. Id.
6. 609 P.2d 1101 (Colo. 1980).
7. In re Robert C. Ozer and the 1978 Statutory Grand Jury, No. CR-1 1603 (Dist. Ct.
Colo., filed December 13, 1978) (complaint for contempt).
8. Both rules pertain to the requirement of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
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exhausted the alternative sources available to him," ° and had failed to show
a compelling state interest to justify the chilling effect which enforcement of
the subpoena would have upon newsgathering and freedom of the press. In
his affidavit, Pankratz admitted interviewing Ozer, but swore that the establishment of a confidential relationship was a condition precedent to that interview.
In February 1979, Judge Edward C. Day denied Pankratz' motion on
the ground that there was no shield law in Colorado which would excuse a
reporter from responding to a valid subpoena."1 The court held that there
was no support for the claim of such privilege according to well-settled rules
regarding first amendment reporter privileges.' 2 In the absence of a statutory privilege, Pankratz would qualify as a witness.1 3 Accordingly, when a
reporter has been an observer or participant in wrongful or criminal conduct, he must respond to a valid subpoena to testify or to produce documents relating to that transaction. He possesses no special privilege and is
14
considered to be in "the same shoes as an ordinary citizen."
Judge Day also examined Pankratz' balancing argument and found the
state interest sufficiently compelling to burden Pankratz' first amendment
rights since he was the only witness present during the entire interview.' 5
The court stated that the testimony of Pankratz went to the heart of the
allegations against Ozer and, therefore, all the available evidence must be
produced. The court rejected the claim that enforcement of the subpoena
would have a chilling effect on subsequent newsgathering activities.
Pankratz successfully moved to stay the proceedings. He then filed a
Petition for Relief in the Nature of Prohibition with the Colorado Supreme
Court. ' 6 In April 1980, the Supreme Court of Colorado discharged the rule
to show cause why the subpoena should not be quashed, and stated that,
under the circumstances of this case, there was no constitutionally based reporter's testimonial privilege. Justice Dubofsky did not participate. Justice
Rovira, specially concurring, stated that while he agreed with the result, he
would apply the three-pronged test promulgated in the dissent of Justice
Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes.17 That is, there must be probable cause to
believe that the reporter has information that is clearly relevant; such infor10. Gregory Fasing, staff attorney for the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, was present during only part of the interview. Affidavit of Fasing, In re Ozer and the 1978 Statutory Grand
Jury, No. CR- 11603 (Dist. Ct. Colo., filed December 13, 1978) (complaint for contempt).
11. Judge Day also heard a motion filed by Ozer to dismiss both the citation and the
amended citation and a motion of the Special Prosecutor to file the amended citation. The
motions of Ozer were denied; the motion of the Special Prosecutor was granted.
12. Pankratz v. District Court, No. CR- 11603 (Dist. Ct. Colo., Feb. 1, 1979) (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
13. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-101 (1973) states that "[ajll persons, without exception,
other than those specified in §§ 13-90-102 to -108 [not applicable to the instant case] may be
witnesses."
14. Pankratz v. District Court, No. CR-1 1603, slip op. at 8 (Dist. Ct. Colo., Feb. 1, 1979).
15. Id.
16. COLO. APP. R. 2 1(c). As a witness rather than a direct party, Pankratz alleged he had
no plain and speedy remedy at law. See, e.g., Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo.
227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976); People ex rel.Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597
(1902).
17. 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972).
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mation cannot be obtained by alternative means; and there is a compelling
need for the information.
II.

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

Wigmore developed a four-part test to justify recognition of privileged
communications.i The communications must "originate in a confidence
that they won't be disclosed;" 1 9 the confidentiality must be essential to the
relationship between the parties; the relationship must be one which is recognized by the community as being of great importance; and, the potential
injury to the relation must be greater than the benefit gained in litigation by
the disclosure of the information. No special evidentiary privilege for reporters was formally recognized at common law.
Federal 20 and state 2 l rules provide that no person has a privilege to
refuse to be a witness, to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any
object or writing, or to prevent another from being a witness except as required by the state 22 or federal 2 3 constitution, rules promulgated by the
26
25
24
and common law.
Supreme Court of Colorado, state statutes,
Recognition of a privilege is in direct conflict with the underlying purposes of the rules of evidence. 27 The rules are the embodiment of the principle that "the public . . . has a right to everyman's evidence" unless
protected by common law or by statutory or constitutional privilege. 2 8 They
are to be followed to ensure the fair administration of justice and the procurement of truth which will provide for a just determination of a given
cause. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is "beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to
support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his
' 29
testimony whenever he is properly summoned."
The issue of a reporter's privilege was first raised at the state level; the
courts refused to recognize the need for any special treatment of representatives of the press. 30 In the first three cases presented to it by petition, the
31
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
18. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2286.
19. Id.
20. FED. R. EVID. 501.
21. COLO. R. EVID. 501.
22. CoLO. CONST. art. 2, §§ 7, 10, 18.
23. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V.
24. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 26.
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973).
26. Set 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4.
27. See, e.g., COLO. R. EvID. 102.
28. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4,
§ 2192).
29. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)(quoting Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
30. See Exparte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297,
184 P. 375 (1919); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72,
70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
31. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Murphy, No. 19604 (Sup. Ct. Colo.), cert denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961), noted in In re Goodfader, 45

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:3

In the first case, Garland v. Torre,32 Judy Garland brought suit against
CBS for breach of contract and defamation. The civil action in defamation
stemmed from a story written by Marie Torre in which she credited a CBS
network executive with making statements that Miss Garland asserted were
false and damaging to her reputation. Miss Torre refused to divulge the
source of her story and claimed that compelled disclosure violated the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first amendment and the requirement of
a free society that there be an unrestricted flow of news. The lower court
held that the freedom of the press was not absolute. The information sought
went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim and, as such, there was no constitutional right to refuse to answer.
Again, in In re Murphy,33 an unpublished Colorado case, the reporter's
privilege was asserted and denied. The case arose as part of a disciplinary
proceeding against a Colorado lawyer 34 who, in a petition filed with the
Supreme Court, allegedly made defamatory statements against a former
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. The attorney was accused of
giving the statements to a reporter prior to filing the petition. The reporter
refused to answer as to whether she had received a copy of the petition. The
Colorado Supreme Court compelled her testimony, holding that it was relevant and material to the state's case against the attorney.
The third case, State v. Buchanan,35 involved published interviews with
marijuana users. The student reporter was held in contempt after refusing
to disclose the identity of her source of information during a grand jury investigation. The court held that, in the absence of a state statute, there was
nothing in the state or federal constitution that would compel recognition of
the reporter's privilege.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1972, chose to address the reporter's privilege by granting certiorari in four cases36 consolidated for appeal in Branzburg v. Hayes." The first three cases 3 8 each involved grand jury
testimony by reporters who were subpoenaed because they were first-hand
observers of the alleged criminal conduct. The reporters asserted that they
had a constitutionally based privilege premised on the first amendment of
the United States Constitution. In each case, the lower courts held that
there was no absolute or qualified constitutional privilege that would accommodate a refusal to respond to the subpoenaes. The decisions were affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392

U.S. 905 (1968).
32. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).

33. No. 19604 (Sup. Ct. Colo.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
34. People v. Gately, 147 Colo. 336, 363 P.2d 666 (1961).
35. 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
36. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Meigs (Ky. 1971) (unreported decision) (same factual
issue as Branzburg v. Pound); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
37. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Meigs (Ky. 1971) (unreported decision); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
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In the fourth case, 39 the reporter was subpoenaed to testify about interviews with members of the Black Panther Party rather than about observed
criminal conduct. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that,
absent compelling reasons for requiring the reporter's testimony, he was
privileged to withhold it. The Supreme Court rejected the finding of qualified privilege and also rejected, as burdensome to the judicial process, the
requirement that the government show a compelling need for the reporter's
40
testimony.
In support of their assertions of a constitutionally protected privilege,
the reporters cited, inter a/ia, the decisions reported in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 4 1 and Curtzs Pubhshing Co. v. Bulls, 42 which supported the principle
that official action that adversely affects first amendment rights must be justified by a compelling public interest. This had been the position taken by
43
the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell o. United States.
Branzburg v. Hayes was a five-four decision; the deciding, and somewhat
qualifying, vote was cast by Justice Powell who emphasized both the limited
nature of the Court's decision as well as the need to balance the individual
constitutional interests and societal concerns on a case-by-case basis. 44 The
majority opinion noted instances in which a qualified privilege would be
recognized 45 and, in dicta, suggested that Congress and the state legislatures
46
Jusaddress the problem by enacting federal and state press shield laws.
47
tice Douglas dissented on the ground that the privilege should be absolute.
In their dissent, 48 Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall promulgated a three-part test to apply in cases of this nature: 1) probable cause
must be established which demonstrates that the reporter has information
that is relevant to the alleged violation of the law; 2) the information sought
is not available from alternative sources; and 3) there must be a compelling
interest in the information.

III.

TRIFURCATED APPLICATION OF BR.4NZBURG

Branzburg v. Hayes stands as the leading case in the area of reporter's
privilege. Because of the Supreme Court's complex response to this problem,
however, the case has been applied in varying ways. Some courts have interpreted the majority opinion in a very narrow fashion. Others have given
greater weight to the concurring opinion and have used the balancing test
39. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. 408 U.S. at 678.
41. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

42. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
43. 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
44. 408 U.S. at 709.
45. Id. at 707-08. The Court stated that some protections are recognized within the first
amendment. A privilege will be recognized if the grand jury investigation is not instituted or
conducted in good faith. There is also no justification for harassment of the press or purposeful
disruption of a reporter's relationship with his news sources. Grand juries must operate within
the limits of the first as well as fifth amendments.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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proposed by Justice Powell. These cases further appear to give credence to
the dissent by proposing the application of the three-part test that requires
establishment of probable cause, use of available alternatives for procurement of the information, and establishment of a compelling interest in the
information. The third approach, as suggested in the majority opinion, requires a legislative response in the form of the "press shield laws." This trifurcated application of Branzburg has resulted in a three-pronged approach
may require furto the problem of reporter's privilege for which resolution
49
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
by
consideration
ther
The first approach follows the majority's opinion in Branzburg. In a decision arising from a murder case, New York Times Co. o. Jascaletch,5° the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Branwburg and stated there is "no present authority in this Court that a newsman need not produce documents material to
51
In a second denial of rethe prosecution or defense of a criminal case."
porter Farber's petition for a stay of execution, Justice White repeated this
principle and also stated that there was no authority for the notion that "a
defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances
52
before enforcement against newsmen will be had."
In Zurcher v. Stanford DailyS3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a search warrant that authorized the search of a newsroom. The
Court rejected Stanford Daiy s argument that the warrant was overbroad because, in the course of a general or unspecified search, confidential information could be uncovered. Applying the logic of Branzburg, the Court stated
that it was unconvinced that confidential sources would disappear or that
54
the press would suppress news because of unwarranted searches.
55
Lower courts have also followed Branzburg. In Rosato v. Superior Court,
the California Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of constitutional law
and public policy, the argument that the press will be unable, without a
privilege, to obtain secret information is without merit. Generally, courts
for
find that when a reporter is an actual witness or participant in the events
56
which he has been subpoenaed to testify, there will be no privilege.

49. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971);
Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The journalist'sPrivilege. Branzburg andIts Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV.
829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmens' Pwilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources & Information,
23 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutionsand PriateLitigation, 58 CoLO. L. REV. 1198 (1970); Note, The Rights of SourcesThe CriticalElement in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979); Note, Reporters
and Their Sources. The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
50. 439 U.S. 1301 (1978).
51. Id. at 1302.
52. 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978).
53. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
54. Id. at 564-65; see Teeter & Singer, Search Warrants in Newsrooms: Some Aspects of the Impact
of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 67 Ky. LJ.847 (1978-79); Note, ConstitutionalLaw--First Amendment Rights ofNewspaper Are Adequately Protectedby Search Warrant Requirement, 27 KAN. L. REV.
653 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-First and Fourth Amendments Do Not Prohibit Use of Search
Warrants Against Newspapers, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1513 (1979).
55. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
56. Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
930 (1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973); In re
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A qualified privilege, however, has been recognized when the information possessed by the reporter was not relevant to the prosecution. 57 It has
also been allowed when the reporter did not actually witness any alleged
criminal act. 58 A qualified privilege will be recognized if the court finds that
the purpose of the subpoena was strictly to harass the news media, 59 or if the
information to be obtained is cumulative or available from additional
sources.

60

The second approach following Branzburg emphasizes the balancing test
used by the concurring opinion while strongly favoring the standards
promulgated in the dissenting opinion. In 1979, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion to quash in UntedStates
v. Hubbard.6 1 A subpoena duces tecum was served on a reporter from the
Washington Post to produce his writings and materials concerning an FBI
search of the Church of Scientology. The court relied heavily on Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg62 and invoked the balancing test.
It held that there were alternative means to obtain the information concerning the pre-search briefing conducted by the FBI and that the testimony of
the reporter was not necessary for a fair resolution of the case.
The Florida circuit court, in Florida v. Silber,63 applied Justice Powell's
balancing test to determine that a criminal bribery defendant must establish
compelling interests that outweigh the broad first amendment privilege possessed by the press against compelled testimony and production of documents. The circuit court also applied standards which were very similar to
64
those of the dissent in Branzburg.
In Riley a. Chester,65 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the finding of civil contempt of the lower Pennsylvania court and recognized
a federal common law privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential sources.
The court held that criminal or civil litigants must show that the information sought can be obtained from no other source and that the information is
material, relevant, and necessary and goes to the heart of the litigant's claim.
Although the action was filed under federal law, the court cited the Pennsylvania Shield Law 66 (which provides for a reporter's privilege) because the
interests of the state and federal laws were congruent. 67 The court distinguished this civil action from the criminal case, Branzburg, yet recognized the
strength of Justice Powell's concurring opinion and adopted the balancing
test. The court also appeared, however, to apply the three-pronged test outFarber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert.
dented, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super.
460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
57. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
58. Florida v. Hurston, 3 Media L. Rep. 2295 (1978).
59. Morgan v. Florida, 337 So. 2d 951, 956 (Fla. 1976).
60. United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
61. 5 Media L. Rep. 1719 (1979).

62. 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 5 Media L. Rep. 1188 (1979).
64. Id. at 1189-90.
65. 5 Media L. Rep. 2161 (1980).
66. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon Supp. 1980).

67. 5 Media L. Rep. at 2166.
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lined in Justice Stewart's dissent. It found that there was no compelling
need for the testimony; there were alternative sources from which the evidence could be obtained; and the "information sought to be disclosed ap68
pears to have only marginal relevance to the plaintiff's case."
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit extended, in United
States v. Cuthbertson,69 the principles promulgated in Ritey to criminal cases.
A contempt citation was issued against CBS for failure to produce notes and
out-takes from the show "60 Minutes" on which was shown a story on a fastfood franchise, Wild Bill's Family Restaurants. (A grand jury later indicted
the officers of the franchise for conspiracy and fraud.) The Third Circuit
held that CBS was required to produce, for in camera inspection, all film,
tapes, or transcripts of statements made by named prosecution witnesses and
by approximately 100 named franchisees or potential franchisees. The
Third Circuit upheld the contempt citation as it related to prosecution witnesses, but reversed the contempt order based on the disclosure of statements
made by non-witnesses. The court of appeals noted that Riley was "persua70
It further stated
sive authority" to extend the privilege to criminal cases.
that the privilege included both confidential sources and unpublished information. Applying the balancing test, the court found that the subpoena
must be valid and that the information sought must not be available from
alternative sources.
In October 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on
United States v. Criden. 71 The question decided in this case was whether a
journalist, summoned as a defense witness in a criminal proceeding, may
refuse to affirm or deny that she had a conversation with an individual who
had already publicly testified that the conversation occurred and that certain matters relevant to the judicial inquiry were discussed. The issue involved the credibility of the single self-avowed source rather than the source
of the reporter's information.
Factually, this case involved a charge of prosecutorial misconduct on
the part of representatives of the Department of Justice and the United
States Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. They were
accused of releasing information concerning the ABSCAM investigation to
the media. The defendants were seeking testimony from the reporter concerning the content of the conversation. The source and fact of the conversation had been stipulated to by the government.
The Third Circuit cited the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in
Branzburg and stated that the assertion of the privilege must be balanced
with the interest of the criminal litigant. The court further stated that it
must look to the materiality, relevance, and necessity of the information
sought. The moving party must show that the information cannot be obtained from alternative sources. After reviewing the circumstances of this
case, the court affirmed the decision of the district court and stated that the
68. Id. at 2168.
69. 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1545 (1980).

70. Id. at 1549.
71.

6 MEDIA L. REP. 1993 (1980).
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reporter's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose the contents of the conversation must yield to the defendant's need for the material.
Although these cases are not totally persuasive, they may represent a
trend by which the standards of the concurring and dissenting opinions of
Branzburg are gaining credibility. It is possible that the time is right for further review by the Supreme Court.
The third approach to the problem of the scope of reporter's privilege
relates to the attempts by federal and state governments to enact press shield
laws. In the Branzburg decision, the Court stated that:
Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards
and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the
evil discerned and equally important, to refashion those rules as
experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in
leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems
with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and
72
press in their own areas.
At the time of this decision, seventeen states had passed shield law legislation. Today, there are twenty-six such statutes 73 that vary in the degree of
protection that they offer. Of the total, eleven provide only for a conditional
privilege that can be revoked under certain circumstances or by court order. 7 4 Some statutes, although appearing to confer an absolute privilege,
have been interpreted by the courts as conditional in cases involving criminal activity or grand jury proceedings. 7 5 Furthermore, if a reporter does
successfully assert the protection of a shield law, it can be circumvented by
72. 408 U.S. at 706.
73. ALA. CODE § 21-142 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150, .160 (1973); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1733 (Burns 1968); Ky. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454 (West Supp.
1979); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7 67 .5a (1968);
MINN. STAT. § 595.021 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 2A.84A-21, -21a (Supp. 1978-79); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp.
1978-79); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510 (1975); 28 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330 (Purdon Supp.
1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-. 1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp.
1977).
74. States with statutes providing only a conditional privilege include Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
75. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied,

427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), aJd,
266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super.
460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Ammernan v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d
442 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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76
obtaining a search warrant.

California has amended the state constitution to include reporter's
shield provisions. This amendment provides for an absolute privilege as it
relates to the source of information and disclosure of unpublished information. The Colorado Legislature has not passed a shield law; several bills
were introduced in 1973 but all were unsuccessful. 77 None have been introduced since.
At the federal level, numerous attempts have been made to provide a
privilege to reporters. 78 The most recent effort came in reaction to the Stanford Daily case. 79 While initial attempts reflected a desire to include the concept of privilege, the form of the final bill may represent a compromise.8 0
It would appear that the trend is toward increased legislation. Whether
a substantive privilege is actually afforded through this effort, however, is
questionable. The shield statutes have been narrowly construed and may be
of limited help to either the informant or the reporter.

IV.

RATIONALE OF PANKRATZ V DIsTRIcT COURT

The issue to be resolved in Pankratz v. District Court was whether there
was a constitutionally based privilege that would protect the petitioner and
shield him from compliance with the subpoena issued by the district court.
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that, "under the circumstances of this
case" 8' and "apphed to the facts of this case,' '8 2 a privilege does not exist.
The circumstances and facts of the Pankratz case are very limited. Mr.
76. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); see text accompanying notes 52-53,
supra.

77. H.B. 1327, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973); H.B. 1034, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.B. 1016, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973).
78. See, e.g., S. 1128, S. 318, S. 36, H.R. 7984, H.R. 5928, H.R. 3595, H.R. 2280, H.R.
1263, H.R. 717, S.J. Res. 8, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3552, H.R. 18983, H.R. 16704, H.R.
16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 5146, H.R. 5003, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 919,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); S. 2175, S. 2110, H.R. 5403, H.R. 5281, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
On June 14, 1973, a favorable report was given to the full committee by a subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 5928, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill gave
journalists an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose to federal grand juries the identity of a
confidential source or the content of any confidential communication obtained in their professional capacity. The privilege was extended to civil and criminal federal trials but was conditional and could be revoked if the party seeking the information could show that it was relevant
and was not available from alternative sources. This bill was not passed.
H.R. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), offered reporters and publishers limited protection
from compulsory disclosure of news sources and information in federal and state courts. Known
as the News Source and Information Protection Act of 1975, hearings were held to discuss the
bill before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. The
bill was not passed by Congress.
79. H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), was approved by the Courts, Civil Liberties,
and Administration of Justice Subcommittee and sent to the full committee. H.R. 3486 requires federal and state authorities seeking materials in the possession of anyone engaged in first
amendment activity to obtain a subpoena. A search warrant may be used if the person holding
the materials sought is suspected of a crime or the materials are needed to prevent the immediate death or serious injury of a human being.
80. S. 115, H.R. 4181, S. 1790, and S. 1816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), were considered to
be broader in scope than H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
81. Pankratz v. District Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
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Pankratz, a newspaper reporter, was a first-hand observer of criminal conduct. Although he was not the only observer, the trial court found that he
was the one person who was present during the entire transaction. Pankratz
submitted an affidavit stating that the meeting had taken place with the
informant, Ozer, and confidential information had been exchanged. The
problem, therefore, was not the identity of the informant, but rather the
content of the unpublished information. Furthermore, the petitioner was
not refusing to respond to questions of the grand jury, as in Branzburg. Pankratz involved criminal proceedings, and it was the defendant in the criminal
trial who had allegedly violated the secrecy rules of the grand jury.
In refusing to recognize a privilege, the Colorado Supreme Court relied
heavily on Branzburg. Quoting Branzburg, the court found that when a reporter has witnessed a crime, there is no substantial question concerning the
existence of a privilege. "The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than
when they are not." ' 83 The court found further support in New York Times Co.
v. Jascalevzch ,84 which reaffirmed the Branzburg decision. The court held that
the public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings
is greater than the burden placed on newsgathering.
The court rejected the cases cited by Pankratz as inapplicable to the
present situation. The first four cases 8 5 were civil, and therefore more appropriate vehicles for application of the balancing test. The fifth case 8 6 involved a crime that the reporter had not observed and for which the
testimony of the reporter would have been only remotely relevant.
In his concurrence 8 7 Justice Rovira agreed with the decision of the majority, but stated that he would have applied the three-pronged test and
would have emerged with the same result. That is, the testimony of the
petitioner went "to the very heart" of the charges against Ozer; the information, because Pankratz was the only witness to the entire transaction, could
not be obtained by alternative means; and the testimony was relevant to the
alleged violation of the law.
V.

IMPACT ON COLORADO LAW

The ultimate enforcement of the contempt citation against Howard
Pankratz will never be tested. On August 10, 1980, Judge Day responded to
a motion to quash the subpoena for deposition that was served on Pankratz
by vacating the exparte order for deposition. In applying rule 15 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Day held that a deposition could
only be taken if the witness were unable or unwilling to appear for trial.
Counsel for Pankratz, Walter Steele, assured the court that the witness
83. 408 U.S. at 692.
84. 439 U.S. 1317 (1978).
85. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F & F Investment,
470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp.
1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
87. Pankratz v. District Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1980) (Rovira, J., concurring).
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would be present at trial. He was explicit in pointing out, however, that
while Pankratz would be present at the trial, he could not promise the court
that the witness would testify. The matter was set for trial.
On August 19, 1980, the district court heard a motion filed by Ozer in
which he stated that he had briefed Pankratz about indictments he planned
to seek from the grand jury. Ozer's action released Pankratz from his pledge
of confidentiality.
Judge Day found Ozer in technical contempt and proceeded to purge
the contempt and levy no fine or jail sentence. He dismissed the case and the
subpoenas that had been issued, including the one that would have compelled Pankratz to testify at the trial.
The decision in Pankratz represents only an initial step in the resolution
of the controversy over the reporter's privilege. It is a narrow holding and if,
in fact, the information was not available from another source, a valid decision. Certainly, the public is entitled to "everyman's evidence," particularly
in a criminal case.
It would appear, however, that a trend has developed that would support Justice Powell's proposed balancing test as well as the three-pronged
test of the dissent. Because it appears that the contempt citations in cases
like these will continue to be challenged, application of Powell's standards
would probably be no more time consuming than the lengthy and predictable appeals.88
The court in Pankratz was very specific in pointing out that the ruling
applies only to the facts presented to the court in that instance. This explicitly limited scope leaves many aspects of the question of reporter's privilege
unresolved. For example, will the court recognize a privilege if the information sought relates to the identity of the informant? Are the standards
presented by the court applicable to other types of hearings such as administrative or legislative committee hearings? Does the holding extend to all
newsgatherers? Must the activity of the reporter be within the scope of his
employment? Does it apply only to unpublished material? To what extent
would a press shield statute be accepted by the court? These are questions
that will remain unanswered until subsequently approved legislation or
other cases are presented to the court.
Joan HarcourtCady,

88. Interview with Carol Green, attorney for the Denver Post, August 11, 1980. Ms. Green
indicated that newspapers are, in many instances, requiring that a reporter obtain approval
from his or her editor before a request for the establishment of a confidential relationship with
an informant can be granted. This is sometimes done in the form of a written agreement which
limits the scope of the relationship to the time that a matter may be presented for litigation.
Ms. Green also indicated that since the Pankratz case, there has been a reluctance on the
part of public officials to disclose information. It would appear than an in-depth, sociological
study is warranted to test the hypothesis promulgated by the Supreme Court in Branzburg that
the flow of news to the public is not constricted by the failure to recognize a privilege for reporters.

PRE-ENFORCEMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW:

CF&I STEEL CORP. V

COLORADO AIR POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSION
INTRODUCTION

On March 3, 1980, the Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en banc, again
laid to rest the notion that a person must first violate a statute before its
validity can be challenged in court. In CF&ISteel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission,' the court reaffirmed its holding in Colorado State Board
of Optometric Examiners v. Dixon,2 which first laid the idea to rest in 1968. Two
3
separate cases, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission
,4
and Colorado Ute Electric Association o. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission
had been consolidated because of identical issues. Both actions challenged
the validity of certain regulations 5 promulgated by the Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission (the Commission), which the trial court, in each
6
case, had found valid.
Both plaintiffs, CF&I and Colorado Ute, appealed the district court
judgments, and, at oral argument, the court of appeals raised sua sponte the
issue of petitioners' standing to seek judicial review. 7 Interpreting the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 8 the court concluded that neither
CF&I nor Colorado Ute qualified as "aggrieved or adversely affected" parties since the regulations had not yet been specifically applied against them,
and that, therefore, both lacked standing to seek judicial review. 9 The court
also concluded that a rule of general application does not constitute final
agency action and that Colorado Ute had not suffered injury in fact because
it had not applied for and been denied a permit.' 0
I.

STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW

Until 1970, the view of the United States Supreme Court was that a
1. 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).
2. 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).
3. 606 P.2d 1306 (Colo. App. 1978), rev'd, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980). The other parties in
CF&ISteetl are the respondents Colorado Department of Health, its Division of Administration,
and the Air Pollution Control Division of the Division of Administration.
4. 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978), rned, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980). The other
petitioners in Colorado Ue are Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., City of Colorado Springs, and Public Service Company of Colorado. The other respondents are the individual members of the Commission, the
Air Pollution Control Division of the Colorado Department of Health, Dr. Edward G. Dreyfus,
Executive Director, and Environmental Defense Fund.
5. CF&I Steel Corp., a manufacturer of iron and steel products, challenged regulation
No. 1, § II.D., known as the "fugitive dust regulation." Colorado Ute Electric Association, Inc.,
challenged regulation No. 3, § IIH.l.a., which establishes emission standards.
6. 610 P.2d at 88. These regulations were adopted pursuant to the Colorado Air Pollution Control Act of. 1970, CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-7-101 to -129 (1973).
7. 610'P.2d at 88.
8. CowO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4- 101 to -107 (1973) [hereinafter cited as APA].
9. 606 P.2d at 1307; 41 Colo. App. at 397-98, 591 P.2d at 1327.
10. 41 Colo. App. at 397-98, 591 P.2d at 1327.
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person seeking judicial review of an administrative decision must have a legally protected interest adversely affected by the challenged action and that
the right invaded must be more than an economic or personal interest-it
had to be a right recognized by statute or common law.'I Over the years,
requirements for standing had been gradually liberalized,' 2 culminating in a
rewriting of standing law in Association of Data ProecessingService Organizations

v. Camp.

3

The petitioners in Data Processing, who sold data processing services to
businesses, challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to make data processing services available to other banks
as an. incident of their banking services. The Eighth Circuit, applying the
legal interest test, affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing.' 4 In reviewing the decision, the Supreme Court laid out two tests for
standing: first, the challenged action must have caused the plaintiff injury in
fact, and second, the interest sought to be protected must be arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected by the statute in question. '5 The legal
interest test was rejected as a criterion for standing because it went to the
merits of the case.16
In a recent standing decision, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wefare Rights Organzation ,'7 the Supreme Court reaffirmed both Data Processing tests and divided the injury in fact question into two parts: first, whether the challenged
action has caused injury in fact, and second, whether the injury is likely to be
redressed by the relief sought.' 8 The respondents, several low income individuals and organizations representing such individuals, failed to satisfy either part of the injury in fact test and were denied standing to challenge an
Internal Revenue Service policy which they claimed encouraged hospitals to
deny services to indigents. 19
Despite the result in Eastern Kentucky, it appears that the liberalizing
trend in standing requirements is here to stay. Now, with the relative ease of
satisfying the Data Processing test, the focus of justiciability has shifted to the
20
issue of ripeness.
II.

RIPENESS

Once the plaintiff has established standing to seek judicial review, the
court must still decide if the controversy is "ripe" for review. A major con11. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464 (1938).

12. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309
U.S. 470 (1940).
13. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); accord, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
14. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 843 (8th
Cir. 1969).
15. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
16. Id.
17. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
18. Id. at 38.
19. Id. at 42-43.
20. For a general discussion of the ripeness doctrine, see Vining, D'rectJudciatReviewand the
Doctrine of Rtpeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (197 1).
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cern of the ripeness doctrine is that courts not waste their time reviewing
agency orders that are still subject to revision and, therefore, not final. 2 1
This concern, however, must be weighed against the need of the aggrieved
party to have immediate relief from the alleged harm. As the Supreme
Court explained in Abbott Laboratorieso. Gardner,22 the basic rationale of the
ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt
23
in a concrete way by the challenging parties."
Abbott Laboratories upheld pre-enforcement review of a regulation requiring drug manufacturers to print the established name of the drug prominently on labels. 24 The Supreme Court analyzed the ripeness problem as
requiring an evaluation of both the fitness of the issues for judicial review
and the hardship resulting from withholding review.2 5 Expanding this analysis, it concluded that where the legal issue is suitable for judicial consideration, review should be granted, despite lack of enforcement, if the regulation
requires an immediate and significant change in the parties' conduct, with
serious penalties for noncompliance. 26 In allowing pre-enforcement review,
the Court apparently felt it would have been unfair to force the drug companies to risk criminal penalties and adverse public reaction in order to test the
validity of an administrative decision.
III.
A.

RIPENESS IN COLORADO LAW

The Old View

An early Colorado case, City ofDenver v. Beede, 2 7 dealt with the question
of pre-enforcement review of an ordinance. Beede, proprietor of the Orpheum theatre, sought an injunction preventing the city of Denver from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting Sunday theatrical performances. 28 The
Colorado Supreme Court held that, since the invalidity of the ordinance
could be determined in an action to enforce the ordinance, Beede was not
without an adequate and complete remedy at law, and, therefore, the injunctive power of a court of equity could not be invoked. 29 To test the valid30
ity, Beede had to be willing to take the risk of violating the ordinance.
In Farmers'Datry League v. City of Denver, 3 ' the court again held that the
plaintiff must first violate the statute and then bring up its unconstitutional21.

See generaoly L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, ch. 10

(1965).

22. 387 U.s. 136 (1967).
23. Id. at 148-49.
24. Id. at 154.

25. Id. at 152-53.
26. Id. at 154.

27. 25 Colo. 172, 54 P. 624 (1898).
28. Id. at 172-73, 54 P. at 626.
29. Id. at 175, 54 P. at 625.
30. Id. at 175, 54 P. at 627; accord, Brunstein v. City of Fort Collins, 53 Colo. 254, 125 P.
119 (1912); City of Canon City v. Manning, 43 Colo. 144, 95 P. 537 (1908).
31. 112 Colo. 399, 149 P.2d 370 (1944).
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ity as a defense. 32 Farmers' Dairy was relied on heavily in ColoradoState Board
ofExaminers ofArchitects v. Rico ,33 in which an architect sought a declaratory
judgment to restrain the Board on the grounds that the statute providing for
licensing and regulation of architects was unconstitutional. 34 The court held
in Rico that a declaratory judgment may not be used to seek judicial review
of a statute that adversely affects a particular person, because the proper
remedy is to violate the statute and raise its invalidity as a defense. 35
B.

The New View

The rather calloused view of Rico and its predecessors remained the law
in Colorado 36 until Rico was expressly overruled by Colorado State Board of
Optometric Examiners v. Dixon .37 Dixon and other optometrists sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a regulation that prescribed the location in which optometrists could conduct their profession. 38
The optometrists also sought judicial review of the Optometric Board's ac39
tion under the Colorado APA.
Colorado's APA establishes a uniform system of rulemaking and licensing procedures for state agencies. The judicial review section of the APA
provides that any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final agency
40
action is entitled to judicial review of that action.
In Dixon, the Optometric Board contended that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction restraining the Board because
no final action had been taken, 4 1 thereby making the APA judicial review
provisions inapplicable. The court rejected this argument and held that the
32. Id. at 405, 149 P.2d at 372.
33. 132 Colo. 437, 289 P.2d 162 (1955).
34. Id. at 438, 289 P.2d at 163.
35. Id. at 442-43, 289 P.2d at 165.
36. But see Memorial Trusts v. Beery, 144 Colo. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960).
37. 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).
38. Id. at 491, 440 P.2d at 288.
39. APA, supra note 8.
40. The judicial review section reads, in part:
(1) In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to persons or
parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions, the provisions of this section
shall be applicable.
(2)
Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review
as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been
filed, unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory
provisions governing the specific agency ....
(3) An action may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction by or on
behalf of an agency for judicial enforcement by any final order of such agency. In
such action, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such agency action may
obtain judicial review of such agency action.
(4) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence
an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty days after such agency
becomes effective . ...

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106 (Supp. 1979).
41. 165 Colo. at 491-92, 440 P.2d at 289. The final "action" referred to was the occurrence
of the effective date of the regulation. The complaint was filed on May 27, 1966, but the effective date was June 1. Therefore, the Board argued, the district court was without jurisdiction to
issue an injunction.
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constitute final agency action and, therefore, was subregulation at issue did 42
ject to judicial review.
In regard to the issue of pre-enforcement review of the regulation, the
court considered the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 4 3 and rule 57(b)
of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Exercising the liberal construction expressly required by the statute and rule, the court rejected the proposition that an aggrieved person must first violate a statute before its validity
can be tested in court. 45 In doing so, the court expressly overruled Rico and
those cases following it. 4 6 Thus, in Dixon, the court clearly changed the law
concerning pre-enforcement review and brought Colorado into harmony
47
with a substantial and growing number of jurisdictions.
The cases on judicial review decided after Dixon appear to follow the
rule laid down there, 48 although there is some reason for confusion. As will
be discussed later in this comment, the court of appeals relied on several of
49
these confusing cases in support of its Colorado Ue opinion.
IV.

CF&I STEEL

In the instant case, the Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed Dixon and
clarified the Colorado law on standing and pre-enforcement review. It re50
mains unclear, however, why the court of appeals chose to ignore Dixon.
In ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the APA, the court of
appeals relied on its determination that the regulations in question were of
general application."1 According to its interpretation of the APA, a party
has sufficient interest and standing to seek judicial review only if the rule or
52
order commands or prohibits action on the part of that specific individual.
If the command or prohibition, however, is nonspecific as to whom it applies
or merely formulates licensing procedures or regulatory criteria, then persons
who may be subject to it are not adversely affected until the rule or order has
42. Id. at 492-93, 440 P.2d at 289.
43. The pertinent part reads as follows: "Any person interested . . . or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected . . . may have determined any question of construction
or validity . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-106 (1973).
44. COLO. R. Civ. P. 57(b) reads the same as COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-106 (1973).
45. 165 Colo. at 494, 440 P.2d at 290.
46. Id.
47. As Justice Pringle wrote for the court:
In these days when respect for the law and conformity to it are of prime concern to
all, it seems to us inappropriate to continue to demand that one adversely affected by
a law which he contends is invalid on its face violate that law in order to obtain a
declaration of its validity or invalidity.
Id.
48. Accord, Johnson v. District Court, 195 Co. 169, 576 P.2d 167 (1978); Moore v. District
Court, 184 Colo. 63, 518 P.2d 948 (1974). Contra, Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 570
P.2d 535 (1977); Cimarron Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs (El Paso), 193 Colo. 164, 563
P.2d 946 (1977); Board of County Comm'rs (Otero) v. State Bd. of Social Servs., 186 Colo. 435,
528 P.2d 244 (1974).
49. See notes 82-95 infia and accompanying text.
50. Although Justice Coyte, in his dissenting opinion, relied on Dixon to reach a completely
different result, the majority did not even mention the case. 41 Colo App. at 400, 591 P.2d at
1328.
51. 41 Colo. App. at 398, 591 P.2d at 1327.
52. Id.
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53
been specifically applied to them.

This interpretation would severely limit judicial review of administrative action. Although licensing and adjudicatory proceedings might not be
excluded because they usually pertain to a specific party, most rulemaking
proceedings would be excluded, since, under the APA, a rule can only be
54
This would generally
challenged within thirty days of its effective date.
preclude review, since the aggrieved party would have to await enforcement
before a challenge could be initiated. According to the Colorado Supreme
Court, this was definitely not the intent of the judicial review provisions of
55
the APA.
The supreme court's interpretation was in accord with the intent of the
Colorado General Assembly, which, in response to the court of appeals' interpretation of ripeness in CF&I Seel and Colorado Ue, passed two amendments to the APA. 56 The first added a definition of "aggrieved" which
57
This eliminated the need to
included the concept ofpotenial loss or injury.
await enforcement before achieving the status of "aggrieved party." The second amendment 58 made it clear that once a rule becomes effective it is final
agency action for purposes of judicial review. This defeated the court of
final agency action until
appeals' holding that promulgation of a rule is not
59
it has actually been applied to a specific person.
The court of appeals' opinion in Colorado U/e implied that an "aggrieved
or adversely affected" party is one whose rights, privileges, or duties are
60
directly and adversely affected by the action. For this proposition, Board of
6
Coun/y Commissioners (Otero) v. Sate Board of Social Services ' was cited. The
Colorado Supreme Court distinguished this case on the grounds that the
issue in Otero was whether the county commissioners were a party, not
62
whether they were adversely affected or aggrieved.
The Attorney General, representing the Commission, agreed with CF&I
that it had standing to seek a declaratory judgment, but disagreed that it
63
This disagreement
had standing to seek judicial review under the APA.
was based not on the appellate court's decision that CF&I was not adversely
affected or aggrieved, but rather on the Attorney General's argument that
53. Id.
54. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106(4) (Supp. 1979).
55. 610 P.2d at 91.
56. Hearings on SB. 491 Before the Colo. Senate Comm. on thejudtciag, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess., March 21, 1979.
57. The amendment reads: " 'Aggrieved,' for the purpose of judicial review of rule making, means having suffered actual loss or injury or being exposed to potential loss or injury to
legitimate interests including, but not limited to, business, economic, aesthetic, governmental,
recreational, or conservational interests." COLO.REv. STAT. § 24-4-102(3.5) (Supp. 1979).
58. The amendment reads: "Once a rule becomes effective, the rule-making process shall
be deemed to have become final agency action for judicial review purposes." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-4-103(5) (Supp. 1979).
59. 41 Colo. App. at 397, 591 P.2d at 1327.
60. Id.
61. 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974). For an interesting discussion of this case, see Comment, Standing ofState PoliticalSubdtivsions toChallenge State Agency Rulings Under the Colorado Admmistrative Procedure Act, 53 DEN. L.J. 437 (1976).
62. 610 P.2d at 91.
63. Id.
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CF&I was not a "party" under the APA. 64 Since CF&I had never been
admitted as a party 65 to the Department of Health's hearing on fugitive
dust, according to the Attorney General, it was thereby precluded from judicial review of a regulation resulting from those proceedings. 6 6 In support of
this contention that standing under the APA required party status at the
67
agency proceedings, Otero was cited.
In responding to this argument, the court implied that the APA should
be read in its entirety and given the broadest interpretation possible to facilitate prompt judicial review of agency action.6 The court viewed the Attorney General's definition of "party" as requiring too heavy a burden on
persons seeking to preserve their rights to judicial review. 69 In particular, it
noted that one would be required to have filed an alternative proposal to
preserve the right to judicial review, even though not disagreeing with the
proposed regulation. The court concluded that such could not have been the
70
intent of the legislature.
Another issue before the court concerned the appropriateness of a de7
claratory judgment procedure as a means to seek review of a regulation. '
The court of appeals concluded that Colorado Ute sought declaratory relief
only for a conjectural conflict since it had not sought and been denied a permit under the air quality standards set forth in regulation No. 3.72 Also, the
court found CF&I to be only a potential violator of the fugitive dust regulation. 73 Thus, as the court of appeals viewed the cases, both Colorado Ute
and CF&I sought only advisory opinions in regard to the effect of the regulations on possible future plans. 74 Since the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act may not be used to obtain advisory opinions, its use would have been
75
inappropriate in these cases.
The court of appeals also maintained that neither the imminent prospect of enforcement of a regulation nor the promulgation of regulations constituted a proper basis for a declaratory judgment. 76 In support of this
77
position it relied on a rule, originally announced in Heron v. City of Denver
64. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4-102(11) (1973), defines party as "any person or agency
named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party, in any court or agency proceeding subject to provisions of this article."
65. The Air Pollution Control Act of 1970, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-109 (1973), requires a
person opposed to a proposed regulation to file an alternative proposal in order to cross-examine
witnesses at the rulemaking proceedings. CF&I did not propose an alternative and thus was not
a "party," according to the Attorney General.
66. Answer Brief of Respondents to CF&I at 9, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution
Control Comm'n, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).
67. Id.
68. 610 P.2d at 91.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 92.
71. Id.
72. 41 Colo. App. at 399, 591 P.2d at 1328.
73. 606 P.2d at 1307.
74. 41 Colo. App. at 399, 591 P.2d at 1328.
75. Id.; accord, Farmers Elevator Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 176 Colo. 168, 489 P.2d 318
(1971); American Fed'n of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944); Gabriel v. Board
of Regents, 83 Colo. 582, 267 P. 407 (1928).
76. 41 Colo. App. at 399, 591 P.2d at 1328.
77. 159 Colo. 314, 411 P.2d 314 (1966).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:3

and followed in Cimarron Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners,78 which suggested that there must be evidence that the challenged regulation has been
applied against the plaintiff before a declaratory judgment would be appro79
priate.
The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the "advisory opinion" argument by merely applying the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 8° and by
reiterating the Dixon principle that one need not risk violating a statute
before seeking a declaratory judgment concerning its validity. 8 ' This perfunctory treatment was deserved, but the argument supported by Heron and
Cimarron should have been given a more extensive analysis.
V.

CONFUSING CASES

In Heron, a professional engineer sought a declaratory judgment on the
validity of an ordinance requiring certain drawings to have an architect's
seal. 8 2 Since the engineer had not actually submitted drawings without such
a seal, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that there was no justiciable
issue and held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate in those cir83
cumstances.
Insofar as Heron suggests that a declaratory judgment is inappropriate
for pre-enforcement challenge of a regulation, it was overruled by Dixon .84
In Cimarron, however, which was decided after Dixon, Heron was cited by the
court for the very proposition for which it was supposedly overruled.8 5 As
was noted by CF&I, Heron was only used by the Cimarron court to dispose of
some minor issues, 86 and its use cannot be seen as an intentional derogation
of the Dixon principle.8 7 Nevertheless, if the appellate court was confused on
the state of the law, the carelessness displayed in Cimarron may explain why.
Another case that the court of appeals apparently misunderstood is
Wimberly v. Ettenberg.8S A group of bail bondsmen sought relief for pecuniary
injuries that they alleged had resulted from a pre-trial release program allowing defendants to deposit ten percent of their bail as a condition to re78. 193 Colo. 164, 563 P.2d 946 (1977).
79. Id. at 169, 563 P.2d at 949; 159 Colo. at 318, 411 P.2d at 315.

80. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-101 to -115 (1973). The pertinent part is quoted, supra
note 43.
81. 610 P.2d at 92.
82. 159 Colo. at 316, 411 P.2d at 315.
83. Id.
84. 165 Colo. at 494, 440 P.2d at 290. Dixon expressly overruled Rico and any cases following it. Although Heron did not cite Rico, it did cite Corliss v. City of Westminister, 153 Colo.
551, 487 P.2d 272 (1963), which relied on Rico.
85. 193 Colo. at 169, 563 P.2d at 949.
86. The Cimarron court stated:
Appellants attack several other county regulations as inconsistent with section 30-28133(4)(a) or violative of due process. The record, however, contains no evidence that
the challenged portions of these regulations have ever been applied against appellants
or the class they represent. On such facts, a declaratory judgment is inappropriate.
Heron v. Denver, 159 Colo. 314, 411 P.2d 314.
id.
87. Brief of Petitioner CF&I at 20-21, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control
Comm'n, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).
88. 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977).
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lease. 8 9 The court held that standing required injury in fact resulting
directly from the violation of a legal right. 9° What this meant, as was later
explained, is that an injury alleged to have already occurred must be an injury in fact resulting directly from the violation of a legal right. If the injury
has not already occurred, then it need only be a threat of injury in fact. 9 1
The Colorado Ue court found, in the loose language of Wimber4y, support
for its holding that a mere threat of a future permit denial is not sufficient to
92
Of
give Colorado Ute standing, since it had not yet suffered injury in fact.
course, this interpretation completely ignores the present injury to Colorado
Ute resulting from the uncertainty of its position. 9 3 As was pointed out by
Colorado Ule petitioners, substantial sums of money are expended on a project for planning, engineering, land acquisition, and other items before a
permit application is ever submitted. 94 Some of this pre-application expense
would be unnecessary if the regulation later were found invalid. Thus, the
uncertainty of Colorado Ute's pre-enforcement position did cause actual, not
just threatened, injury, and that the appellate court chose to ignore this injury suggests that something other than the misleading language of W nbery
caused the misinterpretation of the law.
Furthermore, if the court of appeals thought Wimberly represented a
pulling away from the Dixon principle, it did not need to look far to discover
that this was a mistaken view. InJohnson v. DistrictCourt,95 the Dixon principle was reaffirmed, indicating that the court had no intention of retreating
from the rule announced in Dixon.
As the preceding analysis may suggest, the truly interesting question
raised by the instant case is why the court of appeals ruled as it did. Even
allowing for a certain degree of ambiguity in the relevant case law, one cannot help but wonder why a case such as Dixon was not even mentioned in the
appellate court's opinion. 96 Also, one wonders why, when neither the trial
court nor the respondents recognized a standing problem, the court of appeals decided, after only brief questioning at oral arguments, that petitioners
97
lacked standing without even requesting briefs on the issue.
Colorado Ule respondents suggested the key to the appellate court's error
might be due to a misperception that it was being asked to review the reasonableness of state ambient air quality standards, whereas in fact the issue
for review was the validity of the regulation requiring adherence to those
standards. 98 Petitioners created this misperception, according to respon89. Id. at 165, 570 P.2d at 537.
90. Id. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539.
91. 610 P.2d at 92.
92. 41 Colo. App. at 398, 591 P.2d at 1327.
93. Vining, supra note 20, at 1446, suggests that those affected by a regulation may be
indifferent to the outcome of their challenge, simply desiring certainty so they can plan.

94. Opening Brief of Petitioners Colorado Ute at 11-12, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air
Pollution Control Comm'n, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).

95. 195 Colo. 169, 576 P.2d 167 (1978).
96. See note 50 supra.
97. Answer Brief of Respondents to Colorado Ute at 5, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air
Pollution Control Comm'n, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).

98. Id. at 9.
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dents, by arguing extensively regarding the reasonableness of certain air
quality standards to support their contention that the Commission was exceeding its authority in requiring adherence to state standards that were
99
In reply, petitioners vemore strict than corresponding federal standards.
hemently denied having ever challenged the air quality standards, but they
did not refute the suggestion that they may have misled the court.1°°
Whatever the explanation for the appellate court's ruling, it is interesting to note that it soon found it necessary to clarify and limit the rule announced in Colorado Ute. In Augustin v. Barnes, 1° 1 it explained that the
regulations at issue in Colorado Ule were only broad general guidelines as to
criteria for determining whether permits would be granted, and, as such, did
not impose a specific standard of conduct, nor were they directed at a specific individual.' 0 2 The regulation in Augustih, in contrast, had immediate,
specific, and readily ascertainable effects, and, under these conditions, preenforcement judicial review was appropriate. 10 3 Although this distinction
may make the Colorado Ule decision seem a bit more logical, it does not make
it any more acceptable.
CONCLUSION

The mystery which permeates this case does not cloud the Colorado
Supreme Court's holding. If there was ever any reason to be confused about
the court's position on pre-enforcement judicial review, the instant case
should remove such reason. One adversely affected by an agency action,
including promulgation of regulations, may seek judicial review of that action without risking penalties for violating it, and the APA judicial review
provisions are to be broadly interpreted to provide prompt access to the
courts.
As the presence and impact of regulatory actions have become more
and more widely felt in recent years, the pressure on the legal system to
10 4
The court's repermit pre-enforcement judicial review has increased.
sponse to this pressure is laudable and should expedite the administrative
rulemaking process for the benefit of all.
Michael Pennington

99. Id. at 10.
100. Reply Brief of Petitioners Colorado Ute at 2, CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 610 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1980).
101. 41 Colo A pp. 433, 592 P.2d 9 (1978).
102. Id. at 434-35, 592 P.2d at 10.
103. Id. at 435, 592 P.2d at 10.
104. Vining, supra note 20, at 1452.

